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ABSTRACT OF DISSERTATION

QUEERING THE CARCERAL CYCLE:
WOMEN’S RESISTANCE TO THE CARCERAL STATE
Building upon feminist and queer scholarship that recognizes mass incarceration
and the prison-industrial complex as elements of an inherently violent carceral state,
Queering the Carceral Cycle excavates and analyzes twentieth-century incidents in
which women resisted the state’s criminalization and/or punishment of multiply
marginalized women. I argue that the state’s response to women’s acts of resistance
prompted the development of new carceral strategies and technologies that expanded the
carceral state’s investment in control and punishment. Moreover, by critically embracing
a Foucauldian scheme known as the “carceral cycle,” I demonstrate how the state traps
multiply marginalized women in a seemingly endless recurrence of criminalization,
surveillance, and imprisonment. By employing the feminist methodology of
intersectionality, I reveal how multiply marginalized women subverted, or queered, this
cycle of entrapment by refusing to comply with the institutions that uphold the carceral
state, including heteropatriarchy, capitalism, imperialism, and white supremacy. The case
studies I examine vary in scope and severity, ranging from the homophobic attack on
rehabilitation efforts at the Massachusetts Reformatory for Women, to the FBI
surveillance and grand jury abuse used to criminalize a group of dissident lesbian college
students, to the development of the first women’s high security unit, designed specifically
to torture incarcerated leftist revolutionaries. Taking place in different historical and
social contexts across the United States, these cases are united by women’s attempts to
resist, undo, or weaken the state’s investment in carceral control, but also by the state’s
capacity to find new ways to punish those who attempted, and succeeded, in undermining
the state’s interests.
KEYWORDS: Carceral State, Feminism, Political Prisoners, Queer Resistance, State
Surveillance, Women Prisoners
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INTRODUCTION: Women Within the Carceral Cycle
Women and Mass Incarceration
Over the past fifty years, scholars and activists have documented the myriad ways
white supremacy and capitalism sustain mass incarceration in the United States. State
sponsored projects, such as the 13th Amendment, point to the ways in which prison labor
recreated the conditions of slavery in order to reinvigorate U.S. capitalism, a project that
expanded social control and further linked incarceration to the economy. Economic shifts
toward globalization and deindustrialization, paired with the War on Crime and later, the
War on Drugs, prompted the overwhelming arrest and incarceration of poor men and
women of color.1 The promise of economic revitalization vis-à-vis privatized prisons
further contributed to what is now recognized as the prison-industrial complex. After
nearly four decades of expansion, the population of people incarcerated in U.S. state and
federal jails and prisons swelled, growing from approximately 501,826 in 1980 to
2,148,000 in early 2020.2
Carceral studies scholars have turned to many policies, political shifts, and
institutional practices to account for the growth of the carceral state. Popular texts such as
Michelle Alexander’s The New Jim Crow suggest that mass incarceration replaced Jim
Crow segregation in a post-Civil Rights era, arguing that “like Jim Crow (and slavery),
mass incarceration operates as a tightly networked system of laws, policies, customs, and
institutions that operate collectively to ensure the subordinate status of a group defined
largely by race.”3 While Alexander’s account offers a compelling analysis of the War on
Drugs, scholars have been eager to identify other interventions and turning points that
complicate Alexander’s work. For example, Ruth Wilson Gilmore offers a very different
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account of the 1980s prison boom. Gilmore’s examination of the California prison system
situates mass incarceration as the result of a political economic crisis, where prisons and
mass incarceration were used to resuscitate the California economy.4 Faced with surplus
land and “surplus” populations, prison expansion created economic opportunities,
especially in rural agricultural areas, while also creating new prison populations through
the advent of laws that targeted poor communities of color.
Naomi Murakawa and Elizabeth Hinton’s scholarship offers yet another
perspective by attributing carceral expansion not only to conservative political agendas
like the War on Drugs, but also to liberal lawmakers. As their respective works show,
liberal attempts to fight for safety, often through wars on poverty and crime, laid critical
groundwork for carceral expansion. Murakawa’s study demonstrates how liberals,
especially those who advocated for “the right to safety” as a “sanction against white-onblack violence,” helped construct the “civil rights carceral state” in their attempts to curb
racial violence.5 By ignoring the racism embedded within the American criminal justice
system, liberal law-and-order initiatives caused more harm to black community who
were, in fact, subjected to racist policing and surveillance. Hinton’s work adds an
additional layer of complexity by identifying the way bipartisan laws such as the Law
Enforcement Assistance Administration (LEAA) served as a major source of funding that
built up police agencies across the country. Misguided and inaccurate statistical data—
especially data that linked rising crime rates to “rising crime reporting. . . skewed
perceptions of violence,” especially in urban black neighborhoods where increased
policing created the opportunity for increased reporting, and increased arrests.6 Together,
examinations of liberal law-and-order initiatives, changes to the liberal welfare state, in
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addition to new drug legislation, offers a fuller picture of the rise of the carceral state.
In addition to scholarship on that ties the carceral state to political economy and
public policy, scholars such as Marie Gottschalk and Dan Berger have responded to mass
incarceration by analyzing the ways that various social movements and political
dissidents both contributed to, and resisted, the construction of the carceral state.
Gottschalk’s scholarship demonstrates how several social movements concerned with
victims rights were easily co-opted by arguments that advanced punitive carceral politics.
By attending to the nuances of penal policies and those who rallied around them,
Gottschalk argues that scholars must “look more systematically at groups and movements
that are not the usual suspects in penal policy and yet have played pivotal roles in making
public policy more punitive.”7 Her scholarship tracks the ways several social movements,
including the women’s anti-violence movement, LGBTQ activism rallying around hate
crime legislation, and the Million Moms gun control initiative advanced legislation
designed to criminalize, and therefore extend, punitive carceral practices.8 In contrast to
Gottschalk, Berger’s scholarship documents the many ways political dissidents—in
particular multiply marginalized activists agitating for a number of social justice issues—
have been systematically criminalized and incarcerated. The existence of American
political prisoners in the United States, despite efforts to downplay or erase their
existence, highlights the way the “state uses the imprisonment of political leaders and
rank-and-file activists as a bludgeon against movement victories,” where “most of those
incarcerated participated in radical movements seeking fundamental overhauls of
structures of power.”9
Although the prison-industrial complex has absorbed an overwhelming number of
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poor men and women of color, gender is also, in the words of Eric A. Stanley, among the
“organizing structures” of the prison-industrial complex.10 Representing a single-digit
fraction of the total prison population, the growth of the female prison population has
nevertheless outpaced the male prison population since 1980.11 The Sentencing Project
reports that between 1980 and 2017, “the number of incarcerated women increased by
more than 750%, rising from a total of 26,378 in 1980 to 225,060 in 2017.”12 Black and
Hispanic women remained far more vulnerable to incarceration than their white
counterparts, as documented by rates of incarceration that, compared to white women, are
almost twice as high for black women, and 1.3 times as high for Hispanic women.13
Writing in 2003, Angela Davis noted that “California [could] claim the largest women’s
prison in the world, with its more than thirty-five hundred inhabitants,” a statistic that
credited California with having more incarcerated women located in one state “than there
were [across] the entire country in the early 1970s.”14
In 2003, Angela Davis argued that “with a few important exceptions, women have
been left out of the public discussions about the expansion of the U.S. prison system.”15
Over the past fifteen years, several scholars have responded to Davis’s diagnosis by
offering analyses that explicitly attend to the ways gender and sexuality, in conjunction
with racism and classism, contribute to carceral expansion.. If, writing in 1984, feminist
historian Estelle Freedman offered a history of the women’s reformatory that explains
how white, middle-class women reformers advocated for sex-segregated prisons and
reformatories in an effort to protect white and immigrant women from sexual violence,
black feminist scholars including Kali N. Gross, Cheryl D. Hicks, Talitha L. LeFlouria,
and Sarah Haley offer compelling histories that complicate Freedman’s work.16 Together,
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these scholarly accounts of the nineteenth- and early twentieth-century carceral state
reveal the various ways that women of color, immigrants, and the poor were criminalized
and subjected to carceral institutions ranging from the chain gang to the reformatory.
Black women in the post-bellum United States were not only disproportionately
vulnerable to carceral regimes, they were rarely perceived as deserving of the protections
that poor white women received in early carceral institutions.
Feminist scholars have also paid close attention to the ways the state promotes
violence against women in two ways: first, by confining women and increasing their
vulnerability to interpersonal violence behind bars, and second, by criminalizing women
who defend themselves against interpersonal violence. Karlene Faith was among the first
to examine the long history of disciplining “unruly women,” ranging from the
criminalization and annihilation of women accused of witchcraft, to the gendered nature
of women’s crime, including crimes of survival like theft, fraud, and prostitution.17
Writing in the early 1990s, Faith laid the groundwork for a feminist criminology that
recognized the way numerous punitive carceral programs harm women, especially poor,
racially marginalized and indigenous women, many of whom were mothers. In
accounting for the ways that multiple marginalization contributes to women’s (in)ability
to protect themselves, scholars such as Beth Richie have argued that the mainstream antiviolence movement fails to think intersectionally, and as a result, ignores the acute needs
of multiply marginalized women who are more vulnerable to violence than white women.
The result, Richie emphasizes, is that “the further a woman’s sexuality, age, class,
criminal background, and race are from hegemonic norms, the more likely it is that they
will be harmed—and the more likely that their harm will not be taken seriously by their
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community, by anti-violence programs or by the general public.”18 Not only are women
harmed by their perpetrators, they experience harm when increased “policing,
prosecution, and prison imprisonment” are situated as viable solutions to violence.19
Victoria Law describes this approach to solving violence against women as “carceral
feminism.”20 Not only is carceral feminism one-dimensional on account of its
oversimplification of gender-based violence, it shutters resources for activists who seek
non-statist approaches to combating violence. Most recently, Emily Thuma has employed
the term “anti-carceral feminism” to describe the organizing and activism—led by black
feminists and their allies—that depends upon grassroots and community-based action to
respond to gendered violence.21 For more than fifty years, the anti-carceral feminist
movement has fought back against interpersonal violence (and the mainstream feminist
movement) while also advancing a prison abolitionist politics that refuses to accept
carceral solutions that enact violence under the guise of combating violence.
In addition to theorizing and historicizing the myriad ways multiply marginalized
women remain vulnerable to carceral regimes, scholars have addressed the
disproportionate criminalization of LGBT, queer, and trans individuals. Regina Kunzel’s
scholarship on the sexual lives of prisoners demonstrates how the management of samesex sex shaped modern understandings of sexuality. Kunzel’s expansive analysis traces
the many contradictions and anxieties surrounding queer desire in carceral institutions in
the nineteenth and twentieth century, and interrogates assumptions ranging from the
alleged perversity (and inherent criminality) of prisoners, to the anxiety about prisons
producing homosexuality, to the “lesbianism judged to be widespread in women’s
prisons.”22 Kunzel’s work has prompted further scholarship that interrogates the
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relationship between the queer and the carceral, including Eric A. Stanley and Nat
Smith’s edited collection, Captive Genders. In recognizing the historic criminalization,
surveillance, and policing of lesbian, gay, and bisexual individuals, in addition to the
over-criminalization of queer, trans, and gender nonconforming people, Captive Genders
argues that “prison abolition must be one of the centers of trans and queer liberation
struggles.”23 For scholars like Stanley, turning to the carceral state for “protection”—for
instance, vis-à-vis increased hate crime legislation and punishments—only perpetuates
the violence of the carceral state, all the while ignoring the violence that the carceral state
enacts upon queer bodies. In making an argument that mirrors the abolitionist politics of
anti-carceral feminists, it becomes abundantly clear that the state’s capacity to offer
marginalized groups “protection” through the law is but a thinly veiled attempt to expand
carceral control that will disproportionately target the most marginalized people. Indeed,
as Stephen Dillon argues, “the key functioning of incarceration is to punish people who
deviate from racialized, gendered, sexual, and classed social norms.”24 In other words,
those who are queer on account of their difference—as well as those who engage in queer
acts—are always the state’s target.
Building upon feminist and queer carceral studies scholars who collectively
situate the carceral state as inherently violent, my dissertation excavates twentiethcentury incidents in which women resisted the state’s attempts to further criminalize
and/or punish multiply marginalized women. The case studies I present fit within the
larger patterns of racialized, gendered, and sexualized violence that scholars like Berger,
Kunzel, Thuma, and Dillon describe. However, I argue that the state’s response to queer
acts of resistance prompted the development of new carceral strategies and technologies
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that would ultimately expand the carceral state’s investment in control, surveillance, and
punishment. In attending, specifically, to the ways in which homophobia and queerness
were used to justify the state’s punitive efforts, my scholarship enhances a vibrant
scholarly conversation by further demonstrating how a system known for its racism and
classism is also mobilized by sexist and homophobic impulses.
My scholarship employs a Foucauldian scheme known as the “carceral cycle” to
discuss three case studies, each of which demonstrates how the state traps multiply
marginalized women in an seemingly endless cycle of criminalization, surveillance, and
imprisonment. The case studies I examine vary in scope and severity, ranging from the
homophobic attack on rehabilitation efforts at the Massachusetts Reformatory for
Women, to the surveillance and grand jury abuse used to criminalize a group of dissident
college students, to the development of the first women’s high security unit, designed to
torture incarcerated leftist revolutionaries. Despite taking place in the midst of different
historical and social contexts across the United States, these cases are united both by their
attempts to resist, undo, and/or weaken the state’s investment in carceral control, but also
by the state’s capacity to find new ways to punish those who attempt to undermine the
interests of the state.
Writing in Discipline and Punish, Foucault defines the carceral cycle as a
“regenerating cycle that traps subjects within a network of prison, delinquency, and
surveillance.25 The goal of the cycle is to keep subjects entrenched within its three
stations, so that they travel repeatedly from one station to the next, unable to transcend
the power of the forces that weigh on them. As Foucault explains, “police surveillance
provides the prison with offenders, which the prison transforms into delinquents, the
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targets of auxiliaries of police supervisions, which regularly send back a certain number
of them to prison.”26 In this context, the prison is constantly reinvesting in its future by
finding new ways to entrench subjects. When the carceral cycle is working properly, it is
only a matter of time before the newly released “delinquent” succumbs to the state’s
surveillance, is reconvicted, and returned to prison. My scholarship explores how women
interrupt or attempt to interrupt this cycle and, as a consequence, are queered by the state.
Throughout the dissertation, I use the word queer to signal an anti-normative
analytic that Michael Warner describes as a “critical edge” that emerges when queer is
defined “against the normal rather than [against] the heterosexual.”27 In turning attention
to the ways queer logics disrupt the normative carceral state, the term queer resistance
describes acts that attempt to defy, and/or destabilize the state’s grasp on carceral power.
While I deliberately consider at acts of queer resistance that are punished by the state, I
recognize the ways in which the term may sometimes lend to confusion. In certain cases,
the women who engage in acts of queer resistance also self-identify as lesbian, gay, or
queer on account of their gender or sexuality. While I primarily use queer to describe a
type of resistance, many embrace queer as a category of identity that further complicates
the hetero/homosexual binary. It is also worth noting that the state, too, is capable of
using the word queer in a pejorative fashion. In this instance, the state might render a
resister “queer” in an attempt to represent one as inherently deviant and deserving of
punishment. In moments like this, one’s status as a state-sanctioned “queer” may still
correspond to any number of gendered or sexual identities that may, or may not, have to
do with one’s engagement in queer resistance. Throughout this project, lesbians, leaders
of the lesbian feminist underground, and “terrorists” at the center of public scandal are
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rendered queer in the eyes of the state in order to justify legal and carceral abuse. To
further trace these renderings, I employ particular concepts and methodologies from
feminist carceral studies.

Terms and Methodologies
In accounting for the changes in carceral terminology that emerged since the
publication of Discipline and Punishment, I offer the following definitions. Mass
incarceration corresponds to the growth of the prison population. Different from the
prison-industrial complex, or PIC, mass incarceration is used in reference to the
accumulation of people involved in some element of the justice system. The prisonindustrial complex is an institution made up of several political and cultural mechanisms
that transforms mass incarceration into a profitable, ever-expanding institution. In
thinking beyond the prison or jail cell, Eric Stanley situates the PIC as a “set of relations
[that makes] visible the connections among capitalism, globalization, and corporations.”28
As such, the PIC functions as a network of policing, surveillance, supervision, and
incarceration—upheld by a number of industries whose labor and goods are used to
create or maintain carceral spaces—that manages the most vulnerable and multiply
marginalized populations. Although the privatized prison is distinct from state and federal
prisons based on its for-profit structure, it too falls within the large structure of the PIC. A
taxonomy further detailing the historical differences among specific carceral institutions,
including the jail, the reformatory, and the prison, appears in chapter one.
Throughout the dissertation, I use two terms in deliberately expansive ways to
characterize their multifaceted nature. Similar to the way in which the PIC symbolizes a
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set of relations, I use the term state to describe a set of government relations that aim to
organize and control citizens within the boundaries of the nation. The state can refer to
any number of initiatives, offices, or individuals who attempt to organize, control, or
otherwise advance the government’s agenda. Throughout the dissertation, I consider
federal and state employees, prosecutors and judges, local police, and governmental
agencies such as the FBI to be state actors.
I also used the term violence to describe a number of harm-causing acts that the
state sponsors and/or facilitates. Though I do not wish to diminish the material
consequences of physical and sexual violence, I also do not wish to create a hierarchy for
violence given the innumerable affects and consequences it may have on the lives of
those who survive violence. As such, I use violence capaciously to signal the multiple
and expansive ways that the state enacts violence against multiply marginalized women.
Threats, coercion, harassment, and surveillance are all acts of power and control meant to
cause harm. Violence appears in structural settings, such as the prison, which are
deliberately constructed to promote pain and suffering, but it may also appear in the
courts where prosecutors use legal manipulations as forces to squeeze, pressure, or
otherwise harm those who do not wish to collaborate or cooperate. The violence of
criminalization, as my scholarship demonstrates, is merely a gateway for more acts of
violence to emerge from within various forms of punishment.
Intersectionality remains the central methodological lens through which feminist
scholars engage with questions of inequality. My work is guided by an intersectional
methodology that is attuned to the complex ways that modes of marginalization interact.

11

At the insistence of scholars like Jennifer Nash and Vivian May, I use intersectionality to
contend with the ways marginalization and privilege simultaneously exacerbate and
temper the effects of the carceral cycle.29 As I contend with the lived experiences of
multiply marginalized women, in particular queer women, I heed Cathy J. Cohen’s call to
look beyond the marginalization that stems from sexuality. “A broadened understanding
of queerness,” Cohen argues, “must be based on an intersectional analysis that recognizes
how numerous systems of oppression interact to regulate and police the lives of most
people.”30 Though the cases I examine are frequently the result of the state’s strategic use
of homophobia, my analysis addresses the ways that homophobic attacks are also
buttressed by racism, classism, and sexism.
Though at times my scholarship utilizes sociological texts to situate the
development of carceral systems, I do not proceed in the way a feminist criminologist
might. The archival sources that inform my work are arranged in a way that I hope
readers find persuasive, but it is argumentative in the sense that I have arranged sources
to reflect my own understanding of a complex and incomplete history. As such, I do not
aspire, nor pretend to offer a definitive history. What follows, then, is an historical
analysis of the expansion of women’s carceral spaces across the United States that
emerged in response to acts of resistance against the state.

Chapters
Chapter one, “Toward a Penology of Punishment: The Lavender Scare and the
Ousting of Miriam Van Waters,” examines how conservative politicians successfully
fired Dr. Miriam Van Waters from her role as Superintendent of the Massachusetts
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Reformatory for Women in early 1949. Throughout the 1930s and 40s, Van Waters
revived the reformatory’s indenture program by transforming it into a vocational
rehabilitation program that benefitted, in particular, women who fell out of favor with the
conservative Massachusetts parole board. I argue that the attack on indenture, fueled by
mid-century anxieties about homosexuality, resulted in the complete annihilation of the
indenture program.
This chapter contextualizes the months leading to Van Waters’s dismissal within
the early Lavender Scare in order to demonstrate how preoccupations with national
security altered the course of prison rehabilitation in the United States. Van Water’s
enemies were particularly outraged over the way she responded to homosexuality: for
Van Waters, homosexuality was a psychopathology that could be cured. Within the
context of rehabilitation, conservatives feared that Van Waters was capable of integrating
“reformed” homosexuals (possibly produced by the reformatory) into society at a time
where homosexuals needed to be contained. The Van Waters case illustrates how a queer
woman came under attack for queering the carceral cycle. Postwar conservatism’s
debates about homosexuality situated Van Waters, and the reformatory, as more
vulnerable to attack, resulting in the complete destruction of the reformatory model at
Framingham. The significance of this attack marks a distinct shift away from
reformatories as progressive spaces for reformation, toward a staunch investment in
punitive, penological control, justified by an acute need to contain “homosexual” women.
The attack on the Massachusetts Reformatory for Women thus solidified the
belief that homosexual women, and especially incarcerated homosexual women,
threatened national security and therefore required enhanced containment. This belief
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became embedded in the state’s thinking throughout the next decades as the gay and
lesbian community increasingly faced policing, surveillance, and state-sanctioned
violence. Twenty-five years after Van Waters was ousted, the state launched another
campaign against a group of lesbians that depended upon manufactured ideas about the
inherent criminality of lesbians. This time, the state perceived a group of young, white,
lesbian college students as a threat for their alleged (but unproven) involvement in
harboring two lesbian feminist fugitives. Chapter two, “We don’t talk about our sisters to
the state’: FBI Surveillance, Abuse of the Federal Grand Jury, and Queer
Resistance” turns to lesbian feminist grand jury resisters in Lexington, Kentucky. This
chapter demonstrates how five lesbian feminists and one gay man, known as the
Lexington Six, accepted jail sentences in lieu of cooperating with the FBI’s hunt for
radical leftist fugitives, Susan Saxe and Katherine Power. This chapter documents the
precautions communities took to protect against FBI surveillance, and reveals how, in
1975, prosecutors abused the power of the grand jury to investigate, rather that indict,
uncooperative individuals. I argue that what the FBI viewed as criminal collusion must be
read as an act of queer resistance designed to thwart state sponsored legal violence.
In this chapter, I suggest that the Lexington Six’s refusal to cooperate with the
grand jury points to ways in which the state uses legal violence and imprisonment to
create and maintain cooperative, docile citizens. In assuming that citizens would not risk
their freedom if they had “nothing to hide,” the state deduced that only the guilty would
choose to withhold information. The Lexington Six, however, resisted the FBI’s
escalating tactics, refusing, ultimately, to “talk about our sisters to the state” for fear of
supplying or corroborating information that might enable the state to incriminate other

14

women. I assert that when the state links cooperation to freedom, choosing to go to jail as
an innocent person in the name of noncooperation is an act of queer resistance.
Just as chapter two documents the state’s dramatic response to a group of
politically active college students, the following chapter explores yet another escalation
in carceral technologies. As the state contended with a number of long-sought after
fugitives, namely women identified as radical leftist revolutionaries, it deployed another
carceral innovation. Chapter three, “From COINTELPRO to Counterterrorism: Carceral
Power and the Lexington High Security Unit” turns to the state’s attempt to engage in the
ideological reconditioning of women political prisoners. In this chapter, I outline how the
state transformed COINTELPRO into a counterterrorism program that worked to rebrand
leftist revolutionary women as queer agents of domestic terror. I argue that the Bureau of
Prisons (BOP) created the Lexington High Security Unit (HSU) as part of a
counterterrorism initiative that responded, in particular, to two events: Assata Shakur’s
1979 escape, and the mass arrest of leftist revolutionaries in the aftermath of the failed
1981 Brink’s Robbery.
In Lexington, the HSU engaged in a number of sensory deprivation and
behavioral modification techniques, all of which were deemed appropriate for use on
female terrorists including Susan Rosenberg, Alejandrina Torres, and Silvia Baraldini.
This chapter demonstrates how queer methods of resistance perpetuated by the left
pushed the carceral state towards new technologies like the HSU. The HSU stands out,
not only as the first women’s HSU that operated in a capacity similarly to the men’s
maximum-security unit in Marion, Illinois, but also for the constitutional challenges
brought against it. I explain how, when a federal judge ruled that the HSU violated the
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First Amendment by targeting political prisoners, he did not find the unit to be in
violation of Eighth Amendment protections against cruel and unusual punishment.
Ultimately, the BOP elected to close the unit, only to announce and open a larger control
unit for women in Marianna, Florida.
In tracing the state’s increasingly punitive response to women engaged in queer
resistance across the twentieth century, the dissertation concludes with an epilogue that
locates queer resistance within the walls of twenty-first century jails and prisons. That
carceral spaces such as the Lexington HSU were designed with the intent to kill—so
much so that one HSU prisoner acknowledged the fact that the state was “trying to kill
us. But they’d rather we kill ourselves”—this epilogue acknowledges carceral spaces as
increasingly difficult to survive in the twenty-first century.31 As such, I consider prison
suicide, both as a form of control that prisons benefit from, as well as a form of queer
resistance. I argue that suicide, when conceived of as response to one’s status as a
member of “living dead,” can function as a form of queer resistance. Suicide prevention
efforts developed and administered by prison authorities, however, engages in the
production of slow death, which allows the prison to continue to exercise control over
marginalized populations under the auspices that life, under any circumstances, is worth
living. This orientation toward suicide prevention only serves to solidify prisoners as
individuals who, as members of the living dead are condemned to exist, but not live. In
exploring the boundaries of suicide, I turn to the 2015 death of Sandra Bland (which state
officials initially reported as a suicide), and a number of suicides that appear throughout
Netflix’s Orange is the New Black. In these cases, I argue that the stereotype of the strong
black woman emerges as a problematic representation that complicates suicide. While
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suicide, for some, exists as an act of queer resistance, suicide can also eclipse insidious
acts of violence, present within the carceral cycle, that deliberately lead an individual to
take their own life. The epilogue thereby introduces the problem of suicide as queer
resistance as an area for further research.
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CHAPTER 1. Toward a Penology of Punishment:
The Lavender Scare and the Ousting of Miriam Van Waters
The Spectacle of Suicide
On November 9, 1947, Dr. Miriam Van Waters, Superintendent of the
Massachusetts Reformatory for Women at Framingham, recorded the following in her
journal: “Antoinette Bendotte (sic) — commits suicide.”1 While it was unusual for the
superintendent to make remarks about specific inmates at the reformatory, this simple
statement of fact, buried within Van Waters’s detailed account of the day-to-day
happenings at Framingham, suggests that DiBenedetto’s suicide, though atypical, was an
otherwise unremarkable and isolated incident.2 In fact, the brevity of Van Water’s
recording implies that there was no way Van Waters could anticipate that DiBenedetto’s
death would become the political catalyst that would prompt her dismissal over one year
later, on January 11, 1949. There was no reason to suspect that DiBenedetto’s suicide
was anything other than a suicide. When she failed to show up for her work detail, the
reformatory’s Associate Superintendent, Peg O’Keefe, discovered that DiBenedetto
hanged herself in her bedroom.3 DiBenedetto’s death was reported to the corresponding
authorities, and the associate county medical examiner performed an autopsy. Dr. J.
Harry McCann officially confirmed that the cause of DiBenedetto’s death was suicide by
hanging.4
Three weeks after her death, a photo of DiBenedetto appeared in the Boston
Globe. The narrative that followed was not unlike the sensationalized stories that Lisa
Duggan outlines in her study of Alice Mitchell, a young, white, upper-class woman who,
in 1892, murdered her lover, Freda Ward, in Memphis, Tennessee. According to Duggan,
the narrative that emerged in the late nineteenth century portrayed lesbians, particularly
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“mannish” women, as violent criminals who preyed upon unsuspecting, feminine, white,
upper-class women.5 Over fifty years later, the press similarly depicted Antoinette
DiBenedetto as vulnerable to another woman’s homosexual desires. To be sure, when
readers encountered DiBenedetto’s photograph, they immediately confronted her
conventional femininity: bright eyes and long dark hair framed her wide smile and
youthful face. DiBenedetto was fashionable, as indicated by her beret, but her cross
choker also established her as a pious Christian woman. DiBenedetto’s photograph
projected an image of innocent and youthful femininity, but her image stood in stark
contrast to the headline it hovered above. The Globe proclaimed, “Foul Play Denied in
Death Nov. 9 of Girl Prisoner,” and in so doing, raised more questions about the nature of
DiBenedetto’s death than it served to assuage.6 If DiBenedetto’s image—a representation
of goodness—undermined her status as a prisoner, the photo cast further doubt upon
DiBenedetto’s status as a suicidal prisoner. According to the Globe, DiBenedetto’s
parents charged that their daughter’s body “bore several bruises when they received it for
burial,” thus calling the integrity of Dr. Van Waters’s and Dr. McCann’s reports into
question.7 Although the Globe acknowledged that DiBenedetto had been under
psychiatric observation at the reformatory, DiBenedetto’s smiling face transformed the
reality of her suicide into a suspected murder, perhaps motivated by DiBenedetto’s
rejection of another woman’s homosexual advances.
Between November 1947 and June 1948, Antoinette DiBenedetto’s death
transformed from a confirmed suicide to an alleged homicide as Massachusetts State
Senator Michael LoPresti, Jr. demanded multiple investigations into the Massachusetts
Reformatory for Women at Framingham. Miriam Van Waters, preoccupied with
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defeating a harmful house bill in the early months of 1948, initially paid little attention to
Lo Presti’s crusade. Although a reporter warned Van Waters in December 1947, that Lo
Presti was teaming up with another major paper, the Boston American, and was “going to
cause [her] trouble,” Van Waters dismissed his concern with the understanding that
newspapers, “in order to have something to print[,] they stir up trouble.”8 Another month
would pass before Van Waters acknowledged Lo Presti’s persistence. On January 19,
1948, Van Waters learned from the outgoing Commission of Corrections, Paul Doyle,
that he had received calls to fully investigate DiBenedetto’s death. Van Waters lamented:
“this tragedy, inescapable from prison life (there have been two [suicides] in the 16
years) is being used to create suspicion.”9 Indeed, for conservative politicians like Lo
Presti, the death of a constituent at the Massachusetts Reformatory for Women created a
timely opportunity to plague Van Waters’s rehabilitative penology with controversy.
Throughout the spring and summer of 1948, newspapers like the Boston American
insisted that DiBenedetto’s death was the tragic result of a homosexual crime of passion.
On May 7, the American reported that DiBenedetto’s family believed “she was fatally
beaten by another inmate.”10 DiBenedetto’s parents insisted that their daughter was not “a
depressed person planning suicide.”11 Eventually, LoPresti claimed that an inmate—in
fact, a known favorite among reformatory staff—murdered DiBenedetto.12 The
implication that DiBenedetto’s death was “the result of homosexual jealousies at the
reformatory” did not fare well for Van Waters, nor did LoPresti’s accusation that Van
Waters operated the reformatory “behind an iron curtain.”13 DiBenedetto’s alleged
victimization reinforced her image as a “good” and “normal” young woman, while
simultaneously admonishing the Van Waters administration for condoning the perverse
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environment that led to DiBenedetto’s death. The iron curtain that LoPresti accused Van
Waters of operating behind did not, in this case, refer to a strict and impenetrable
administration, but instead a secretive, women-run administration suspected of harboring
homosexuals.
Van Waters vehemently rejected communist rhetoric, claiming that “no iron
curtain” could exist at Framingham because she, quite literally, operated “the most open
reformatory in the nation.”14 However, her belief in acquired homosexuality aligned with
the (panic inducing) notion of sexual fluidity: Van Waters maintained that one could
always experience a change in desires, especially in the case of institutionalized women
who loved women. Van Waters not only interjected a longstanding debate on the origins
of homosexuality of interest to prison officials and sexologists, she articulated a critique
of biological determinism that rejected congenital theories of criminality. In devoting her
penology to the rehabilitation of women offenders—whom she exclusively referred to as
students—Van Waters strategically avoided diagnosing women as homosexuals. In Van
Waters’s mind, an offender’s acts or intimacies did not necessarily bear on her identity
beyond the reformatory, but a formal homosexual diagnosis could preclude a woman
from being perceived as worthy of rehabilitation. By the late 1940s, Van Water’s stance
of homosexuality worked to her disadvantage: in the eyes of the state, Van Waters
condoned homosexuality—a dangerous and subversive position in the midst of the
Lavender Scare.
In the aftermath of Antoinette DiBenedetto’s death, LoPresti’s crusade against the
reformatory prompted several probes and investigations, including an investigation by the
Massachusetts Department of Corrections. Frank A. Dwyer, Deputy Commissioner of

23

Corrections, investigated the reformatory throughout the spring and summer of 1948 and
produced the “evidence” that enabled Elliott McDowell, the Commissioner of
Corrections, to dismiss Van Waters the following January. While Van Waters’s dismissal
was inherently controversial in and of itself, the sanctions McDowell placed upon the
reformatory were far more damaging that Van Waters’s dismissal because they remained
in place even after Van Waters overturned her dismissal in March. When Van Waters
resumed her superintendency, she was left without a crucial rehabilitative tool written
into Massachusetts Law in 1879: indenture.
Upon initially learning of McDowell’s sanctions in June, Van Waters lamented
that McDowell was destroying the reformatory by way of reducing it into “a woman’s
jail.”15 McDowell’s sanctions severely limited Van Waters’s use of indenture: a method
of vocational rehabilitation that afforded offenders opportunities to live and work outside
the reformatory. Indentured women earned wages, gained experience working in a
variety of industries, and most importantly, relied upon the community to aide in the
rehabilitation of offenders. As one study of the reformatory remarked, “the moment the
student enters the institution, the Reformatory thinks in terms of her eventual return to the
community.”16 Time and time again, indenture successfully facilitated this transition by
reintegrating women into communal life.
In this chapter, I argue that Van Waters’s implementation of indenture
successfully interrupted the Foucauldian carceral cycle, but not without consequence. I
demonstrate how Van Waters’s indenture program upended the production of
delinquency by providing women with the skills to evade the grip of incarceration in
Massachusetts. The consequences of Van Waters’s program, however, appeared in the
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form of state-level retaliation that intensified the surveillance of the reformatory and
expanded the definition of delinquency. Van Water’s attempt to disrupt carceral control
ultimately influenced the state leaders to transform the reformatory into a prison.
In what follows, I illustrate how Van Waters actively pursued opportunities to
thwart the carceral state and the mechanisms of marginalization that personally affected
her and systematically affected women offenders. In this sense, Van Waters enacted a
feminist penology that problematized the social power imbalances that interrupted
women’s rehabilitation. Van Waters understood that sexism, racism, and homophobia
maintained the carceral state; an intersectional stance that expands Foucault’s assertion
that class (alone) determines whether or not one will be led to “power or to prison.”17
Van Waters’s ability to intervene in the production of delinquency specifically benefitted
women whom the state was unwilling to parole. For example, Van Waters’s success in
rehabilitating “moral” offenders, particularly queer women, bolstered the state’s
opposition to the progressive superintendent. When politicians invoked the rhetoric of the
Lavender Scare to further discredit Van Waters, they used homosexuality as a scapegoat
to advocate for a punitive penology. The conflation of homosexuality and communism
only exacerbated the state’s scapegoating. In the midst of the Cold War, restoring the
carceral cycle’s equilibrium—in other words, advocating for the punishment of
incarcerated people—aligned with the nation’s obsession with securing the physical and
moral future of the nation.
I offer Van Waters’s story in four parts. I begin by underscoring the importance of
Foucault’s theory of the deliberately failed prison upheld by the carceral cycle. Though
Foucault argues that carceral institutions moved away from punitive penology in favor of
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disciplinary carceral practices, the history of U.S. women’s reformatories reverses this
chronology because the reformatory’s emphasis on rehabilitation necessitated discipline.
A penology of punishment emerged in women’s reformatories when the benefits of
containment outweighed the benefits of rehabilitation. I offer Foucault’s genealogy as a
way of supplementing a brief history of the Massachusetts Reformatory for Women that
distinguished itself from other carceral models implemented in the United States. The
historical precedent for the reformatory not only shaped the institution Van Waters
inherited, it provided her with the autonomy to act in the interests of the women she
served.
As a penologist, Van Waters is perhaps best known for her rejection of biological
determinism in favor of individualized rehabilitative treatments. Individualized treatment
fulfilled three purposes: it assessed the holistic needs of each woman, outlined a tailored
plan for her rehabilitation, and oriented her toward the internalization of the
reformatory’s disciplinary regime. The second section explains how Van Waters used
indenture to break the cycle of delinquency, while also establishing an alternative method
of release that deliberately circumvented the state’s parole board. Bypassing the parole
board was a controversial, but critical step for Van Waters because the board often
refused to consider a woman’s progress toward rehabilitation when determining whether
or not to grant parole.
The third section addresses the relationship between the Lavender Scare,
twentieth-century sexology, and the expansion of delinquency to include homosexuality,
and its synonymous extension, communism. I turn to debates within sexology that
surfaced among politicians concerned about national security, as well as prison
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administrators, psychiatrists, and social workers who wished to better understand the
nature of homosexuality at mid-century. This section expands on Van Waters’s position
on same-sex sex in prison, and explains how she strategically deployed the Rorschach
test to avoid diagnosing homosexuality at the reformatory.
Finally, I return to the matter of Antoinette DiBenedetto’s death, Van Waters’s
ousting, and the destruction of the Massachusetts Reformatory for Women.
DiBenedetto’s death prompted the intensive surveillance of the reformatory that
ironically, yet purposefully destroyed a mechanism that fostered self-surveillance among
reformatory students in favor of punishment. McDowell’s crusade to destroy Van Waters,
and particularly her use of indenture, can only be understood as an effort to reconstitute
the reformatory as a women’s prison. The months leading to Van Waters’s dismissal
signal a shift in women’s carceral practices as the logic of the carceral state descended
upon the reformatory. Destroying the Massachusetts Reformatory for Women—one of
the nation’s most progressive institutions under Van Waters’s tenure—induced the birth
of the punitive women’s prison in the United States.

Discipline, Disruption, and Punishment: The Consequences of the Carceral Cycle
American carceral systems have gone by many names, but jails, prisons,
penitentiaries, houses of correction, and reformatories are, with few exceptions,
historically distinct from one another on account of the populations they housed and in
the penology they executed. The fact that the names of these institutions are often used
interchangeably—for example there is little distinction between a state penitentiary and a
state prison—undeniably lends itself to confusion. The project of transforming the
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Massachusetts Reformatory for Women into a prison, however, amounts to more than a
change in nomenclature because of the gendered nature of reformatories. Though at least
one men’s reformatory existed in New York, reformatories for women in the United
States emerged in the mid-nineteenth century.18 Reformatories were considered safer for
women in the sense that women were less vulnerable to the sexual assault, abuse,
harassment, and harsh living conditions they frequently encountered when imprisoned in
men’s institutions. Unlike prisons, reformatories also carried the distinction of
rehabilitating women offenders, a penological aspiration that stood in contrast to prisons
that, in adhering to the Foucauldian carceral cycle, contained, punished, and promoted
recidivism.
Miriam Van Waters’s penology exemplified successful rehabilitation that
interrupted the carceral cycle by preventing recidivism. Women at the Massachusetts
Reformatory for Women broke the cycle when they internalized self-discipline so well
that they could shed their identity as “delinquents” prior to their release. Indenture
specifically helped accomplish this goal by offering women an opportunity to practice
self-discipline in their work, both within and beyond the reformatory. Though it is true
that indenture, as a form of labor, merely (re)embedded women within capitalism by
“impos[ing] on the convict the ‘moral’ form of wages as the condition of [her]
existence,” Van Waters’s commitment to indenture was distinctly feminist.19 She
affirmed that women, many of whom came from poor or working class backgrounds,
deserved to be paid for their work, in and beyond the domestic sphere.
Indenture’s relationship to discipline and self-surveillance risks being incorrectly
reduced to a mechanism that produced docile women. One can draw this conclusion
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based on the number of women engaged in work that embedded them within the domestic
sphere. This is not necessarily an inaccurate assessment, considering the 1879 indenture
law specifically identified domestic labor as the only form of employment deemed
appropriate for women offenders. However, in accounting for gender within the context
of indenture, I invoke feminists who have critiqued Foucault for his failure to theorize
gender. For example, Sandra Bartky argues that Foucault
is blind to those disciplines that produce a modality of embodiment that is
peculiarly feminine. To overlook the forms of subjection that engender the
feminine body is to perpetuate the silence and powerlessness of those
upon whom these disciplines have been imposed. Hence, even though a
liberatory note is sounded in Foucault’s critique of power, his analysis as a
whole reproduces that sexism which is endemic throughout Western
political theory.20
As I demonstrate later in this chapter, the indenture law relied upon the logic of sexism to
produce docile women who only engaged in “feminine” labor. The women who took
domestic jobs within the context of indenture were taught to remain in the domestic
sphere after their release by continuing to seek domestic work.
Different from her predecessors, Van Waters subverted indenture in two ways.
First, she extended indenture not just to poor women, but to queer women—often coded
as “moral” offenders—who were otherwise unlikely to be paroled. In order to identify
women who were good candidates for indenture, Van Waters created an indenture board
that empowered her, and her staff, to identify potential candidates. In this way, the
indenture board competed with the parole board as a method of release by deliberately
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creating a loophole that, in the eyes of the parole board, “thwart[ed] the will of the court,
ignore[d] the powers of the state parole board, and serve[d] to menace organized
society.”21 Van Waters undermined the parole board’s narrow understanding of who was
suitable for re-entry to society vis-à-vis parole by implementing a system that rewarded
any woman’s progress toward rehabilitation.
Second, Van Waters expanded the kind of labor women could engage in under
indenture by turning to non-domestic industries. It is significant that the expansion of
indenture under the Van Waters administration was not legal. In fact, Van Waters was
regularly accused of using indenture “illegally” throughout 1948—an accusation that
was, unfortunately, accurate and consequently damaging. However, Van Waters’s illegal
use of indenture was not without purpose or support: Van Waters expanded the program
to include non-domestic labor during World War II. At the end of the war, Van Waters
did not relinquish the employment opportunities provided by the war in the post-war
years. Instead, she continued to bend the indenture law to accommodate expanding
opportunities for women. On several occasions, Van Waters formally advocated for the
expansion of indenture, even when accusations of her illegal indenture practices were
invoked to justify the abolition of indenture altogether.
Van Waters’s use of indenture expands the political possibilities of the docile
body. When docile women internalize gendered discipline within the patriarchal order,
they conform to and maintain the status quo of patriarchal power. Van Waters’s
production of docile bodies, however, was rooted in resistance: indentured women
internalized discipline and self-surveillance practices with the purpose of evading the
carceral cycle. Furthermore, the women who participated in indenture were always
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deemed less suitable for release based on their offenses, if not also their ethnic, racial, or
national identity, their class, or their sexuality. Thus, while docility certainly operates as a
method of control, docility in this case acted as a powerful form of resistance. In other
words, when women offenders transitioned out of delinquency and into docility, they
broke out of the carceral cycle. While it remains true that women offenders were always
embedded within a disciplinary regime, a disciplined life was strategic. Discipline
afforded far more freedom to women who might otherwise remain stuck within a wellcalibrated web of carceral control, rooted in perpetual delinquency.
Van Waters’s reformatory—an institution initially rooted in discipline—reverses
the chronology of carceral institutions that Foucault offers in Discipline and Punish. In
this text, Foucault examines the genealogy of the prison, and distinguishes between three
distinct phases in the history of carceral control: torture and corporal punishment,
punitive penology, and last, disciplinary regimes of carceral control. Because the
Massachusetts Reformatory for Women was initially structured as a disciplinary space
that succumbed to punitive penology in the aftermath of the Van Waters case, it is
important to understand the history of women’s reformatories as they emerged as
disciplinary spaces.
Eugenia C. Lekkerkerker’s 1931 study of American prisons and reformatories
offers a detailed taxonomy of the numerous penal systems implemented in the United
States dating back to the seventeenth century. While jails existed at the height of corporal
punishment, imprisonment was not initially used as a form of punishment; rather, the
colonies operated county or municipal jails as holding spaces for individuals awaiting
trial.22 Convicted offenders who were not sentenced to the scaffold for public torture
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and/or humiliation were sometimes sent to workhouses or houses of correction. Offenders
who received fines, but could not afford to pay their fines, were also sent to the
workhouse. As Lekkerkerker notes, William Penn, following the example of the English
and the Dutch, mandated in 1682 that “all prisons [jails] shall be workhouses for felons,
thieves, vagrants, and loose, abusive and idle persons, whereof one shall be in every
county.”23 These penal workhouses—synonymous with ‘houses of correction’—date the
centuries-long relationship between penal institutions and labor to the seventeenth
century. Indeed, penologists would continue to use penal labor to combat the idleness that
accompanied a new model—the prison— that was established throughout the eighteenth
century.
It was not until after the Revolutionary War that imprisonment grew in popularity.
At this point, the severity of one’s crime determined where an offender might serve time
if sentenced to imprisonment. Offenders convicted of minor crimes, many of whom were
women, were considered “misdemeanants,” and served jail sentences. Felons,
predominantly men, were sentenced to imprisonment in state prisons. Different from
jails, the prison, as Regina Kunzel argues, “was envisioned as an enlightened, humane,
and progressive alternative to capital and corporal punishments and shaming practices
common in colonial America.”24 The first state prisons in the United States, the Auburn
Penitentiary in New York and Eastern State Penitentiary in Philadelphia, opened in 1819
and 1829, respectively. They offered new architectural and penological models that
influenced correctional systems throughout the world during the nineteenth century.25
Auburn and Eastern State implemented a disciplinary model that emphasized isolation in
an attempt, according to Kunzel, to promote “opportunities for rehabilitation through
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remorseful self-reflection.”26 Inmates at Auburn lived in silence, worked and ate among
other inmates, and slept in individual cells, while inmates at Eastern State lived in silence
and solitary confinement, for twenty-four hours each day.27 Foucault observes that the
objective of these two systems was “coercive individualization, by the termination of any
relation that is not supervised by authority or arranged to according to hierarchy.”28 To
put it differently, the penitentiary’s disciplinary regime created a climate where prisoners
learned and internalized discipline in order to transform into law-abiding citizens. Selfdiscipline, as a method of social control, guaranteed that prisoners would submit to
disciplinary power.
Carceral practices in the American South were fundamentally different from those
in the North, especially in the post-bellum years. Michelle Alexander and Ava DuVernay
have outlined the history of carceral racism by turning to its origins: the 13th Amendment.
Ratified on December 6, 1865, the 13th Amendment stated that “neither slavery nor
involuntary servitude, except as a punishment for crime whereof the party shall have been
duly convicted, shall exist within the United States, or any place subject to their
jurisdiction.”29 As such, the 13th Amendment ushered the convict lease system, which
regenerated slave labor by criminalizing emancipated African Americans living in the
South. Under the protection of the constitution, convicted criminals could be legally
forced to work, thus prompting the creation of racist legislation that would generate black
criminals. Alexander explains that “nine southern states adopted vagrancy laws—which
essentially made it a criminal offense not to work and were applied selectively to
blacks—and eight of those states enacted convict laws allowing for the hiring-out of
county prisoners to plantation owners and private companies.”30 While the convict lease
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system had the obvious goal of regenerating plantation labor, black men were sentenced
to work on chain gangs, which performed manual labor, both productive and
unproductive.31 Lekkerkerker’s study suggests that black men were exclusively assigned
to work on chain gangs, but Sarah Haley’s scholarship reverses Lekkerkerker by
emphasizing that black women were also sent to the chain gang. Forgetting that black
women were treated as poorly, if not worse than men, reflects “their exclusion not just
from the category ‘woman’ but also the category ‘female.’”32 The joint forces of racism
and sexism positioned black women as laborers who, if not working on chain gangs,
worked in the fields of state prison farms that resembled plantations. The concentration of
women’s reformatories in northern states suggests, on account of geography, that it was
unlikely for Southern black women to be sentenced to a women’s reformatory. The racist
dehumanization of Southern black women portrayed them as unredeemable, and thus
unworthy of the social uplift that reformatories afforded.
Alexander’s scholarship argues that the convict lease system naturalized carceral
racism in the United States. As the segregated Jim Crow South took hold, vagrancy laws
enabled the targeted policing of African Americans, which inevitably led to arrest,
conviction, and incarceration.33 The convict lease system exemplifies Foucault’s carceral
circuit: states expanded delinquency through the law, racism bolstered surveillance of
Southern African Americans, and prison labor played a pivotal role in the South’s
economic recovery. While racism undeniably organized delinquency throughout the
nineteenth, twentieth, and twenty-first century, the history of American prisons must also
be understood alongside the sexism that fueled the policing of women throughout the late
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nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. The incarceration of women, many of whom
were white ethnic minorities, prompted a different carceral system: the reformatory.
Throughout the early nineteenth century, women imprisoned in municipal jails
were subjected to horrific conditions. Early jails were not built to accommodate women:
the alleged moral superiority of women and limited access to public space rendered
female crime an anomaly. Women sent to jail in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries
were jailed alongside men, which endangered women by subjecting them to sexual
violence perpetrated by male inmates, in addition to other forms of mistreatment. It was
not until 1828 that New York passed a law requiring county jails “to separate male and
female inmates.” While, in theory, the segregation of inmates on account of gender would
improve living conditions for women, it often relegated women to even more abject
conditions. As Estelle Freedman points out, up to fifteen women could be confined to a
cell with one bed in the mid-nineteenth century. Not only were women collectively
confined in small, poorly ventilated spaces, they remained vulnerable to sexual violence
because male guards maintained exclusive access to their cells. The inhumane treatment
of women, Freedman explains, was acceptable given the stigma associated with women’s
crime.34
The treatment of jailed women corresponded to the stigma associated with the
“crimes” women were found guilty of committing. Although Freedman’s research reveals
that the influx of “crimes against chastity or decency, applied almost exclusively to
women,” the gendered nature of crime implicates the classed and racialized elements of
policing in the United States. Women who were poor, immigrants, and/or women of color
were disproportionality more vulnerable than white, middle-class women. Like the
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vagrancy crimes used to criminalize African Americans in the South, crimes that
emphasized a “stricter code of female morality” resulted in a dramatic increase in
women’s crime rates. But, just as vagrancy crimes purposefully neglected to criminalize
white Southerners, men were rarely criminalized when they participated in moral
offences, which solidified a sexist double standard. The women convicted of adultery,
prostitution, as well as other crimes of survival linked to racial or ethnic marginalization,
were disregarded as “fallen women.” These women were believed, according to the logic
of Victorian-era purity, to be irredeemable and therefore deserving of the sexual assault
and maltreatment they experienced in jail. When one takes into account the social
protections afforded to white, middle-class women in the name of white supremacy, the
gendered nature of “women’s crime” also signals the ways in which race, ethnicity, and
economic inequalities shape the idea of the women offender in the United States.35
In 1827, British penologist Elizabeth Fry insisted that women could be reformed,
and that women must take charge in accomplishing this task. Fry’s influence extended
across the Atlantic and influenced many American women, particularly middle and
upper-middle-class white Protestant women, and especially those identifying as Quaker
and Unitarian. Although Quaker women began visiting jailed women in 1823, the
treatment of women prisoners did not receive substantial attention until the 1840s, when
the female members of the Prison Association of New York (PANY) “questioned not
only prison conditions, but also the underlying attitudes toward female criminals that
perpetuated them.” This group, known as “The Female Department,” began their work as
reformers by visiting imprisoned women, and attempted to reduce recidivism rates by
opening the Isaac Hopper Home, a halfway house that provided “shelter, prayer, and
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training [for] drunken, vagrant, and immoral women” recently released from jail. Over
time, women reformers who adopted Fry’s belief in reforming fallen women grew
increasingly frustrated with their male colleagues, who refused to legitimize their reform
efforts and acknowledge the vulnerability of jailed women. Freedman explains that this
tension led to several women leaving the Female Department of PANY in order to form
the Women’s Prison Association and Home (WPA) in 1854. As white women throughout
the mid-nineteenth century affirmed their place in prison rehabilitation by advocating for
their unique ability, as women, to reform fallen women, many advanced to
professionalized leadership roles in women’s reformatories that opened throughout the
1870s.36
Lekkerkerker’s overview of American reformatories argues that while men’s and
women’s reformatories were guided by similar penological strategies, “the motives which
led to the establishment of the women’s reformatories were very different from those
which underlaid the development of the Elmira-system,” otherwise known as the first
men’s reformatory in the United States.37 The Elmira reformatory opened in upstate New
York in 1876, a year before the Massachusetts Reformatory for Women opened in 1877,
but nine years after the first women’s reformatory opened in Indiana in 1867.38 The
motivation to open a reformatory for men was
to create a prison which would be of more reformative character than the
then existing Auburn and Pennsylvania systems, particularly in view of
the class of young adult offenders too old to be sent to children’s
institutions, but still young enough to offer hope of their being
reclaimed.39
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When silence and solitary confinement failed to rehabilitate incarcerated men,
penologists explored alternatives that would overwhelmingly benefit young white men.
Throughout the reformatory’s first sixteen years, 76.6% of inmates were white American
citizens, 20.2% were white immigrants, and roughly 3.2% of inmates were “colored”
(3.0%), Chinese (0.07%) or Indian (0.03%).40 Elmira’s first Superintendent, Zebulon R.
Brockway, employed a rehabilitative strategy derived from models used by penologists in
New Zealand, Ireland, and England.41
The differences between the origins of men’s and women’s reformatories reveals
much about the gendered double standards embedded within nineteenth-century
penology. For example, during the first National Prison Congress in 1870, the secretary
of the Massachusetts Commission of Prisons received considerable backlash in light of a
state-mandated advisory board designed to explore the possibility of a separate women’s
prison in Massachusetts. Lekkerkerker’s study reports that prison officials at the National
Prison Congress opposed separate women’s institutions for two reasons. On the one hand,
women prisoners were forced to perform the prison’s domestic labor, so separate
women’s prisons would increase operations costs by requiring men’s prisons to pay for
domestic labor. On the other hand, private contractors who hired incarcerated women
might lose out on the profits they garnered from women’s labor.42 The National Prison
Congress’s interest in continuing to control and benefit from women’s labor in co-ed
prisons meant that the economic opportunities tied to (free) women’s labor outweighed
the importance of their safety. When juxtaposed against the fact the National Prison
Congress enthusiastically received Brockway’s paper describing the rehabilitative
methods that he would implement at Elmira, it is clear that women offenders were still
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not imagined as redeemable subjects worthy of the protection a separate institution would
afford.
According to Freedman, the need for separate women’s institutions was
ultimately rooted—at least, from the perspective of white, middle-class women
reformers—in the need to separate women from men, provide “differential, feminine
care,” to incarcerated women, and allow women to assume the roles of superintendent
and staff at women’s institutions.43 Freedman explains that the gendered rationale for
separate women’s institutions deliberately emphasized gendered difference as opposed to
women’s equality, but motivations to create women’s reformatories also implicated
nineteenth-century class and race relations. The women who facilitated prison reform
were white and middle-class, who felt called upon to “uplift” fallen women.44 The
benevolence of white middle-class reformers must not overshadow the ways in which
they reinscribed race and class hierarchies in women’s reformatories. Poor women,
immigrants, and women of color were always more likely to criminalized, which, in
contrast to white, middle-class, women who staffed the reformatories, distinguished
between the “goodness” of whiteness and wealth, and the “badness” of poor women,
women of color, or immigrants.
There are a number of reasons why women in the late nineteenth and early
twentieth century may not have served time in a reformatory, including, but certainly not
limited to, racism and classism, geography, and state correctional infrastructure.
Although women’s reformatories opened as early as 1873, they emerged alongside
institutions that Nicole Hahn Rafter refers to as “custodial prisons” for women. All but
one of these six prisons emerged between 1870 and 1935. Custodial prisons for women
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often pre-dated reformatories, and remained in operation as the only carceral institution
for women in states that did not open reformatories. Often, custodial units originated as
women’s units that operated as extensions of men’s prisons. For example, the oldest
custodial women’s prison, Mount Pleasant Female Prison at Ossining, New York opened
in 1835—52 years before the first New York women’s reformatory opened. Mount
Pleasant did not function independently; it was “administratively dependent on the Sing
Sing prison for men,” but it did maintain “its own buildings and staff.” Often, custodial
prisons operated independently only after they inherited carceral space from men’s
institutions: the State Prison for Women in New York (1893), the Joliet Women’s Prison
in Illinois (1919), and the Raleigh State Prison in North Carolina (1933) operated within
former men’s institutions. In Alabama, the Wetumpka Penitentiary became an allwomen’s institution by default when the men moved into the brand new Kilby prison in
1923. Women’s custodial prisons were not intentionally built for women, nor were they
equipped to serve them. As Rafter observes, women in custodial prisons “received
treatment similar to that of men in corresponding prisons for male felons,” but they did
served time in “outmoded” spaces that lacked a “fulltime physician, chaplain, or teacher,”
as well as programs and job opportunities.45
Although Rafter’s scholarship demonstrates that women’s custodial prisons
operated before and alongside women’s reformatories, I distinguish custodial prisons
from the punitive women’s prisons that, as I argue, emerged out of the reformatories in
the twentieth century. This is because punitive women’s prisons replaced reformatories
in the twentieth century, whereas custodial women’s prisons closed upon transferring
their inmates to newly opened women’s reformatories. The organization of carceral
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institutions for women was generally determined by the state legislature. For example,
Rafter explains that states like New York “needed some kind of accommodation for its
female felons, who, as yet barred from reformatories, were clogging county
penitentiaries.” In some cases, the relationship between a woman’s age, race, ethnicity,
class, and her rate of recidivism and/or severity of her offense determined whether or not
she was deemed suitable for a reformatory. For example, New York attempted to operate
a state prison farm for repeat female offenders over the age of 30, whom the state
considered “incapable of reform.” Although the farm only operated for three years, it
documents New York reformer’s commitment to eugenics, considering that the farm held
immigrant women predominately convicted of gendered offenses like drunkenness and
prostitution. Such targeted incarceration limited a woman’s reproductive capacity.
Women’s custodial prisons in states like New York demonstrate that lawmakers decided
who was, and who was not, fit for rehabilitation; but the presence of a custodial unit or
autonomous custodial prison does not necessarily indicate that this distinction was
applied everywhere. In some states, women’s custodial prisons were the only carceral
spaces reserved for women in the nineteenth and early twentieth century.46
In the case of the first women’s reformatories, the way in which the state
addressed juvenile delinquents frequently influenced the formation of early women’s
reformatories. For example, while Indiana opened the first women’s reformatory in 1873,
attempts to generate support for a separate women’s institution were stifled in
Massachusetts. One key difference between these states rests in their treatment of
juvenile delinquents. In 1856, Massachusetts opened the Lancaster Industrial School for
Girls, which functioned as an institutional repository for delinquent girls.47 Indiana
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lacked institutions for girls and women alike, and consequently opened the Reformatory
Institution for Women and Girls in order to incarcerate adult women and girls in one
institution.48 It took over four years for reformers in Massachusetts to successfully lobby
for a women’s reformatory: only after receiving over 7,000 signatures in favor of a
reformatory did the Massachusetts state legislature pass the bill that provided the funds to
build the reformatory in June of 1874.49 The Reformatory Prison for Women opened in
1877 in Sherborn County, later renamed Framingham, one year after Elmira.50
As reformatories emerged throughout the late nineteenth century, gender, race,
class, and age determined who the state committed to the reformatory. Louis Robinson’s
1923 study of American penology defines reformatories as “a prison in which a state tries
to reform selected adults.”51 Indeed, the men’s reformatory at Elmira sought to reform
“those convicted for the first time of a felony and not under sixteen or over thirty years
old” in order to maximize the success of individual reform.52 Unlike Elmira, the 1877 law
that established the Reformatory Prison for Women focused on misdemeanors by
mandating that all women “convicted of being vagrants, common drunkards, lewd and
wanton and lascivious behavior, common nightwalkers, and other idle and disorderly
females” be sentenced to the reformatory.53 The propensity to sentence women convicted
of misdemeanors to the reformatory, compared to the first felony standard at Elmira,
establishes that nineteenth century women were more likely to be institutionalized for
petty crimes compared to their male counterparts. Sexism accounts for many double
standards when it comes to nineteenth century crime. For example, in 1879,
Massachusetts passed a law that “authorized the courts to sentence women convicted for
drunkenness a second time to the reformatory prison for an indefinite period not
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exceeding two years.”54 This law subjected women to harsher sentences for
misdemeanors like drunkenness, while first time male offenders were merely fined for
drunkenness, and only imprisoned in the event of non-payment. A law passed the
following year, in 1880, compounded gender discrimination with classism by stipulating
that first time offenders, regardless of gender, would be fined one dollar for drunkenness.
Men convicted of drunkenness for a third time could be “punished by a fine not
exceeding ten dollars, or imprisoned in any place now provided by law for common
drunkards for a term not exceeding one year.”55 As a result, women subject to the 1879
law confronted incarceration sooner than men, and for a longer period of time. This
comparison illustrates that women were subjected to harsher sentences for the same crime
as men, and that women’s offenses were less socially tolerable. Scholars like Robinson
justified sexist double standards by suggesting that “the women guilty merely of a socalled misdemeanor, for example, soliciting on the street, is more apt to be in need of the
reformatory discipline than is the one guilty of a felony.”56
In addition to the Indiana Reformatory Institution for Women and Girls and the
Reformatory Prison for Women at Sherborn, Massachusetts, two women’s reformatories
opened in New York before the turn of the century: the New York House of Refuge for
Women in Hudson, in 1887, and the House of Refuge for Women in Albion, in 1893.57
The New York Reformatory for Women at Bedford Hills, though approved by the state
legislature in 1892, did not open until 1901.58 Together, the first four women’s
reformatories implemented four features that distinguished them from men’s prisons, and
influenced the organization of twentieth-century reformatories to come. Like nineteenthcentury prisons, women’s reformatories were designed to implement disciplinary power
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as a means of rehabilitation. Within the context of the reformatory, discipline was
broadly conceived of and implemented across several training methods designed to
rehabilitate women. The three disciplinary characteristics of women’s reformatories that
Lekkerkerker describes include the mark system, the classification system, and
indeterminate sentencing.
The mark system determined the number of “marks against each sentence, which
the convicts had to earn by their good behavior and industry before they could obtain
release.”59 In this arrangement, discipline incentivized and rewarded behaviors that
corresponded with reform, while simultaneously creating a hierarchy among inmates in
the reformatory. The mark system complemented the classification system, which
analyzed newly admitted inmates before they entered the reformatory’s acclimation
regimen. The classification system transformed “each individual [into] a case” by
documenting one’s life history and establishing a baseline point of reference against
which each individual’s progress could be measured.60 The classification system also
oriented new inmates to the reformatory in the same way: “newly admitted prisoners had
first to undergo a period of six to nine months of hard, unpleasant labor, which was called
the period of probation; after this they were admitted to the second part of the sentence,
consisting of four successive grades, each higher one allowing a larger degree of freedom
and responsibility than the one below it.”61 Together with the mark system, the
classification system emphasized individual progress through discipline. Learning—be it
good behavior, domestic labor tasks like sewing, knitting, mending, and laundering, or
attending prison school to learn to read and write— forced inmates to discipline
themselves.62 In order to assess whether or not an inmate was ready to move on to the
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next level, reformatories established “examinations”— better imagined as criteria—by
which reformatory workers enacted “a normalizing gaze, a surveillance that ma[d]e it
possible to quantify, to classify, and to punish.”63 While the goal was to reward women
offenders, failure was always within the realm of possibility. In this case, failure to
progress signified a failure to rehabilitate.
The mark system and the classification system would not be effective if not for
indeterminate sentencing. Different from conventional sentencing practices, in which one
receives a sentence to jail or prison for a predetermined amount of time that reflected the
severity of one’s offense, the indeterminate sentence guaranteed one’s release only after
the individual demonstrated their reformation.64 Indeterminate sentences fostered selfdiscipline and responsibility by giving the offender the “power” to control the length of
their sentence. At the same time, the indeterminate sentence exerted power over offenders
by organizing the reformatory as a panoptic institution. While women’s reformatories did
not use panoptic architecture, the indeterminate sentence produced a similar effect. As
Foucault argues, the panopticon functioned “to induce in the inmate a state of
consciousness and permanent visibility that assumes the automatic functioning of
power.” 65 The indeterminate sentence worked similarly by reminding inmates that they
lived in a state of constant surveillance. The indeterminate sentence automatically
embedded inmates within a power structure that forced them to appease the authority
who had the power to determine their progress. The surveillance that supported the
indeterminate sentence helped organize carceral time by transforming it into productive
time that emphasized change, as opposed to passive time that maintained the status quo.
Although all reformatory sentences were technically indeterminate, maximum sentences
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were eventually established that ensured one’s release after five years for felonies, and
after two years for misdemeanors.66 Regardless, the indeterminate sentence incentivized
rehabilitation while simultaneously functioning as a panopticon that “reduce[d] the
number of those who exercise [power], while increasing the number of people on whom
[power] is exercised.”67
According to Freedman, the Massachusetts Reformatory Prison for Women made
a unique contribution to American prison reform by implementing a practice called
indenture.68 In 1879, the Massachusetts legislature passed a law that allowed prison
commissioners
to bind out for domestic service to a private employer any inmate of the
reformatory during her term of sentence, provided she consented to it. The
employer was to keep diligent watch over the conduct of the prisoner and
to have regard for her welfare and reformation, and to report to the board
any of her acts which were improper or wrong. The commissioner could
return her to the prison whenever they deemed it necessary for her
welfare. This act was frequently applied during the first twenty-five years
of the reformatory and was virtually used as a kind of parole: a trial of the
woman at liberty which could be revoked if she misbehaved.69
In Massachusetts, the use of indenture as a mode of rehabilitation for adult women can be
traced back to the state’s juvenile reform schools. For example, the Lancaster Industrial
School for Girls permitted girls to be indentured to “suitable” families for a two-year
period, beginning at age sixteen until their release at age eighteen.70 Indenture, for both
girls and women, initially involved domestic labor, which necessitated some degree of
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vocational training. Although women at the Massachusetts Reformatory engaged in a
variety of jobs around the reformatory, many trained as domestic servants who lived and
worked in upper-class homes. In order to be eligible for indenture, women had to “be in
the highest grade in the prison, which usually meant she had served about three-fourths of
her sentence.”71 The prison superintendent recommended potential indenture placements
to women, but each woman and her prospective employer had to agree upon the match.
Indenture reintegrated women into the domestic sphere as they prepared to fully
transition from the reformatory to independent living. If, within the reformatory, women
learned how to discipline themselves while under constant surveillance, indenture
allowed them to practice self-discipline in the absence of the reformatory’s surveillance.
In this arrangement, the community replaced the reformatory by facilitating the
surveillance of the indentured woman. Indenture could be revoked at any time if women
violated the terms of their indenture placement, but successful indenture placements
reflected the offender’s ability to practice self-discipline while outside the structure of the
reformatory. In essence, indenture gave women the opportunity to prove that they were
rehabilitated. Indentured women also earned wages at the prevailing rate that they could
access upon their release.72
For criminologists like Sheldon and Eleanor Glueck, “the indenture system [was]
one of the practical means of countering the routinizing tendencies of an institution.”73
Although domestic training was initially the “chief function of the disciplinary power” at
Framingham, Van Waters’s propensity to indenture poor women, women of color and
immigrants, and queer women prioritized the rehabilitation of women who, on account of
their identities, were particularly vulnerable to the carceral cycle.74 While it is true that
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indenture many have reproduced gendered labor expectations by confining women to the
domestic sphere, Van Waters explored non-domestic opportunities for her students that
helped transition women to life beyond the reformatory. Within the larger history of
American incarceration, the indenture system remains one of the most progressive forms
of rehabilitation that uplifted multiply marginalized women who inhabited the
reformatory. And yet, despite indenture’s contributions to progressive penology, it fell
under relentless attack over the course of Miriam Van Waters’s career.

Indenture at the Massachusetts Reformatory for Women, 1911-1948
Miriam Van Waters’s predecessor, Jessie Hodder, served a twenty-year term as
Superintendent from 1911 until her death in 1931. A tour de force in her own right,
Hodder implemented five critical changes to the reformatory, without which Van Waters
would have had considerably less success. In addition to removing the word prison from
the reformatory’s name, Hodder altered the landscape of the reformatory.75 She
introduced what was known as “the cottage system” at Framingham, which housed small
groups of women in cottages located near or beyond the borders of the reformatory.
Beginning with the two Houses of Refuge that opened in New York in 1887 and 1893,
the cottage system quickly became standard practice among reformatories built in the late
eighteenth century because they focused on the development of domestic skills.76
Implementing the cottage system at Framingham restored the reformatory’s position as a
leader in women’s penology. Hodder also remodeled “punishment division” of the
reformatory by replacing cellblocks with a gymnasium that allowed women to exercise.
An emphasis on physical activity, in conjunction with the cottage system, introduced
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subtle forms of discipline at the reformatory that completely bucked the traditional
organization of prisons.
In addition to new cottages and a new gymnasium, Hodder undermined the
carceral cycle by introducing a classification system and clearing house at the
reformatory. The clearing house, as Lekkerkerker reports, was “equipped with a
laboratory, where medical, neurological, psychiatric and psychological studies could be
made of each prisoner.”77 The introduction of the clearinghouse reflects the influence of
Dr. Katherine Bement Davis, the first Superintendent at the New York State Reformatory
for Women at Bedford Hills. Davis emphasized the importance of the psychological
evaluation of women offenders, which garnered attention from public figures and
scientists interested in studying the nature of women’s crime, and subsequently led to
several bodies of research on incarcerated women.78 Hodder’s interest in incorporating
scientific methods into the reformatory also reflected the larger urge to use science to aid
in the development of individual treatment plans.
The information gathered from each woman, including her family history and
economic background, certainly reflects the kind of surveillance associated with a
disciplinary institution. However, the classification system also served the purpose of
decriminalizing mentally ill women. Hodder called for “mentally defective” inmates to be
transferred to a “custodial institution designed for this class of women.”79 Though
Lekkerkerker emphasizes that the reformatory was poorly equipped to treat mentally ill
women, Hodder believed that they “should not be stigmatized as offenders.”80 In the
midst of the eugenics movement, which advocated for the separation and sterilization of
“mental defectives,” many women scientists working within the Progressive tradition
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hesitated to adopt “biological nor psychological nor economic determinism.”81 By calling
for the decriminalization of women with mental illness, Hodder refused the eugenic
belief that the mentally ill were predestined to perpetrate crime or delinquency.82
Building on Hodder’s rejection of biological determinism, Van Waters similarly insisted
than an individual’s social circumstances led to offenses as opposed to their biological
makeup.
Within the context of the carceral cycle, one might expect that classification
information would facilitate the production of delinquency by predicting which women
were most likely to recidivate. However, Hodder and her multidisciplinary team used the
classification system to create treatment plans that benchmarked each woman’s progress
and ensured the rehabilitation of criminalized women. The classification system helped
Hodder focus on the production of docile bodies that would theoretically afford women
more mobility outside of the reformatory. In addition, Hodder’s classification system
complemented her interest in research, and eventually led to the establishment of a
research department at the reformatory. Hodder evaluated the effects of the indeterminate
sentence “on the basis of the scientific information gained,” but also studied the effects of
indenture.83 In 1920, Hodder published an article titled “Indenture of Prisoners: An
Experiment,” in which she detailed the success of the program. From Hodder’s
perspective,
we do not plan to bind the prisoner to labor—we mean to apprentice her to
life, to learn to live in the world. We shall place her at work for wages,
and we shall expect her work to be excellent and the wage high, but
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neither the work nor the wage is our primary object; they are but the
means whereby we shall get the prisoner beyond the reformatory walls.84
In emphasizing indenture’s ability to reduce recidivism rates, Hodder highlighted the
necessity of preparing women to transition out of institutional life. Learning to live in the
world meant practicing internalized discipline— an experience that simply could not take
place within the boundaries of the reformatory. Indenture allowed women to practice
self-discipline, gain vocational experience, and earn money while acclimating to society.
Women’s reformatories, like all carceral institutions, were not exempt from, or
immune to, participating in the carceral cycle. However, superintendents like Jessie
Hodder and Miriam Van Waters made deliberate decisions to thwart any production of
delinquency at the Massachusetts Reformatory for Women. Van Waters continued
Hodder’s legacy by expanding indenture, even when it meant “stretching its scope far
beyond the letter of the law.”85 While Van Waters defended indenture against political
attack throughout her career, the vicious cycle of critique crystalized in 1948 and played
a significant role in her 1949 dismissal. The attacks Van Waters faced prior to 1948 can
be divided into three categories of concern regarding labor, economics, and institutional
power.
The most persistent debate about indenture corresponds to a power struggle
between the Department of Corrections and the State Board of Parole. Parole was not the
only mechanism by which incarcerated individuals could gain release, which frustrated
and disempowered the parole board. Writing in 1937, Ralph W. Robart, chairman of the
Massachusetts parole board, claimed that there were four methods of release in addition
to the parole board: the District Court, the Probate Court, the Massachusetts training
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schools, and the indenture law.86 In arguing for the centralization of authority, Robart
claimed “it [was] obvious that with so many avenues of release open in this
Commonwealth, divided authority is bound to manifest itself.”87 Although Robart did not
detail what, or how, multiple avenues of release would “manifest itself,” advocating for
the consolidation of power within the parole board was a covert way of responding to a
strategy Van Waters devised to circumvent the parole board altogether.
As superintendent, Van Waters wanted as much control as possible over the
release of women offenders. Van Waters prioritized rehabilitating women as quickly and
efficiently as possible, but the parole boards Van Waters worked with—a body composed
of five men or women appointed by the governor— were not always accommodating or
understanding of her penology. For example, Van Waters became irate when she realized
certain parole board members “based their decisions about early release on past criminal
records, not on progress toward rehabilitation.”88 This kind of bias not only presented an
obvious obstacle for Van Waters, it completely undermined her ability to do her job.
Parole board politics only continued to grow worse in 1935 under Governor James
Michael Curley’s administration. To Van Waters’s dismay, the parole system turned
“into a kind of indulgence sale, rewarding to the highest bidders with early release.”89
Rather than attempt to fix the corruption imbedded within the parole board, Van Waters
used indenture to release women who were unlikely to receive a favorable decision from
the parole board. The ability to circumvent the parole board was of critical importance to
Van Waters’s strategy, which was well within her power as superintendent.
That Van Waters’s political opponents attempted to destroy indenture in the late
1930s by repealing the 1879 law signifies the state’s urge to (re)establish the carceral

52

cycle at the reformatory. Despite the fact Commissioner of Corrections Arthur T. Lyman
insisted that indenture was an overwhelmingly successful program, members of the
parole board continued to call for the repeal of the indenture law.90 Reports of indenture
abuse appeared in newspapers, including one 1938 report that emphasized indenture’s
capacity to expose students to immorality. This report suggested that “an immoral offense
was committed” in one indenture case, and that “girls had been returned to Sherborn
because of immorality while on indenture.”91 Charges of immorality were clearly meant
to portray indenture as a uniquely dangerous rehabilitative method, but Lyman backed
Van Waters when he claimed that “immorality might enter into any parole or indenture
system.”92 By emphasizing that women offenders could be exposed to immorality
regardless of their method of release, Lyman assuaged the public of any fears they might
have about indenture, and put to rest the notion that parole was a better form of release
for women at the reformatory.
Van Waters faced numerous challenges to indenture throughout the 1930s, but the
1940s also brought two bills that sought to limit indenture. The merits of indenture were
highlighted during World War II, when indenture offered a solution to U.S. labor
shortages. As Freedman points out, work for imprisoned women “struck a deep nerve in
depression-era Massachusetts,” but World War II welcomed women into the work
force—even imprisoned women—allowing Van Waters to expand indenture.93 Women
worked at laundries, a restaurant, a shoe factory, and a hospital, but also engaged in farm
and factory labor, including work at defense plants.94 Women working at the reformatory
were incredibly productive, so much so that “the reformatory earned a certificate of merit
from the War Production Board for the greatest per capita production of any institution in
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the country.”95 The advantages of the reformatory’s program were so great that
Commissioner Lyman proposed legislation that would allow men’s prisons to take
advantage of the indenture law. In late 1942, Lyman argued that local farmers felt the
effects of the labor shortage the most: one farmer, for example, lost a significant part of
his apple crop because he did not have sufficient help during harvest.96 Lyman charged
that indenturing incarcerated men could easily serve two purposes: on the one hand, it
could offset the labor shortage; on the other, indenture could benefit “prisoners in their
reformation. It would keep them busy on essential work and enable them to send money
to their families and possibly help relieve the welfare burden.”97 While it is unsurprising
that members of the parole board stood in opposition to Lyman’s plan, their resistance
reveals how delinquency functioned as a flexible and dynamic category that helped
maintain the carceral cycle. It is clear that gender played a significant role in determining
who the state categorized as a delinquent, and who the state wished to immunize against
delinquency.
Writing in January 1943, Reuben L. Lurie, chairman of the parole board, argued
that Lyman’s “proposal smacked of Southern chain-gangs.”98 Even worse, “it was
suggested that contract labor might cause drunks to be arrested to fill farm jobs.”99
Though the parole board opposed to the indenture of women, their opposition to the
indenture of men suggests that indenture attacked white masculinity. By invoking the
specter of chain gangs, Lurie attempted to argue that indenture would make white men
vulnerable to overcriminalization in the same way that Southern black men were
disproportionately arrested for violating vagrancy laws. This bold comparison
misrepresented indenture as a predatory carceral practice, akin to slavery, that generated
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prisoners, when in reality it interrupted the production of delinquency. For Lurie,
indenture would jeopardize the freedom of white men in the event their day-to-day
behaviors, like drunkenness, were considered ‘delinquent’ behaviors. Lurie’s argument
reveals how the parole board carefully used this argument to maintain the carceral cycle,
which always functions as a method of power and control. Lurie opposed indenture in
order to protect white men from overcriminalization, but he did not acknowledge that
women were regularly overcriminalized for crimes like drunkenness. The parole board’s
opposition to women’s indenture represented a different motivation: a desire to keep
women within the carceral cycle.
This double standard exemplifies the relationship between illegality and
delinquency that Foucault describes as “some dark, secret understanding between those
who enforce the law and those who violate it.”100 As Foucault emphasizes, illegal acts do
not automatically result in criminalization. In fact, there is a difference between illegality
and delinquency that determines who is predestined for power and who is predestined for
prison: “a differential administration of illegalities” determined who could get away with
illegal acts, and who would be punished for them.101 The parole board opposed the
indenture of white men in order to maintain their privilege to participate in illegality
without fear. By focusing on keeping white men out of prison, the parole board refused to
consider how incarcerated men might benefit from indenture. At the same time, the
parole board opposed the indenture of women because indenture interrupted the
production of delinquency at the reformatory by reducing recidivism rates. This
comparison illuminates the gendered nature of carceral control at mid-century:
rehabilitation did not matter to the state so long as white men retained the power to
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participate in illegal acts without consequence. To be sure, Lyman’s proposal was
effectively blocked and never advanced to the state legislature.
In the immediate years following the war, Van Waters maintained sole authority
over indenture contracts, and retained WWII contracts that placed students in occupations
that extended well beyond domestic employment that the 1879 legislation sanctioned. In
1945, Van Waters succumbed to more formal oversight when the newly appointed
Commissioner of Corrections, Paul Doyle, expanded the indenture board to include “Van
Waters, her deputies, a physician, and several social workers” who collectively made
recommendations for indenture placements. As Freedman notes, Doyle retained the
power to approve the indenture board’s recommendations, different from former
commissioners who signed blank indenture contracts for Van Waters. Despite the fact
Doyle was appointed by Democratic Governor Maurice J. Tobin, and as such remained a
political liability for Van Waters, the Commissioner and Superintendent worked
harmoniously, as evidenced by Doyle’s support of indenture placements in factories and
other non-domestic occupations. The commissioner’s support, paired with the
rehabilitative success associated with indenture, led Van Waters to formally advocate for
the expansion of indenture. In early 1947, Van Waters began to gather support to amend
the 1879 law to formally include non-domestic employment.102
Commissioner Doyle protected indenture, but the most successful attack on
indenture originated shortly after Van Waters began to lobby to expand indenture. In May
1947, state auditor Thomas J. Buckley publically alleged that indenture allowed
reformatory students “to work illegally in private employment for pay ‘far below the
open labor market.’”103 Doyle defended Van Waters in the press by assuring that students
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“were paid the same wages as the other employees doing the same work” so as to
emphasize that indentured labor was no more attractive to private industries than “free”
labor.104 Buckley’s claim that indentured women’s wages were far less than their free
counterparts was not necessarily rooted in a benevolent attempt to pay indentured women
the prevailing wage. As Freedman argues, his critique raised the concern that indentured
women working outside the domestic sphere threatened employment opportunities that
belonged to free men before WWII. Buckley’s use of the world “illegal” in his attack
pointed to the fact Van Waters knowingly bent the indenture law in order to place women
in non-domestic occupations.105 Buckley’s attack ultimately portrayed Van Waters as a
subversive penologist who enabled women to steal employment opportunities from
deserving men. Indenture ultimately empowered women to lead self-determined lives by
giving women vocational training that would help them independently maintain a steady
income. Employment allowed women to shed their status as delinquents and gain
financial independence, therefore interfering in the patriarchal production of delinquency
so crucial to the carceral cycle.
Freedman’s analysis of the Buckley attack, and its extension, 1948 legislation that
proposed to abolish indenture know as House Bill #1544, argues that gendered labor
remained at the core of the indenture debate. However, Reuben Lurie’s 1943 attack also
reveals that race played a significant role in the indenture attack, particularly because
supporters of HB #1544 claimed that indenture was akin to slavery. This fallacy
functioned as a problematic red herring. As Robert Chase emphasizes, the African
American men and women who predominantly occupied southern prisons were forced
into “literal and legal” slavery that did not compensate prisoners for their labor
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whatsoever.106 Van Waters’s rehabilitative indenture program stood in stark contrast to
southern prisons that “eschewed rehabilitative programs” by using “hard agricultural
labor [to structure] southern prison life.”107 Despite the glaring differences that
distinguished indenture from slavery, the anti-indenture arguments that relied upon antislavery rhetoric, as Freedman points out, “belied the motive to keep women working in
unpaid state industries rather than for wages outside the institution.”108 As such, distilling
anti-indenture arguments reveals much about the hierarchies organized around gender,
race, and class: women, as a category, should only be engaged in domestic labor; white,
working-class women deserved to be paid fairly for their work; the state should maintain
the right to benefit from the free labor of poor women, women of color, and immigrants.
The right to earn wages while incarcerated remained at the core of the Van Waters
controversy. Indenture provided women with money to pay for medical expenses
including dental work, glasses, surgical corsets, and orthopedic shoes. Indenture
significantly offset the ongoing budget cuts that perpetually reduced the reformatory’s
medical and clothing budget.109 Van Waters argued that if indenture was outlawed, as
much as $18,000 in tax dollars would have to be allocated to the reformatory in order to
make up for lost wages.110 Still, supporters of HB #1544 ignored indenture’s economic
advantages and disregarded the ways women financially benefitted from indenture. The
state’s willingness to ignore these benefits may seem counterintuitive, but this willful
ignorance reaffirms that HB #1544 benefitted the state in the long term by restoring
carceral control. The state was entirely comfortable with the possibility of diminished
living conditions and health care for reformatory women. Even though indenture cost the
state nothing—private employers paid women engaged in day work (another name for
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indenture), while Van Waters used private funds donated by Geraldine Thompson, a
wealthy philanthropist, to subsidize indenture positions within the reformatory—it was
still framed as undesirable.111
The proposed legislation to abolish indenture targeted Van Waters’s rehabilitative
methods in an attempt to transform the reformatory into a prison that produced delinquent
women. However, as the origins of HB #1544 reveal, legislation was not the only tactic
the state used to regain carceral control. Throughout 1948 and 1949, the reformatory
itself would experience unprecedented surveillance that sought to detect the production of
delinquency. The presence of delinquency within the reformatory would prove that
women’s rehabilitation was an impossible feat, which consequently justified the need to
punish women offenders. The most advantageous way to “detect” delinquency was to
frame homosexuality as product of the prison at a time when homosexuality was widely
feared and little understood. In the midst of the Lavender Scare and ongoing mid-century
debates about sexuality, Van Waters’s hope to continue her rehabilitation vis-à-vis
indenture was no match for state-sanctioned homophobia.

Queering Delinquency
The Lavender Scare influenced the way Van Waters endured political attack,
particularly throughout 1947-1949. John D’Emilio and David K. Johnson’s scholarship
on the Lavender Scare explains how the federal government came to suspect homosexual
employees of acting as communist sympathizers and potential informants.112 In the late
1940s, the federal government launched a crusade against homosexuality in an effort to
thwart domestic communism. Homophobic, anticommunist hysteria manifested itself as
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political conservatism, intense surveillance regimes, and widespread cultural anxiety, all
of which factored into the Van Waters case.
As an extension of the Red Scare, the Lavender Scare specifically referred to the
national security threat posed by homosexuals on account of their compromised morals
and vulnerability to blackmail.113 According to Johnson, communists and homosexuals
were similar because they “seemed to comprise hidden subcultures, with their own
meeting places, literature, cultural codes, and bonds of loyalty. As people feared
communist ‘cells’ within the federal government, they feared ‘nests’ of homosexuals.”114
Little evidence justified the association between communism and homosexuality, and yet
the fear that both communists and homosexuals could hide in plain sight was enough to
establish a relationship between the two. Ultimately, homosexuals and communists posed
an irrefutable threat to the nation’s survival: while homosexuality endangered American
Christian morality, communism threatened to eclipse American democracy.115
The Lavender Scare prompted the State Department’s loyalty checks that were
used to quietly purge homosexuals from federal employment as early as 1947.116 On
March 21, 1947, President Harry Truman issued Executive Order 9835, which
established that “the presence within the Government service of any disloyal or
subversive person constitutes a threat to our democratic processes.”117 The executive
order called for a loyalty review board that would subject all current and future civilians
employed by the federal government to loyalty investigations.118 President Truman’s
order did not have to name homosexuals as an explicit target in order to oust them from
the government. Rather, he focused on employees who maintained “membership in,
affiliation with or sympathetic association with any foreign or domestic organization,
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association, movement, group or combination of persons, designated by the Attorney
General as totalitarian, fascist, communist, or subversive.”119 In the eyes of the
government, participating in same-sex sex automatically identified one as a homosexual,
which further categorized one as subversive and morally weak, thus justifying grounds
for dismissal.
Although President Truman’s executive order affected all federal employees, the
State Department took an even more proactive approach to security than the President by
dismissing employees who were considered loyalty threats or security threats. As
Johnson establishes, “persons guilty of espionage or connections to allegedly subversive
organizations like the Communist Party were guilty of disloyalty.”120 The basis for a
disloyalty charge appeared to be evidence based, but the criteria for a security risk was
fundamentally speculative. Security risks “might divulge secret information, because they
were either careless or coerced.”121 A number of behaviors could designate an individual
a security risk, all of which focused on an element of moral pathology.
The “alcoholic, the loquacious, [and] the pervert” were the predominant types of
individuals considered to be security risks, but behavioral characteristics including
“habitual drunkenness, sexual perversion, moral turpitude, financial irresponsibility or
criminal record” also flagged individuals as security risks.122 Ultimately, the State
Department identified characteristics that might lead individuals to divulge secret or
sensitive information to communist spies or other foreign entities, who could in turn use
this intelligence to subvert or otherwise harm the United States. The loquacious
individual might reveal information on account of being over talkative, while the
alcoholic might reveal state secrets under the influence. But as Johnson emphasizes,
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“only the pervert was always [considered] a security risk.”123 On the one hand, the State
Department believed that homosexuals’ susceptibility to blackmail would lead them to
offer information to communists. On the other hand, the capacity for homosexuals to pass
as heterosexual rendered homosexuals an even greater threat.124 A fundamental issue
nagged as the purge of homosexuals began, which undoubtedly contributed sexual panic:
what, precisely, counted as homosexuality?
In the absence of material evidence that proved one engaged in same-sex sex,
government officials in the late 1940s were forced to contend with a question that could
not be easily answered.125 As Naoko Shibusawa points out, the lack of “physical markers
used to reject individuals from entrance into the military or the nation, such as flat feet,
hookworm, or syphilis” were unavailable to the various committees charged with the task
of identifying security risks.126 Matters were made more complicated by the lack of racial
diversity in the civil service, forcing the State Department to locate the alleged security
risks among a homogenous group of white men and women. In addressing the fact that
racial minorities “could not serve as convenient scapegoats,” Shibusawa argues that the
State Department relied upon “‘othering’ homosexuals as the very opposite of what loyal
public servants supposedly stood for. . . [because] [t]hey did not know what to look for in
a potential security risk.”127 Indeed, the State Department’s criteria for homosexuality
relied upon conflating homosexuality with “immoral” behaviors that had little to do with
one’s sexual identity or desires. For example, Johnson notes that homosexuals were
believed to be gregarious, and therefore at risk of sharing secrets, while 1940s
psychiatrists linked alcoholism to latent homosexuality.128 In addition, many maintained
that homosexuals were inherently criminal—a belief that dated back to nineteenth
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century.129 Overall, the State Department’s failure to arrive at a definition of
homosexuality was perhaps pragmatic: the suspicion of homosexuality, or any other
behavior believed to be associated with homosexuality was enough to justify one’s
dismissal. However, the federal government’s inability to specifically define
homosexuality—at least as anything other than the accumulation of moral pathologies—
reflects upon very instability of the term.
Sexologists engaged in research on homosexuality remained divided over two key
issues. First, sexologists remained conflicted over the cause of homosexuality. Writing at
the turn of the century, sexologists such as Havelock Ellis reaffirmed the nineteenth
century belief that homosexuality was a congenital condition, and could not be cured.130
Ellis’s position stood in contrast to Sigmund Freud, who asserted that homosexuality was
an acquired trait, and as such, had the potential to be reversed or cured with appropriate
treatment.131 The second debate corresponded to the definition of homosexuality.
Homosexuality was difficult to define because it was unclear “how much” homosexuality
one had to engage in—by way of one’s acts or desires—to constitute a homosexual
identity. While sexologists like Richard von Krafft-Ebing argued that effeminate men and
masculine women were an indication of “true” homosexuality on account of their gender
inversion, this logic failed to account for masculine men and feminine women.132 As
Regina Kunzel notes, Krafft-Ebing made “an effort to distinguish between homosexuality
caused by inborn anomaly, which he termed ‘perversion,’ and its ‘acquired’ forms, which
he labeled ‘perversity.’”133
Mid-century understandings of homosexuality grew increasingly complicated in
1948 with the publication of Alfred Kinsey’s Sexual Behavior in the Human Male.
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Kinsey’s groundbreaking study not only claimed that 10% of the population was
homosexual, but that the vast majority of individuals experienced some form of same sex
desire.134 Kinsey established the idea of sexual fluidity by demonstrating that one’s
desires and behaviors can change over time, thus prompting the development of the
Kinsey Scale. This scale, which denoted exclusive heterosexual behavior and desires at
the 0 mark, and exclusive homosexual behavior at the 6 mark, suggested that many
individuals could fall anywhere between 0-6, where a 3 denoted an equal amount of
heterosexual and homosexual desires and/or behaviors.135 Kinsey’s research was
groundbreaking, but as Kunzel points out, his study was heavily critiqued because his
data, “which he presented as a representative sample of American men,” included “sexual
histories of convicts, outcasts, and deviants. . . and imprisoned sex offenders.”136
Although Kinsey’s data remained unaffected when he removed prisoners from his
dataset, this critique reflected the belief that homosexuals were inherently criminal.137
While the federal government and sexologists concerned themselves—albeit for
very different reasons—with understanding the definition and cause of homosexuality,
these questions were amplified within American prisons. Sexologists and prison officials
were well aware of the high incidence of homosexuality within prisons. Kunzel explains
that, “because of the close connections between criminality and sexual deviance forged in
the criminological imagination, the fact that the population of criminals and homosexuals
overlapped was utterly predictable.”138 While the targeted criminalization of homosexuals
explained the higher rates of homosexuality in prisons, many believed that prisons caused
homosexuality. This fear was particularly intense at mid-century, Kunzel suggests, due to
the belief that “prison, rather than simply collecting perverts, played an active part in
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producing them.”139 In fact, when the state charged that Van Waters condoned
homosexual relationships among reformatory students, they implied that Van Waters
produced homosexuals.140 In a cultural moment where homosexuality was perhaps the
most dangerous form of delinquency, the insinuation that Van Waters produced
homosexuals had the capacity to destroy her career.
The notion that homosexuals filled prisons was not altogether unsupported: Dr.
George W. Henry and Dr. Alfred A. Gross’s study of male homosexual delinquents
solidified the figure of the homosexual delinquent when they revealed that “members of
this delinquent group are social liabilities” due to high recidivism rates, addiction,
poverty, and a “poor biological start.”141 Acknowledging the alleged production of
homosexuality in a predominantly white women’s reformatory only increased moral
panic and outrage in the midst of the Lavender Scare. According to population data
gathered by Lekkerkerker between 1927 and 1929, 80.1% of students at the
Massachusetts Reformatory for Women were classified as “native white.”142 The
remaining 19.9% of the reformatory’s population represented foreign-born women,
including “colored foreign-born” women, across eleven nationalities.143 It is unclear how
“native” black women were classified at Framingham, but evidence of a racially
integrated institution implies that black women in the Boston area were sent to the
reformatory.144 On the one hand, Framingham’s integration suggests that the
incarceration of black women in Massachusetts might have inverted a growing national
trend in which, according to Cheryl Hicks, more black women served time in “custodial
local jails. . . than in rehabilitative institutions.”145 On the other hand, it was common for
so-called “integrated” reformatories to segregate within the institution on account of
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racism that underscored a desire to curb intimate relationships among black and white
women.146 Van Waters’s decision to maintain racial integration would have been suspect
in an era where “any degree of closeness between people of different races was likely to
be interpreted. . . as implying a sexual relationship.”147
Van Waters’s academic training influenced her approach to confronting charges
of homosexuality at the Massachusetts Reformatory for Women. Van Waters did not
ignore same sex relationships, but she did hesitate to assign a homosexual identity to
women at the reformatory.148 Van Waters’s interdisciplinary understanding of
homosexuality, informed by the fields of medicine, psychiatry, sexology, and social
work, influenced her belief that homosexuality was a psychopathology that could be
cured. Though it would seem counterintuitive for Van Waters to take this stance,
understanding homosexuality as a pathology aligned with her larger belief in
rehabilitation. Those who believed in congenital homosexuality were stuck with an
immutable condition that could not be changed. By extension, congenital homosexuality
could easily be linked to congenital criminality which left no room to support
rehabilitation, and instead supported a punitive penology. Van Waters’s belief in
rehabilitation, however, suggests that she maintained a strategic interpretation of prison
homosexuality: homosexuality may be pathological, but its acquired forms had the
potential to be treated, redirected, and even cured.
At the reformatory, Van Waters recommended psychological testing for women
suspected of homosexuality, but there is little evidence to suggest that Van Waters
attempted to cure homosexuality, or convert known homosexuals at Framingham to
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heterosexuality.149 In one 1948 letter to the Massachusetts Society for Mental Hygiene,
Van Waters described the Reformatory’s procedures for psychological testing:
The Rorschak [sic] test is given to selected cases. Results are interpreted
by my brother, Ralph Van Waters, psychologist, formerly with the State
Department of Criminology and Juvenile Research in Illinois, now
operating a clinic in Boston. Cases are selected on recommendations of a
psychiatrist or on referral from the classification committee.150
In noting that the Rorschach test was implemented at Framingham, Van Waters cited her
commitment to a test that was commonly used to detect homosexuality among men. Peter
Hegarty explains that the Rorschach test was developed by the Swiss psychiatrist
Hermann Rorschach in 1921, but became popular in the United States in the early 1940s
when “homosexuality became grounds for psychiatric exclusion from the military for the
first time.”151 In the midst of World War II, Rorschach tests were regularly administrated
to prospective servicemen in group settings, and interpreted in order to identify
homosexuals and dishonorably discharge them from military service.152
An individual’s response to the ten Rorschach inkblots was believed, in the 1940s,
to reveal information about their unconscious. A psychiatrist or trained researcher could
compare an individual’s response to the inkblots to Rorschach’s interpretive schemas,
and determine whether the subject was homosexual or heterosexual. Although
interpretive schemas for the Rorschach test would continue to be refined and developed,
the test was still an incredibly subjective method for detecting homosexuality. Indeed, as
Allan Bérubé demonstrates, it was not uncommon for sympathetic military psychiatrists
to cover up their patient’s homosexuality by purposefully misdiagnosing them.
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Sometimes this meant misdiagnosing a patient with a physical condition, while other
times psychiatrists misdiagnosed patients as psychoneurotic instead of homosexual.153
The goal of these “humane errors” was to keep the word homosexual out of the patient’s
medical records, which would grant them an honorable discharge from the military.154 A
Rorschach test that pointed to homosexuality could be purposefully misinterpreted, or be
overturned by a psychiatric examination.
In returning to Van Water’s letter to the Massachusetts Society for Mental
Hygiene, it is noteworthy that Van Waters omitted information related to treatment
protocols for homosexuals at the Reformatory. In fact, it would be difficult to prove that
Van Waters established a treatment plan for homosexuals, considering, as Freedman
points out, the “psychiatric records at Framingham reveal that the staff tried to avoid ‘any
punitive attitudes’ toward homosexual behavior, especially if the Rorschach test did not
provide ‘positive evidence.’”155 Not only did the staff at Framingham avoid punitive
attitudes, the Rorschach test was administered but rarely used to diagnose a woman as
homosexual. Psychiatric records corresponding to September 1948 reveals a list of
women identified as possible homosexuals.156 In these records, the staff psychiatrists, Dr.
A. Ward and Dr. H. Baker, consistently avoid diagnosing the women as homosexual,
even when they admitted their homosexual desires. For example, one woman’s
psychiatric observation indicated that she was “dominated by homosexual feelings” but
that there was “no evidence” of homosexuality at the reformatory.157 This woman’s
Rorschach test did “not provide positive evidence regarding homosexuality,” but it also
did not rule it out: “personal experiments of this nature on her part are not impossible.” 158
Overall, the psychiatrist concluded that “there is no indication, however, that this is a
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basic problem,” and the woman was paroled to her mother within six months.159 Another
observation concerning a woman rumored to be homosexual concluded that there was
“no evidence of homosexuality although she is a tom-boy in appearance and has an
attitude of reliance and self confidence.”160 Despite her masculine gender transgression,
the psychiatrist argued that the woman “had made much improvement” and was “a
suitable person for parole consideration.”161
Like WWII psychiatrists, psychiatrists at the Massachusetts Reformatory for
Women were reluctant to diagnose women offenders as homosexuals in the absence of
overt evidence of homosexual acts. At most, Framingham psychiatrists labeled women as
a “homosexual type,” which, as one psychiatric observation emphasized, did not mean
the woman in question was “a homosexual,” but “merely ‘a type’” of homosexual.162
Within the context of Freudian psychiatry and sexology of which Van Waters was a
proponent, this meant the woman could be considered a latent, or unconscious
homosexual. Alternatively, a repressed homosexual was another possibility, which,
different from the act of suppressing homosexual desires, suggests that homosexuality is
“unable to enter consciousness.”163 Overall, psychiatrists overwhelmingly diagnosed
women as having a “psychopathic personality.”164 Just as WWII psychiatrists used a
psychoneurotic diagnosis to circumvent a homosexual diagnosis, reformatory
psychiatrists avoided homosexual diagnoses by instead diagnosing women with
psychopathic personalities, a significantly more vague personality disorder.
There are several strategic explanations for why Van Waters, and by extension,
the psychiatrists she worked with, would have avoided diagnosing women offenders as
homosexual at the Reformatory. Women who were known homosexuals, while eligible
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for indenture under Van Waters, would stand little chance of parole in front of a
conservative parole board who would view homosexuality as an incurable form of
delinquency. This fear was legitimated by the fact that even cooperative parole boards
could do little to justify parole in the face of overt homosexuality. On July 3, 1944, one
woman’s parole was revoked because she had “been engaged in homosexual activities to
such an extent that she is unable to adjust in employment.”165 Although the parole board
was aware of a previous parole violation the woman committed on May 15, 1944, they
overlooked this violation and did not take action against her until reports of
homosexuality surfaced. After parole was revoked, this woman was transferred to the
Salem House of Correction, a jail north of Boston in Essex County, for two years before
being transferred back to Framingham. Ultimately, this woman, who was known to
participate in homosexual acts at the reformatory, married a man in 1946, and was
released from the reformatory in 1947.166 This example reveals that known homosexual
prisoners could be punished by adding years to their incarceration, not because they
committed new crimes, or violated their parole, but because of their delinquent sexuality.
Regardless of what Van Waters personally believed about homosexuality, the
criminalization of homosexuality significantly undermined her ability to rehabilitate
women offenders at Framingham. In an effort to prevent delinquency and homosexuality
from being conflated, it worked to a woman’s advantage to be classified as having some
other psychological condition other than homosexuality to increase their odds of
obtaining release. Another reason Van Waters and her staff hesitated to diagnose women
as homosexual rests in the fact a homosexual diagnosis may have been a misdiagnosis.
Within the context of the reformatory, the distinction between a “real” or “true”
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homosexual was difficult to discern. What was known, however, was that same-sex sex
was to be expected in institutions that segregated its inhabitants from the opposite sex.
Among the sexologists who researched the cause of homosexuality, many were
primarily concerned with the occurrence of “congenital” homosexuality among middle
and upper-class whites whose same-sex sex threatened white supremacy.167 As Melissa
Stein outlines, the alleged biological inferiority of “lower classes” and “lower races”
advanced by scientific racism led sexologists to conclude that African Americans, people
of mixed race or ethnicity, and immigrants spread homosexual vice.168 For example,
feminine women like Antoinette DiBenedetto— on the cusp of whiteness, yet Italian;
pious and respectable, but probably working class—did not fit neatly into the homosexual
rubric advanced by American sexologists. In the eyes of the homophobic public, it was
shocking to imagine that a woman of DiBenedetto’s social stature could potentially be
embroiled in a homosexual relationship. Van Waters’s belief in acquired homosexuality
was hardly reassuring in this context—especially when she collapsed the racist and
classist distinctions of American sexology by affirming that it was normal for women,
regardless of background, to engage in same-sex sex when institutionalized.
While American sexologists were often unsympathetic towards homosexuals,
several prominent European sexologists advocated on behalf of homosexuals. In
analyzing Van Waters’s thoughts on homosexuality, it would seem that she followed the
work of Dr. Magnus Hirschfeld: a renowned German sexologist who led Europe’s gayrights movement by insisting that homosexuality was congenital, and therefore must be
decriminalized in Germany. In 1919, Hirschfeld founded the Institute for Sexual Science
in Berlin, which functioned as both a free medical clinic and a research lab that offered
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free public lectures. The Institute survived until 1933, when Hitler ordered it to shut
down, resulting in the burning of Hirschfeld’s collection and the Institute’s robust library.
Hirschfeld died of illness in 1935, but his students compiled his work in a collection titled
Sexual Anomalies: The Origins, Nature, and Treatment of Sexual Disorders. Published in
1948, this text was imagined by Hirschfeld as a “textbook for those whose professional
duties render a knowledge of sexual pathology necessary or useful, such as students,
criminologists, judges, probation officers, [and] educators.” Even though Van Waters and
Hirschfeld disagreed on the origins of homosexuality, Hirschfeld’s theory of female
homosexuality proved useful to Van Waters.169
In advocating for the decriminalization of homosexuality, Hirschfeld argued that
homosexuality could not “be eliminated by psychological means,” and consequently
rejected psychological interventions like hypnosis as a form of treatment. Although Van
Waters believed homosexual urges could be cured, or at least redirected, Hirschfeld’s
examination of female homosexuality helps explain Van Waters’s reluctance to diagnose
women offenders as homosexual. Hirschfield believed, in accordance with Havelock
Ellis, that women may “seek sexual satisfaction in Lesbian love, as a substitute for
normal intercourse. This applies with even greater force where intercourse with men is in
itself difficult or impossible, while intercourse with women is particularly easy.” The
prison, according to Hirschfeld, was a totally unsurprising site for lesbianism because
women had little to no access to men.170
Although Hirschfeld acknowledged the existence of genuinely homosexual
women, he believed that most homosexual women were actually “pseudohomosexual.”
Hirschfield primarily distinguished genuine homosexuality from pseudohomosexuality
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by comparing an individual’s sexual acts with their sexual desires. For Hirschfeld,
genuine homosexuality “only exists where the physical acts are an outcome of
homosexual mentality,” while pseudohomosexuality “relates to homosexual acts which
are not determined by a consistent mentality, but are directed by aims which are outside
the sphere of the sexual impulse.” In distinguishing between sexual acts and sexual
desires, or “mentality,” Hirschfeld emphasized that one’s sexual acts may not align with
one’s mentality, or sexual desires. This meant that pseudohomosexual women were not
pathological, especially if they had been seduced by a homosexual woman. Hirschfeld’s
theory of pseudohomosexuality is reflected in Van Waters’s belief that women exhibiting
homosexual tendencies at the reformatory were quite likely temporary and circumstantial
departures from heterosexuality.171
At Framingham, Van Waters possessed two scientifically backed strategies that
allowed her downplay the occurrence of homosexual acts among reformatory women,
and avoid the propensity to use homosexuality as a means of justifying one’s
incarceration. On the one hand, women who acknowledged their homosexual desires, but
who did not produce psychiatric evidence of homosexuality through the Rorschach, could
not be considered genuine homosexuals. On the other hand, women who participated in
homosexual acts could not be considered genuine homosexuals if their desires potentially
still aligned with heterosexuality. As fears of homosexuality and communism spread,
however, the difference between genuine homosexuality and pseudohomosexuality
mattered little as post-war conservatism took hold and the Lavender Scare spread.
Eventually, there was little Van Waters could to do to circumvent the idea that prisons
produced homosexuality. As the reformatory succumbed to intensive state surveillance,
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Van Waters simultaneously succumbed to an attack that sought to destroy her personally
and politically.

The Chief Pervert’s Lavender Delinquents
Miriam Van Waters’s indenture program attracted decades worth of negative
attention from the Massachusetts parole board, and yet, for years, Van Waters managed
to survive this ongoing power struggle. The death of Antoinette DiBendetto, however,
launched a two-pronged attack that transformed the reformatory into a prison by
destroying indenture and using homosexuality to justify the punitive imprisonment of
women offenders. In fact, destroying indenture only became possible after the
reformatory succumbed to intensive surveillance that appealed to the Lavender Scare by
making a spectacle of homosexuality at the reformatory. Writing in September 1948, Van
Waters recognized the power of the carceral cycle as it attempted to overthrow
rehabilitation: “The time is evidently at hand for the people of Massachusetts to make up
their minds if the Reformatory For Women is to continue its work of rehabilitation,” Van
Waters wrote, “or to be run as a prison.”172 Van Waters recognized that the state’s
crusade to destroy her and her methods of rehabilitation was the prelude to a new era of
women’s prisons.
Over the course of her career, Van Waters’s contributions to the fields of
penology and social work led her to national and international prominence among
academics, clergy, penologists, and politicians. As a product of the progressive
movement, the rise of the Cold War transformed Van Waters from a celebrated
progressive into a dangerous subversive whose expertise potentially threatened national
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security. Johnson’s study of the Lavender Scare emphasizes that the rapid expansion of
the federal government, as part of the New Deal implemented by President Franklin
Delano Roosevelt throughout the 1930s, led many Americans to believe “that
bureaucracy was a powerful, emasculating, immoral force subverting American’s
democratic traditions.” In addition to the emasculated men who worked in the federal
government, many of the new civil servants were women who “invaded the male
workspace” and inverted “the natural order” when they refused to return to the domestic
sphere. Not only were civil servants frequently “better educated and of a higher social
origin than the law makers,” they were perceived as a threat because they were
considered an “antidemocratic force” that seized power from “the people’s elected
officials.” Van Waters may not have endured the same kind of loyalty/security checks
that federal civil servants experienced in Washington D.C., but she undeniably resembled
the type of civil servant that threatened the government.173
As an appointed state employee, Van Waters occupied the middle ground between
an elected politician and a hired civil servant. Appointing a woman to the position of
superintendent was not unusual considering the history of American women’s
reformatories, but women like Van Waters routinely bucked traditional female gender
roles. For example, Van Waters earned her PhD in anthropology in 1913, which, aside
from being rare for women in the early twentieth century, equipped Van Waters with
opportunities to publish, travel, and ultimately lead the fields of social work and
penology.174 As much as Van Waters’s education empowered her, it simultaneously
portrayed her as an approximation of the well-educated civil servant. A woman with a
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doctoral degree represented the kind of intellectual expertise that rendered well-educated
civil servants suspicious.
As an unmarried woman, Van Waters put her career ahead of her personal life,
particularly as she established her reputation on the west coast. Eventually, Van Waters
adopted her daughter after falling “in love” with a seven year old girl that she became
acquainted with through her work in Los Angeles’s juvenile courts.175 At the same time
Van Waters entered motherhood, she also transitioned into another life-altering
relationship when her friendship with Geraldine Thompson evolved into a romantic
partnership. Thompson’s influence and philanthropy eventually facilitated Van Waters’s
ability to find gainful employment Boston, but their physical proximity did not mean
their relationship was any less discreet. Although the two spent extensive time with one
another’s families over more than forty years, neither Van Waters nor Thompson
identified as lesbians, much less as homosexual.
Van Waters’s sexuality is difficult to describe because her relationship with
Thompson began at a time where the language used to describe women who loved
women was in flux. According to Estelle Freedman, it would be ahistorical to refer to
Van Waters or Thompson as lesbians, a term which throughout the early twentieth
century functioned as a pejorative typically used to describe working class, overtly
masculine, and/or women of color.176 Van Waters and Thompson’s whiteness and
conventional femininity, in addition to the benefits both women gleaned from
Thompson’s wealth, squarely excluded them from the category of lesbian. Even in the
event Van Waters and Thompson occupied different social positions, Lillian Faderman
argues that many women who loved women would have refused to identify as lesbians in
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the 1930s on account of their financial dependence upon men, fear of the resentment
associated with seeking independent employment, and/or discomfort with the
pathological rhetoric associated with homosexuality.177 For women like Thompson who
maintained access to wealth through her husband, identifying as a lesbian would likely
destroy her marriage, and by extension, the “respectability of that socially condoned
institution.”178 However, Van Waters, as a beneficiary of other women’s wealth, had the
opportunity to live a more subversive life and risk the loss of femininity associated with
holding an “important professional position.”179 Even though World War II ushered in a
more tolerant social climate that would have allowed Van Waters to identify as a lesbian
with fewer consequences, it was still difficult for the women of Van Waters’s and
Thompson’s generation to shed the myriad negative connotations associated with
lesbianism.
It is impossible to arrive at an identity that accurately describes Van Waters.
However, her relationship with Thompson need not be called a lesbian relationship in
order to consider Van Waters a queer figure. The extent to which Van Waters and
Thompson engaged in a sexual relationship is irrelevant to scholars like Jennifer Reed,
who emphasizes that “one does not have to ‘know’ what physically happens between
people to know they are creating intimacies that matter, outside of the terms of
heteronormativity.”180 In accordance with Reed, the term queer signals Van Waters’s
refusal to acquiesce to compulsory heterosexuality, while also accounting for Van
Waters’s capacity to challenge hegemonic femininity. Van Waters’s queerness is
noteworthy because she was keenly aware of the vulnerability that living outside of social
norms entailed. For instance, Van Waters’s relationship with Thompson supported Van
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Waters’s rehabilitative work at Framingham, but this relationship simultaneously put Van
Waters’s livelihood at risk in the event political enemies discovered the romantic nature
of their relationship. In fact, Van Waters proactively protected herself from homosexual
and/or lesbian accusations when she decided to burn her personal correspondence with
Thompson at the height of the state’s surveillance of the reformatory in 1948. Noting in
her journal that “one can have no personal ‘life’ in this battle,” Van Waters deliberately
burned Thompson’s “many letters over 22 years.”181 Freedman understands Van Waters’s
remark as “the smoking gun” that explains the absence of intimate correspondence
between Thompson and Van Waters, but this passage also suggests that Van Waters’s
deliberate silences, gaps, and absences speak the loudest as Van Waters occupied an
unspeakable identity.182
Van Waters and Thompson were not the only couple whose relationship
eschewed a clear and definitive label in the 1930s and 1940s. For example, Van Waters
and Thompson maintained close ties to Eleanor Roosevelt, a friend of Thompson’s. Reed
emphasizes that the public never identified Roosevelt as lesbian or bisexual, but several
historians agree that Roosevelt led a queer life. According to Reed, Roosevelt’s
“expansive affectional capacity, her ability to love intensely outside of heteronormativity,
and her positioning as a woman outside the norms of femininity [made] her queer.”183
Historians often invoke Roosevelt’s letters to Lorena Hickok as evidence of their
romantic relationship, though many historians maintain that their relationship was
platonic. The content of Roosevelt’s letters are difficult to read as platonic exchanges, but
it is also significant that Hickok, like Van Waters, burned “the most explicit of the
letters” she received from Roosevelt. Rodger Streitmatter’s compilation of Roosevelt and
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Hickok’s letters includes an anecdote in which Hickok explained to Eleanor’s daughter,
Anna, that “your Mother wasn’t always so very discreet in her letters to me.”184 While
the contents of Hickok and Van Waters’s burned letters will always be unknown, the urge
to destroy this correspondence points not to a definitive identity, but to an awareness of
the consequences of existing as a woman who loved another woman. Power and privilege
did little to protect against the stigma associated with loving and existing beyond
heteronormativity.
Despite all the ways in which Roosevelt lived a queer life, she was still
considered an extraordinary influential political ally. Thompson initially introduced Van
Waters to Roosevelt as a means of drawing political attention to the Massachusetts
Reformatory for Women at various points throughout Van Waters’s career. Roosevelt
visited the reformatory five times between 1940 and 1957, after which Roosevelt would
sing Van Waters’s praises in her syndicated newspaper column, “My Day.” For example,
after visiting in the fall of 1945, Roosevelt remarked that the reformatory needed “new
buildings and, under the new commissioner, they hope to get some of them.”185 For
Roosevelt to use her political clout as former First Lady to publically pressure a state
official to act is merely one example of Roosevelt’s queerness at work that demonstrated
her ability to assert herself as an authoritative political figure. Van Waters undeniably
benefitted from Roosevelt’s endorsement, but Johnson’s scholarship points out that by
1948, Americans believed that the New Deal contributed to the loosening of the country’s
moral codes, which in turn, promoted homosexuality.186 For those who viewed Eleanor
Roosevelt as a subversive figure, an association with Roosevelt further positioned Van
Waters as sympathetic to subversion. Although, as Freedman puts it, Van Waters was
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“never accused of communist sympathies,” Van Waters consistently engaged in
subversive acts as a woman, mother, romantic partner, penologist, and superintendent.
The ways Van Waters consistently pushed the boundaries of hegemonic femininity were
easily enumerated.
In the early months of 1948, the attack on indenture and the attack on
homosexuality at the reformatory quickly converged. On January 9, Van Waters learned
that Congresswoman “Leslie Culter [would be] introducing a bill at Miss [Katharine]
Sullivan’s request about indenture.”187 Noting the day before that the parole board was
uncharacteristically “gentle” and caused “no destruction,” Van Waters finally understood
that the parole board was conserving its energy for a much larger battle.188 The
significance of Katherine Sullivan’s request was not lost on Van Waters. Governor Tobin
appointed Sullivan to the parole board in 1946, but Sullivan was already critical of
indenture after participating in the parole board’s 1936 indenture investigation on behalf
of Governor Curly.189 Sullivan had long opposed Van Waters’s penology: while Van
Waters downplayed the severity of moral offenses, Sullivan maintained “a punitive
approach to moral offenders.”190 As a conservative Catholic, Sullivan’s politics were
unsurprising, especially in contrast to Van Waters. As a Protestant, Van Waters placed
the notion of redemption at the cornerstone of her penology, which differed substantially
from the Catholic belief in penance.
Sullivan’s 1956 monograph, Girls on Parole, illuminates her motivation in asking
Cutler to introduce House Bill #1544 and abolish indenture. Sullivan believed that “a
prison system is valueless when it returns its charges to society more corrupt than when it
took them, yet this is one of the grave hazards of our prison system today.” Sullivan
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identified homosexuality, commonly referred to as “doll racket” at the reformatory, as the
moral hazard that could corrupt anyone facing incarceration. In fact, Sullivan was among
those who feared that the prison caused homosexuality, writing that “the most tragic
inmates are the ones who lived normal lives before being sent to prison and who after
‘doing time’ have not the slightest interest in leading natural lives again.” Sullivan’s
belief that prison homosexuals had the capacity to ruin heterosexual women explains her
opposition to indenture. If Van Waters used indenture to circumvent the parole board,
knowing full well that “moral offenders” stood little chance in front of the conservative
board, Sullivan believed that a prison sentence produced delinquent behavior like
homosexuality. For Sullivan, destroying indenture would prohibit the rehabilitation of
morally corrupt women who were, by virtue of their exposure to homosexuality,
impossible to rehabilitate. Abolishing indenture would also restore full power to the
parole board, which would help contain homosexuality by denying homosexuals and
other moral offenders the opportunity of parole. As an outspoken homophobe, Sullivan
maintained that “a true or confirmed homosexual would be an extremely poor parole
candidate and I do not recall ever releasing such a woman.” In keeping with mid-century
conservatism, Sullivan doubled down on the belief that homosexuals were delinquents.
As long as carceral institutions ruined women by exposing them, or converting them to
homosexuals, they could not be rehabilitated. As a result, homosexuality, when situated
as an irrefutable form of delinquency, provided the impetus to restore punitive carceral
control at the reformatory.191
On January 19, 1948, Van Waters consulted with the outgoing Commissioner of
Corrections, Paul Doyle, and his Deputy Commissioner, Daniel McDevitt, to determine
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what individual or group was spearheading the attack on indenture.192 Although Van
Waters knew that the state auditors were “making the bullets,” and that Sullivan was
“suppl[ying] the fear and the hate,” she did not get an answer. Instead, Doyle and
McDevitt showed her a letter that demanded “of the commissioner a full examination of
the suicide of Nov. 11.”193 This warning came days before Elliott McDowell began his
term as Commissioner of Corrections in February 1948. While Van Waters remained
preoccupied with defeating HB #1544 throughout the month, her attention turned to the
surveillance of the reformatory on February 28, when she discovered that McDowell
appointed Frank A. Dwyer as his deputy commissioner.194 Van Waters, well aware of
Dywer’s political commitments, considered him the reformatory’s “chief enemy” not
only because he supported HB #1544, but because of his homophobia.195 “And now Mr.
Dwyer, the fox, guards the vineyard (Framingham),” Van Waters wrote, upon learning of
Dwyer’s appointment.196
McDowell and Dwyer visited the reformatory throughout the spring of 1948 to
review the indenture contracts Van Waters maintained with local businesses. According
to Burton Rowles’s 1962 biography of Van Waters, Van Waters and Associate
Superintendent Peg O’Keefe “had trouble satisfying the demand to produce all the day
work contracts,” because some of the contracts were made orally, to which “McDowell
and Dwyer expressed displeased surprise.”197 When HB #1544 was defeated in the spring
of 1948, McDowell continued to chip away at indenture. On April 22, Van Waters held a
conference with McDowell and Dwyer in which they imposed a number of limitations on
indenture. McDowell demanded that all indenture records at the reformatory be
transferred to the State House, relinquishing Van Waters’s ability to supervise indenture
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placements.198 McDowell further regulated indenture by attempting to ensure that
reformatory students were exposed to as little moral vice as possible. In order to ensure
that reformatory students did not work for ex-convicts, as had been the case at a
restaurant in Wellesley, “McDowell wanted no more [indenture] contracts submitted with
the employers signatures already on them. He wanted applications only. His office would
check the applications before authorizing any contracts.”199 Dismantling the indenture
program appeared to be McDowell’s primary path of destruction, but he also prohibited
Van Waters from hiring former prisoners, even when they were the most qualified
candidates for reformatory jobs. Despite the fact Van Waters believed her penology was
sound, and that currently incarcerated women benefitted from presence of former
inmates, McDowell refused to acknowledge the rehabilitative benefit associated with
employing formerly incarcerated women. In addition, McDowell disregarded her requests
and decisions, seeking to undermine Van Waters as often as possible. In recalling her
encounters with McDowell throughout the spring of 1948, Van Waters wrote that the
reformatory “could not secure cooperation from the commissioner.”200
The clerical errors that McDowell would identify upon reviewing Van Waters’s
indenture contracts allowed him to limit indenture, but clerical errors alone could not
uproot Van Waters from the reformatory. State Senator Lo Presti’s ongoing demands to
investigate the reformatory, however, provided a legitimate opportunity to surveil the
reformatory’s operation. Although the reformatory had been twice probed regarding the
matter of DiBenedetto’s suicide, first by the district attorney’s office, and a second time
by Deputy Commissioner McDevitt under Commissioner Doyle’s administration, Lo
Presti pressured McDowell to investigate.201 On May 1, 1948, Lo Presti announced that
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he would travel to the reformatory to investigate DiBenedetto’s suicide.202 McDowell
informed Van Waters that she maintained the authority to deny Lo Presti and direct him
to McDowell, but she could not turn Dwyer away when he arrived two days later to
conduct a “death investigation” on McDowell’s behalf.203 Dwyer’s investigation, an overt
form of state surveillance, quickly transformed into an interrogation as Dwyer harassed
reformatory staff and inmates over the coming months as he searched for evidence of
homosexuality.
In May 1948, the attacks on indenture and homosexuality converged as Dwyer
wreaked unchecked havoc at the reformatory and in the press. As Freedman writes,
McDowell sent Dwyer because he was “particularly interested in finding evidence that
[DiBenedetto’s] suicide might be related to the ‘doll racket,’ or homosexuality.”204 A
crusade against homosexuality, in mid-1948, facilitated McDowell’s agenda, but it also
launched a public attack on the reformatory that sought to discredit Van Waters as
superintendent. Over the course of his investigation, Dwyer interrogated and intimidated
inmates and staff at the reformatory, and even went so far as tracking down a formerly
incarcerated woman and interviewing her while she was drunk.205 Worse, Van Waters
suspected that Dwyer leaked his findings to the press. The Boston American, according to
Van Waters, was a “publication of lies,” that published scandalous information about Van
Waters and the reformatory that cast a shadow of immorality upon the reformatory.206
Van Waters routinely journaled about the “daily attacks” she encountered in the press. On
May 11, she shifted her focus from the “ex-convict employer” that indentured women as
waitresses to “prison homosexuality.” 207 For Van Waters, this shift in attack marked “the
darkest hour yet in Framingham.”208
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As Dwyer pursued the story behind DiBendetto’s death, an inmate with a
“mannish nature and deep voice” was identified as the alleged cause of DiBenedetto’s
death.209 According to Rowles, this particular inmate was “journalistically branded a
homosexual who had rebuffed Toni’s [DiBenedetto] suit, and either murdered her or
[drove] her to depression and suicide.”210 Although Dwyer ultimately rescinded these
claims, conceding that DiBenedetto had indeed committed suicide, rumors of
homosexuality at mid-century represented Van Waters’s superintendency as lenient, if
not altogether subversive. Despite the fact that homosexuality was well documented
throughout American prisons, Dwyer sought to “expose laxity in the Van Waters
administration,” which meant construing any form of homosexual tolerance into a
purposefully subversive act.211
The resolution of the DiBenedetto probe did not subdue Dwyer’s surveillance.
Instead, McDowell “authorized an expansion of Dwyer’s investigation because of the
new charges uncovered during the DiBenedetto investigation.”212 On June 1, Van Waters
was “put through the inquisition” and questioned by McDowell and Dwyer for five
hours.213 On this day, McDowell outlined a list of Van Waters’s infractions derived from
Dwyer’s investigation. McDowell accused Van Waters of favoritism, charging that
“inmates are holding or have held key positions without staff supervision,” and that
inmates have been allowed off the reformatory grounds without supervision.214 He
objected to Van Waters’s decision to hire formerly incarcerated women and employ staff
with criminal records. McDowell’s most damning accusation alleged that “many of the
inmates receiving special favors [were] ‘known’ homosexuals or dangerous
psychopaths.”215
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McDowell’s charges not only portrayed Van Waters as sympathetic to known
homosexuals and dangerous criminals, they suggested that Van Waters favored
homosexuals at the reformatory. He attacked the Thompson Fund, charging that women
“received money from private funds,” which “introduce[d] the possibility of
favoritism.”216 According to McDowell’s logic, favoritism at the reformatory always
benefitted homosexual women—an idea that McDowell perhaps developed after
speculating about Van Waters’s relationship to Thompson. Although Estelle Freedman
notes that Van Waters was not publically accused of homosexuality, she emphasizes how
accusations of homosexuality at the reformatory were used to target “not simply love, or
even erotic desire, between women, but also any nontraditional female choices, including
mannish dress, political authority, and economic mobility.”217 As such, McDowell’s
charges must be interpreted as attacking Van Waters on account of her queerness, which
did not necessitate publically admonishing her as a homosexual. Indeed, it would be
sufficient for McDowell to represent Van Waters as an immoral leader who favored
homosexuals, so much so that she strived to systematically rehabilitate them into the
community through the indenture program. For McDowell, this meant limiting Van
Waters’s agency as superintendent, ending rehabilitation, and containing the
reformatory’s homosexual threat. Delinquent women were irredeemable in the eyes of the
state, and deserved to be embedded within a cycle of delinquency, surveillance, and
prison.
Van Waters’s rebuttal to McDowell’s charges highlights how she used psychiatric
diagnoses and sexual classification systems to contest accusations of homosexuality at
the reformatory. Van Waters’s strategy demonstrates how one could invoke psychiatric
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expertise in a subversive attempt to protect herself, incarcerated women, and ultimately
the reformatory, from hostile accusations of homosexuality.218 Van Waters specified that
there were “no ‘known’ homosexuals or dangerous psychopaths receiving special favors”
at the reformatory.219 Furthermore, she stressed that homosexuality was a “medical
classification” that must be “diagnosed only by competent authority.” Van Waters needed
more professional support to help evaluate women, because same-sex desire “may not be
permanent in any event.”220 By leaning heavily on the expertise of mid-century
psychiatry, Van Waters emphasized that she could not recognize homosexuality because
she was not a psychiatrist, and as such, could not diagnose homosexuality because it was
a medical condition. To Van Waters’s benefit, the reformatory’s staff psychiatrists
avoided diagnosing women as homosexuals even in overt cases, which allowed Van
Waters to argue that one’s sexual acts, especially while incarcerated, do not necessarily
account for one’s identity. While this position did not subdue McDowell and Dwyer’s
overt homophobia, Van Waters’s theory of prison homosexuality aligned with Kinsey’s
groundbreaking study, further aligning her position with scientific research, albeit
research that contributed to controversy and panic throughout the United States.
To further contest McDowell’s charges of favoritism, Van Waters situated acts
perceived as favoritism as essential mechanisms of rehabilitation. Van Waters insisted
that women were deliberately given more responsibility in accordance with their
treatment plan, emphasizing that this approach “aided rehabilitation” and “made the
institution more efficient in output.” Similarly, she cited a lack of state funds as
justification for the Thompson Fund, which offset the reformatory’s “extreme need” and
paid for labor “beyond the line of duty.” Van Waters stressed that the Thompson Fund
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increased inmate morale, provided them with incentives, and ultimately offered “a chance
for rehabilitation of some of the most perplexing cases.” The Thompson Fund paid for
psychiatrists and psychologists when the state budget fell short, without which Waters
would have no scientific understanding of prison homosexuality, much less an
understanding of how to address this issue within the reformatory.221
Van Waters could not refute the charge that she hired staff with criminal records.
She patiently explained that the reformatory was hardly unique in this case. “This is true
of other institutions in the state,” Van Waters claimed, “and if these individuals [former
convicts] are to be excluded – the policy must be stated – and applied throughout all state
functions.”222 Rather than explain to McDowell why it was strategic to employ formerly
incarcerated women, Van Waters demanded that state policy, should it exist, be enforced
among all carceral institutions across the Commonwealth.
Despite Van Waters’s efforts to rebut McDowell’s charges, the damage caused by
Dwyer’s investigation was impossible to contain in 1948. In her journal, Van Waters
described Dwyer as a “character assassin” who “turned gossip into guilt” in order to
emphasize the power of Dwyer’s accusations in the midst of a nationwide panic over
homosexuality and communism.223 The state maintained the ability to discredit Van
Waters on account of suspicion, which caused her to fear that Governor Bradford might
dismiss her.224 Accusations of homosexual favoritism caused Van Waters’s methods to
carry the “taint of homosexuality,” forcing her to confront the possibility of losing control
of the reformatory.225 Indeed, the sixteen years Van Waters spent disrupting the carceral
cycle were coming to an abrupt end.
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Within a week of the May inquisition, McDowell presented Van Waters with a
list of twelve directives that undercut her agency as superintendent. Among the twelve
directives, McDowell demanded that Van Waters terminate indenture contracts for
women indentured to Van Waters or a reformatory staff person, while also requiring Van
Waters to submit a list of formerly incarcerated women employed by the reformatory as
staff.226 The most damaging directives, however, closed the reformatory’s permeable
border. These directives demanded that Van Waters keep all women “in custody within
the boundaries of the Reformatory for Women” and “permit no prisoner to leave the
premises of the Reformatory for Women.”227 Not only did these directives effectively end
indenture—only women lawfully indentured in domestic vocations could continue—they
created a permanent barrier that divided the reformatory from the Framingham
community. For a man like McDowell, who believed “the backbone of the penal
institution is custody and punishment,” these directives corresponded to the need to
contain homosexuals and other delinquent women, and formally introduce the carceral
cycle to the reformatory.228 McDowell destroyed Van Waters’s interventions, and in so
doing, created an environment that permanently embedded poor and working class
women within an unending cycle of incarceration. Aggravated by McDowell’s demand
for Van Waters to adhere by reformatory rules and regulations dating back to October of
1926, Van Waters insisted that “you cannot revert to rules of a quarter century ago
without disruption of modern rehabilitation.”229 Indeed, McDowell accomplished his
goal.
Once McDowell issued the twelve directives, he turned his attention to legislative
investigations of Framingham, and to the larger project of dismissing Van Waters. When
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McDowell received a completed version of what came to be known as the Dwyer Report
in late June, he shared the report with Governor Bradford, who authorized a legislative
probe into the reformatory.230 Lo Presti had motioned for a “thorough investigation of the
conduct of the Reformatory for Women at Framingham” as early as June 9, 1948, but
Bradford did not compile the eleven-person committee until early July.231 Investigating
homosexuality remained at the center of the legislative probe. When the press reported on
Bradford’s decision to launch a new probe, they continued to refer back to the rumors
surrounding Antoinette DiBenedetto’s death, despite the fact Dwyer concluded that
DiBenedetto commit suicide and that her death had nothing to do with homosexuality.
The press kept the production of homosexuality, and Van Waters’s allegedly subversive
penology, at the center of their coverage. The effect of this coverage garnered fervent
support for Van Waters among her allies, while many others demanded the “chief
pervert” be ousted from the reformatory’s superintendency.232
Governor Bradford’s eleven-person legislative committee did relatively little
throughout the summer of 1948. By September, an infuriated Lo Presti demanded that
Bradford suspend Van Waters because “the facts reveal that the conditions [at
Framingham] are so scandalous that they constitute an indictment of the present
superintendent of the reformatory.”233 The allegedly scandalous conditions at the
reformatory were derived from the Dwyer Report, parts of which were published in the
Boston American. A sustained focus on homosexuality, as Freedman notes, was
perpetuated by language that emphasized “charges of ‘shocking sex perversion’ and
‘Immoral Practices’” at the reformatory.234 The publication of the Dwyer Report stirred
the press, but it offered Van Waters little opportunity to defend herself because she never
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received a copy of the report, and refused to read the Boston American’s version.235 As
the possibility of her dismissal came into increasing focus, Van Waters’s supporters
rallied around her and established the Friends of the Framingham Reformatory, a
substantial defense fund for Van Waters’s attorney. The Friends organized a strong
counter narrative that illustrated the virtues of Van Waters’s rehabilitation, often
endorsed by clergy in an attempt to combat the misinformation that circulated in the
press.
Over the course of the fall Van Waters and her staff regularly worked with an
attorney, Claude Cross, and other influential leaders in the Boston community to prepare
Van Waters for the looming legislative committee hearing. The legislative committee
stalled, however, due to upcoming state elections, which included a gubernatorial race.
Van Waters became acquainted with Governor Bradford’s opponent, Paul A. Dever, who,
to her relief and satisfaction, “affirm[ed] his belief in rehabilitation.” 236 In early
November, Dever defeated Bradford in a landslide election. Dever’s election seemed, at
the time, advantageous to Van Waters, but the election of a new governor only served to
further interrupt the legislative committee’s action in the closing months of the Bradford
administration. Days after the election, Van Waters wrote that the “radio says [the]
Legislative Committee is folded up. What a frightening Cold War!”237
After the election, suspicion, anxiety, and paranoia settled into Van Waters’s
every day life. Despite being the subject of the legislative probe, she received little
information about the committee’s status—a decision that likely reflected a desire to
catch Van Waters in an illegal act by depriving her the opportunity to prepare for the
committee’s visit. Forced to live as if she were under surveillance, Van Waters never
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knew when the legislative committee would descend upon the reformatory. Indeed,
contrary to the radio’s report, nine members of the legislative committee appeared at the
reformatory to investigate on November 18. Though Van Waters learned on this day that
Governor Bradford contacted both McDowell and the legislative committee to “call off
the public hearing,” Van Waters still testified on her penology and the reformatory’s
conditions at the State House in Boston on November 22, 1948.238
Van Waters emerged from this hearing with a shallow victory: the legislative
committee “voted to call it quits and suggested the 1949 session of the Legislature name
another group of probers.”239 Under the impression that Dever was sympathetic to her
reforms, Van Waters took immediate action to overturn McDowell’s June directives. She
met with the League of Women Voters to discuss “plans for legislation,” insisting that
“we must rid the Commonwealth of this injustice to the woman offender.240 However, on
December 5, Van Waters learned that Dever intended to “appoint a new commission (not
an expert)” to investigate her superintendency and the reformatory.241 In expressing her
disappointment in Dever’s decision to appoint a new commission of politicians, Van
Waters articulated her belief that politicians were ill equipped and frankly too uneducated
to judge her rehabilitative program. Emphasizing her position as an expert in penology
and social work, Van Waters stated in the press that “law makers and law enforcement
officers who are competent to define the laws are not equipped to prevent
delinquency.”242 The desire to be judged by her peers, however, only served to further
portray Van Waters as an intensely subversive bureaucratic figure: she positioned herself
and the reformatory as complex, scientific, and illegible to the common politician. At a
time when education and expertise were grounds for suspicion and potential subversion
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in Washington D.C., Van Waters risked further aggravating Massachusetts politicians by
portraying them as too unqualified and uneducated to truly evaluate the women’s
reformatory.
By December 11, a new rumor circulated in the press: McDowell intended to
dismiss Van Waters.243 Although it was also rumored that McDowell would “not remove
her until the new administration [took] over next January—if at all,” Van Waters received
widespread support in response to this rumor in and beyond the Boston community.244
Clergy, social workers, politicians, and experts in criminology and penology publically
and privately advocated for Van Waters. Despite the public admonishment of
McDowell’s plan, his intentions were confirmed in the press as early as December 27.245
On January 7, 1949, the same day Governor Dever took office, Van Waters received a list
of twenty-seven charges from McDowell that culminated in her termination at midnight
on January 11. Van Waters’s legal team immediately gathered to assemble a sound legal
strategy. No ally was beyond reach—even Eleanor Roosevelt was shortlisted as a
potential trial witness in support of Van Waters as the appeal proceedings began to
unfold.246 The Van Waters case would determine the future of women’s penology in
Massachusetts: either Van Waters would win her appeal and presumably return to
rehabilitating women at the reformatory, or the reformatory would continue to transform
into a women’s prison.

The Birth of the Punitive Women’s Prison
Elliott McDowell’s twenty-seven charges targeted the tools and strategies Van
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Waters used to interrupt the production of delinquency at the Massachusetts Reformatory
for Women. Some charges amounted to clerical or technical infractions, which often
implicated a former commissioner of correction’s poor attention to detail. Other charges
addressed moments when Van Waters broke the law, particularly when she used the
indenture law beyond its domestic scope. By far, the most damaging charges alleged that
Van Waters condoned homosexuality, implemented subversive rules, and jeopardized the
reformatory’s security. In an attempt to gather public support for Van Waters’s removal,
McDowell implied that the reformatory produced homosexuals under Van Waters’s
watch. When she failed “to segregate inmates with recorded homosexual tendencies from
other inmates,” McDowell alleged that Van Waters “failed to prevent” homosexuality at
the reformatory.”247 The rehabilitation of women offenders rapidly transformed into a
dangerous project in light of each woman’s perceived exposure to homosexuality. Many
members of the public agreed with McDowell. In the words of one individual, the women
left in Van Waters’s care “may be received as women yet seldom leave as women.”248
The attack Van Waters faced damaged her reputation and her reforms, but it
annihilated the indenture program that “moral offenders” depended upon as a means of
easing their transition between the institution and the community. The targeted
destruction of indenture demonstrates the state’s decision to denounce indenture’s
rehabilitative benefits in favor of parole, a far less successful method of release.
According to one report comparing the differences between parole and indenture,
between 31-44% of the reformatory’s population was paroled each year between 1943
and 1947, compared to 6-15% of students who were indentured. Among the women
paroled, only 58-71% maintained parole, meaning paroled women had, on average, a
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35% chance of returning to the reformatory upon revocation of parole. Indenture was
significantly more successful: 73-84% of indentured women maintained their positions,
while an average of 21% of indentured women escaped from their positions.249 Despite
the fact that escapees received an additional sentence, indenture was always more
successful than parole in reintegrating women into the community. McDowell’s crusade
to destroy indenture can only be understood as a concerted, if not conscious, effort to
transform the reformatory into a punitive prison that would maintain the production of
delinquency within the carceral cycle.
McDowell could not claim that indenture was inferior to parole, but he could
imply that Van Waters indentured potentially homosexual women. Equipped with the
Dwyer Report—a document derived from months of state surveillance that Van Waters
had never seen— McDowell villainized Van Waters for what she could not control: same
sex-attraction within a same-sex institution. According to McDowell’s logic, tolerating
homosexuality fostered the creation of new homosexuals in the reformatory. In this sense,
McDowell ironically accused Van Waters of producing delinquency through
homosexuality, when in fact her penology concentrated on inhibiting the production of
delinquency with sophisticated rehabilitative strategies. These accusations allowed
McDowell to reinstate the carceral cycle as a system that prioritized the production of
delinquency as a method of carceral control. Indeed, ending indenture and centralizing
parole as a method of release would, in time, increase the rate of recidivism among
women offenders.
Throughout the first three months of 1949, Van Waters fought for her
reinstatement. Doing so included two tedious public hearings, where Van Waters
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requested a trial to present evidence that might convince McDowell to reinstate her.
McDowell ultimately upheld her removal, prompting Van Waters to appeal to Governor
Dever. The governor appointed an impartial, three person committee to evaluate the case,
and Van Waters won her reinstatement on March 11, 1949. She returned to Framingham,
and for the remainder of her career, attempted to salvage as many of her reforms as
possible. Despite her efforts, Van Waters quickly realized that it was impossible to
reverse the damage initiated by McDowell. The twelve directives of June 1948 remained
in effect, and indenture contracts were significantly limited. A once robust program that
offered opportunities to 104 women at its height, rapidly fell to single digits in 1948.
The Van Waters case illuminates how the nation’s most progressive reformatory
transformed into a punitive women’s prison. This story demonstrates how the carceral
cycle uses prisons to generate delinquency so that, upon a prisoner’s release, they are
recognized as delinquent, subjected to state surveillance practices, and eventually
returned to the prison. As a technology of social control, the carceral cycle always seeks
to grow the prison population, which positions rehabilitation as its antithesis. Van
Waters’s capacity to disrupt the fabrication of delinquency compromised one angle of the
carceral cycle, which led to an intensification of the reformatory’s surveillance, and a
redefinition of delinquency that fixated—almost exclusively—on homosexuality. Despite
Van Waters’s best efforts to facilitate a disciplinary regime that positively affected the
lives of women offenders, the Department of Corrections’ capacity to destroy indenture
at the reformatory was the first step in transforming the Massachusetts Reformatory for
Women into a distinctly punitive institution.
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The Van Waters case study points to the way homophobia and sexism appealed to
state authorities who wished to increase the use of punitive carceral strategies against
women. As the homosexual woman transformed into the figure of the lesbianism, the
state continued to wield homophobia as a means of criminalization in the following
decades. In the face of explicit attack—for instance, in the form of gay and lesbian bar
raids and police surveillance of cruising spots throughout the 1950s and 1960s—
resistance against homophobia, criminalization, and police brutality emerged in the form
of a gay and lesbian rights movement. Twenty-five years later, the carceral state would
once again mobilize homophobia to target, surveil, and criminalize members of the
lesbian and gay community who refused to help the state protect itself against a
burgeoning lesbian feminist “threat.”
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CHAPTER 2. “We don’t talk about our sisters to the state”: FBI Surveillance, Abuse of
the Federal Grand Jury, and Queer Resistance
An Evening with the FBI
On January 16, 1975, two FBI agents arrived at Sally Kundert’s doorstep, flashed
their badges, and asked to enter her home. Kundert refused, explaining to the agents that
she had “heard of people like you.” The agents responded: “We’ve heard of people like
you too, Sally Kundert, and you’re wanted for murder. The house is surrounded.”
Stunned by the FBI’s accusation, Kundert acquiesced, and the FBI entered her home.
Indeed—the house was surrounded: the number of FBI agents swelled to four when two
additional agents appeared from the back door. The lead agent began his interrogation
with a terrifying statement: “We have had people verify that you are Kathy Power.”1
It remains unclear to what extent the FBI actually believed that Sally Kundert was
Katherine Power— a fugitive on the FBI’s ten most wanted list. Power, and her lover,
Susan Saxe, were wanted for their involvement in several robberies that sought to protest
the Vietnam War.2 In collaboration with three men, Saxe and Power robbed banks and
the National Guard Armory in Newburyport, Massachusetts in order to “buy explosives
to melt down the wheels of trains that carried military weapons and to arm the Black
Panthers.”3 The September 23, 1970 robbery of the State Street Bank Trust Co. in
Brighton, Massachusetts, however, resulted in a death when one of Saxe and Power’s
accomplices shot and killed a Boston police officer. In spite of an intense hunt, Saxe and
Power proved impossible to apprehend when they went underground in 1970. The FBI’s
first break in the case did not occur until years later, when the Cincinnati FBI received a
tip indicating that Saxe and Power spent the summer of 1974 in Lexington, Kentucky.
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The FBI suspected that Lexington’s women’s community—specifically the lesbian
feminist community—sheltered Saxe and Power.
To the disappointment of many new friends, Saxe and Power (known in town as
Lena Paley and May Kelly, respectively) left Lexington in the early autumn of 1974.4
Despite the fact the FBI should have known that Saxe and Power moved, they maintained
the theory that Sally Kundert was an alias for Katherine Power. Kundert and Power
shared a few things in common: both moved to Lexington in the early summer of 1974,
and both grew acquainted with a group of radical lesbian feminists with whom they
identified personally and politically. However, Kundert believed the FBI’s accusation
“was entire bullshit” because “the woman they wanted was three inches shorter than me,
so it wouldn’t have taken them very long to realize that I wasn’t that person.”5 Although
Kundert convinced the FBI that she was not Katherine Power upon their first meeting,
they continued to berate her with questions. Who were her parents? Where did they live?
What political groups did she belong to? Despite being completely caught off guard by
the FBI’s visit—Kundert would later find out that she was the first to be visited by the
FBI—she exercised her right to refuse to answer the FBI’s questions. Kundert told the
FBI that she “would give them any information about [her]self, but [she] wouldn’t give
them information about other people.”6 Kundert’s cooperation, however, mattered little:
“whatever information I wouldn’t give them, they gave to me.”7 Whether or not the FBI
actually intended to gain information from Kundert remains unclear, but what is clear is
that the entirety of their visit was steeped in suspicion and intimidation. If nothing else,
the FBI’s visit alerted Kundert to the fact she was, and would continue to be, the subject
of FBI surveillance.
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The FBI’s inability to locate Saxe and Power prompted the surveillance of what
Pam Goldman calls the “spectrum of radicalism” in Lexington, Kentucky.8 Throughout
the 1970s, Lexington’s leftist community was predominately composed of “young, white,
educated, middle-class people” that spanned several social movements including anti-war
activists, a number of socialist organizations, labor organizing, the women’s movement,
and gay liberation.9 When the FBI descended upon Lexington, they would interview
more than sixty radicals throughout January and February 1975. Their most intensive
surveillance efforts, however, were directed at the group of lesbian feminists who opened
their home to Saxe and Power. FBI agents blatantly followed these women, tapped their
phone lines, and opened their mail. Apartments were searched without warrants and often
in the absence of their occupants. The FBI’s surveillance tactics were difficult, if not
impossible to evade, but half a dozen individuals known as the “Lexington Six”—Jill
Raymond, Marla Seymour, Gail Cohee, Deborah Hands, Linda Link, and J. Carey
Junkin—refused to speak to the FBI. While the FBI primarily targeted the lesbian
feminist community, Junkin, the student leader of the Gay Student’s Coalition at the
University of Kentucky, stood in solidarity with his lesbian sisters in refusing to
cooperate with the FBI’s investigation.10
The FBI’s approach to Lexington paralleled the investigation of lesbian feminist
communities in New Haven and Hartford, Connecticut. When Ellen Grusse and Terry
Turgeon refused to cooperate with FBI, the Bureau threatened them with grand jury
subpoenas. The FBI made good on their threat, but Grusse and Turgeon also stood firm in
their commitment to noncooperation. Similarly, when the Lexington Six refused to
cooperate with FBI interviews, the FBI turned to the U.S. Attorney General to secure
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grand jury subpoenas. In the eyes of the FBI, the Lexington Six’s resistance to interviews
signified guilt, which only reinforced the need for subpoenas. The coercive nature of
grand jury subpoenas deliberately pressured the Lexington Six as jail sentences figured
into their decision to cooperate or be held in contempt. When the Six refused to cooperate
as witnesses before the grand jury in February 1975, they were immediately granted use
immunity—a pseudo-protection against prosecution that immunized an individual’s
grand jury testimony, but offered no immunization against future prosecution. While an
individual’s testimony could not be used against them, the state could use other
testimonies to corroborate or otherwise gather evidence necessary for prosecution. Once
immunized, acts of noncooperation would result in civil contempt charges and jail
sentences that would remain in effect for up to eighteen months, the length of the grand
jury term. Each member of the Lexington Six maintained control over the length of their
sentence: at any moment, one could agree to “purge” themself of contempt and gain their
freedom by testifying before the grand jury.
Although the FBI’s approach to lesbian feminist communities in New Haven,
Hartford, and Lexington were similar, the theories driving the investigations shaped the
ways in which FBI targets thwarted the FBI’s efforts. In Lexington, the FBI’s objective
was to expose the alleged underground lesbian feminist network that sheltered fugitives.
In this chapter, I turn to a collection of oral histories conducted by Pam Goldman
throughout the late 1980s to delineate how the Lexington Six used queer resistance to
combat FBI surveillance and the grand jury’s legal violence. In deploying the word queer
to describe the Lexington Six’s tactics, I do not mean to eclipse or erase the historical
specificity of lesbian feminism as a marker of identity and/or politics. Rather, I follow the
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work of Cathy Cohen, who defines queer as a verb used by those who destabilize
structures of power. In arguing that queer be oriented toward the intersectional nature of
marginalization, Cohen gestured toward a queer theory that speaks to the “nonnormative
and marginal position of punks, bulldaggers, and [so-called] welfare queens.”11 In
following Cohen’s call to contend with the ways homophobia intersects with systematic
racism, classism, sexism, colonialism, and imperialism, I recognize queer resistance as
action that aspires to protect multiply marginalized communities from state “regimes of
immobilization.”12
Stephen Dillon argues that regimes of immobilization function as forms of state
violence that “punish people who deviate from racialized, gendered, sexual, and classed
social norms.”13 While prison is perhaps the most obvious form of immobilization, it is
but one aspect of what Foucault describes as the carceral cycle, which the state depends
on to discipline and punish so-called deviants. The cycle depends on the interlocking
system of surveillance, criminalization, and incarceration to force individuals to
acquiesce to state power. Thus, when faced with the decision to answer the state’s
questions, or maintain one’s freedom, the state anticipated that Grusse, Turgeon, and the
Lexington Six would relinquish their privacy before forgoing their freedom. In assuming
that one would not risk their freedom if they had “nothing to hide,” the state deduced that
only the guilty would choose to withhold information. The Lexington Six, however,
deliberately withheld information that would be of little use to the FBI. They did not
know, throughout the summer of 1974, that Lena Paley and May Kelly were fugitives
wanted by the FBI, much less their whereabouts in early 1975.
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In this chapter, I argue that what the state perceived as criminal collusion can also
be read as queer resistance. In disrupting the state’s use of surveillance and refusing to
answer grand jury questions, the Lexington Six inverted the power hierarchies that
attempted to exploit their difference as a group of “unruly” citizens. When, in the 1970s,
agencies such as the FBI decided to count certain forms of resistance as “illegal,
exceptional, violent, backward, irrational, and beyond politics,” it did so in order to
criminalize resisters and drain their support.14 In the case of the Lexington Six, the state
sought to make an example out of young, white, middle-class, gay and lesbian feminist
college students who chose to resist the state. Understanding the Lexington Six’s
resistance as queer resistance illuminates the relationship between state surveillance and
the criminal justice system. Just as FBI surveillance cast a shadow of delinquency over
the surveilled, the grand jury worked as an apparatus for legal violence that prohibited
individuals from establishing their innocence. When six individuals who were guilty of
no criminal acts went to jail, the Lexington Six illuminated the state’s criminalization of
non-cooperation. Even when equipped with white, middle-class privilege and legal
representation from one of Kentucky’s premier civil liberties attorneys, there was no way
for the Lexington Six to emerge from the grand jury unscathed.
This chapter unfolds chronologically. The first section outlines the circumstances
that led Susan Saxe and Katherine Power to live underground in Lexington throughout
the summer of 1974. I detail the FBI’s descent upon the lesbian feminist community, and
discuss how the FBI harassed even cooperative individuals. The second section explains
how the FBI surveilled, harassed, and intimidated members of Lexington’s leftist
community. I detail acts of sousveillance that undermined the efficacy of FBI
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surveillance by letting the government know that their targets were watching back. By
acknowledging the FBI’s presence, actively resisting their surveillance, and refusing to
cooperate with FBI interviews, the Lexington Six, among others, disrupted the FBI’s
surveillance efforts. The third section examines feminist reactions to FBI harassment in
the hunt for Saxe and Power. While the lesbian feminist community expressed much
concern over the safety and security of lesbians, some feminists, and even some lesbian
feminists, denounced Saxe and Power, and furthermore rejected the Lexington Six’s
noncooperation as a viable political strategy. I explain the logic of this position by
comparing Jane Alpert’s 1974 self-surrender to the arrest of Saxe to contextualize the
significance—and controversy—of the Lexington Six’s resistance.
The fourth section explains how the FBI procured grand jury subpoenas that
sought to extract information about the witnesses’ sexual identity, political affiliations,
and possible connections to other progressive political groups. I emphasize how, when
faced with resistance, the state used the criminal justice system to squeeze information
from its subjects, particularly those who were vulnerable to homophobic attacks. The
final section concerns the Lexington Six’s commitment to collective defense—a term
developed by Emily Hobson that characterizes the act of choosing against oneself in the
name of collective solidarity. In light of many claims that the Lexington Six’s decision to
go to jail simply was not worth it, this section highlights the payoffs of queer resistance.
In particular, I explain how queer resistance helped protect not just the lesbian feminist
community, but other marginalized communities who were similarly vulnerable to the
state’s immobilization and grand jury abuse.
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The Search for Susan Saxe and Katherine Power
The shooting, and subsequent death of Officer Walter A. Schroeder initiated an
intense hunt for Saxe, Power, and their three male accomplices in the aftermath of the
State Street Bank and Trust Co. robbery. Police immediately apprehended Robert Valeri,
but the man who shot Schroeder, Robert Gilday, as well as Stanley Bond, Saxe, and
Power remained at large. By the end of September, law enforcement detained Gilday and
Bond, but they remained unable to locate the women.15 Clothing discovered in a locker at
the Boston airport indicated that Power fled to Los Angeles in the aftermath of the
robbery.16 Though Gilday was solely responsible for firing more than 25 shots at
Schroeder, the entire group would be charged with felony murder due to the fact
Schroeder’s death coincided with the robbery.17 Considered by the FBI to be “armed ‘and
very dangerous,’” in light of the other robberies they facilitated, Saxe and Power secured
spots on the FBI’s ten most wanted list on October 17, 1970.18
According to the FBI, Saxe and Power were “members of a ‘small, revolutionarytype organization which, in addition to attacking military and police forces, reportedly
advocated violent attacks against established society and robberies to further aims and
provide financial contributions to such organizations as the Black Panther Party.”19 The
FBI’s information was accurate: Saxe and Power were radicalized as students at Brandeis
University, and were actively involved in the Women’s Liberation movement, as well as
the National Student Strike Information Center at Brandies.20 Although Saxe and Power
were not explicitly affiliated with other revolutionary women wanted by the FBI, their
names were often mentioned in the same breath as Bernardine Rae Dohrn, a leader in the
Weather Underground Organization, and Angela Davis, a member of the Communist
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Party USA and Black Panther Party, as well as ex-Panther turned Black Liberation Army
leader, Assata Shakur.21
Despite the FBI’s best efforts, Saxe and Power could not be found. The young
women’s parents remained equally mystified by their daughters’ disappearance: “It’s as
though she dropped off the face of the earth,” remarked Power’s father.22 Citing the FBI’s
inability to locate Saxe and Power, Richard Connolly of the Boston Globe suggested that
“hunted women [could] hide more easily” because “in crime, the female of the species is
more cunning than the male.”23 While Saxe and Power’s success was, to some degree,
contingent on their ability to alter their physical appearance, they remained hidden
because they cut off all ties to family and friends. Life underground did not, however,
preclude Saxe and Power from political engagement. On April 15, 1971, the first official
communication from Saxe and Power appeared in off our backs, a newly formed radical
feminist newspaper. In an address to Bernadine Rae Dohrn, Saxe and Power described
their circumstances: “People must realize that . . . going underground does not imply
political or cultural death. True, we live with a certain amount of fear (who doesn’t?) and
have to be very careful about being busted, but we see this as just another aspect of our
revolutionary duty . . . in short, we are alive and well.”24
In the summer of 1974, Saxe and Power arrived in Lexington, Kentucky.
Although they initially claimed to only be visiting Lexington for a few days, the couple
extended their stay, probably because they “blended easily into the [leftist] community
around the University of Kentucky.”25 As self-identified lesbian feminists, Saxe and
Power befriended Marla Seymour and Gail Cohee, who introduced them to other lesbian
feminists, radicals, and socialists in the Lexington community. Saxe took a job at Alfalfa,
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a new health food restaurant near the University of Kentucky campus, and built a
reputation as a “skilled and innovative cook . . . known for her discourse on politics and
food,” while Kathy took a more innocuous job as a secretary.26 Saxe and Power did not
explicitly take on leadership roles within the leftist community, but they surrounded
themselves with politically active lesbian feminists, and lived with Seymour, Cohee, and
Linda Link. According to Letty Ritter, who, thanks to her roommates, inadvertently lived
with Saxe and Power, the couple was “militant” and “always ready to take on a new
cause.”27 Indeed, Lexington’s vibrant leftist community afforded Saxe and Power a
multitude of opportunities to engage with and inspire action. However, by the fall of
1974, Saxe and Power realized that they had “stayed too long in one place.”28 As
historian Pam Goldman notes, their departure was particularly difficult to understand
because Saxe and Power refused to provide their Lexington friends with a forwarding
address. Saxe espoused the belief that “friendship was forever, [but] it did not require
continuity or communication.”29
There are competing accounts detailing who initially realized that Lena and May
were, in fact, Susan Saxe and Katherine Power. However, the overall circumstance under
which this discovery was made remains congruent. In the early fall of 1974, Ritter
accompanied her friends, Leslie Ott and Nancy Campisano, on an errand at a Lexington
post office. While at the post office, the trio flipped through the FBI Most Wanted
posters, and laughed when they recognized May after glancing at Katherine Power’s most
wanted flyer: “Ain’t it funny how our imagination could get carried away, to think that
that looked like May?”30 When they turned to the next the page and saw Lena’s face, they
realized that their recognition was not a coincidence: Lena and May were actually Susan
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and Katherine. Despite the fact the FBI Most Wanted poster emphasized that Saxe and
Power were wanted for murder, Ritter, Ott and Campisano decided not to report to the
FBI. According to Ritter, the three women were worried about jeopardizing their own
security: “we decided it’d be crazy to have the cops come around, since we had . . . drugs
on . . . the premises” of their home.31 Ritter, Ott, and Campisano’s reluctance to report
their discovery speaks to their inability to trust the state: helping the FBI did not exempt
them from being criminalized on account of their drug use. As such, the three women
discussed their discovery with roommates and friends, but did not turn to the police or the
FBI for fear of the surveillance such a report would initiate.
Sue Ann Salmon, a woman who maintained close ties to the Alfalfa community,
remembered the discovery of Saxe and Power differently. According to Salmon, Barry
Bleach, one of the co-founders of Alfalfa, was at a Lexington post office for a film shoot.
He happened to be “thumbing through the FBI Most Wanted list. . . and saw Lena. . . and
her friend May.”32 While Salmon could not account for the way Ritter came to discover
Lena and May’s identity, she remembered that it was not Bleach, but Ritter, who notified
the FBI. In contrast, Ritter maintained that one of her friends, Steve Wood, notified the
FBI. Wood had recently moved to Covington, Kentucky, and as Ritter suspects, wanted
to report to the Cincinnati FBI in order to collect the reward money.33 While
inconsistencies remain in these stories—for instance, some remember that Ritter and her
boyfriend reported to the FBI—it seems that the reporter did not fear how they might be
implicated in the FBI’s immediate action.34
When the FBI arrived in Lexington, they were greeted with both uncooperative
and cooperative women in the lesbian community. Ritter’s personal bias against Lena and
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May, in part, contributed to her willingness to cooperate with the FBI. Ritter resented
Lena and May for several reasons. For one, Lena and May were “down on drug use,” and
Ritter especially disliked Lena’s bossiness. Ritter’s search for more information about
Saxe and Power also influenced her impression of the fugitives. When Ritter found out
that Lena and May were, in fact, Saxe and Power, Ritter could only find more
information about the pair when she searched under “murderer” at the library. Although
Saxe and Power did not kill Walter Schroeder, the library’s catalogue resonated with
Ritter. While Ritter’s roommates refused to interact with the FBI, therefore risking
further consequences that included jail time, Ritter chose to cooperate because she
“couldn’t justify going to jail for [Lena and May].”35
Despite the fact that Ritter cooperated with the FBI, agents capitalized on Ritter’s
drug use to threaten her into maintaining an open line of communication. Ritter’s drug
use offered the FBI leverage in two ways. One reason, Ritter suggests, that she
cooperated with the FBI had to do with the fact she was “stoned out of [her] head all the
time and. . . just talked to them.” Even when the FBI pursued lines of questioning that
had nothing to do with Saxe and Power, Ritter talked: “I look back on it now, and I think
there were a lot of things that they asked that didn't have to do with Lena and May, and
so, it wasn't really any of their business. But I think I was so scared of getting busted that
I thought I should give him full cooperation.” Knowing that the FBI could retaliate and
arrest her for drug use at any point, Ritter felt compelled to cooperate, even when the FBI
overwhelmed her with visits. Soon, Ritter resented the fact that the FBI “came every day.
They expected you to take time to sit down and talk to them.”36 From the FBI’s
perspective, Ritter was a perfect target. Her paranoia, resentment toward Lena and May,
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and heavy drug use allowed them to blur the line between coerced and cooperative
communication.
Unlike Ritter, many women who knew Saxe and Power as Lena and May refused
to answer the FBI’s questions. Contrary to the FBI’s belief that Lexington’s lesbian
feminists were operating an underground sanctuary for fugitives, no one suspected that
Lena and May were fugitives, much less Saxe and Power. In hindsight, Saxe and Power
engaged in a number of idiosyncratic behaviors that could have alerted discerning
individuals to the fact they were living underground. In addition to being critical of
household drug use, Saxe and Power avoided any encounter with law enforcement. Ritter
recalls that they were outraged when, after attempting to apply for work at a Lexington
mall, they learned that their prospective employers wanted to fingerprint them. Ritter
remembers that Lena and May “were ready to march against that. They thought
[fingerprinting] was wrong.”37 Even Saxe’s dyed red hair, as Goldman points out,
garnered no reaction from the Lexington women, despite the fact it was “a great
incongruity for someone who espoused radical feminist politics” that generally deplored
cosmetic capitulation to patriarchal beauty standards.38 While it is clear that Saxe and
Power’s political critiques corresponded to a politics of self-preservation, no one
challenged their stance. No one in Lexington knew who they were.
Surveillance and Sousveillance
By the autumn of 1974, members of the New Left were keenly aware of FBI’s
reach, especially in the years after the FBI’s COINTELPRO program was exposed in
1971 and the Watergate scandal broke. For more than two decades, COINTELPRO—
short for Counter Intelligence Program— engaged in a number of illegal acts meant to
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thwart dissenting political activists, including the murder of black activists and the wider
surveillance of the New Left.39 The Watergate scandal similarly alerted the public to the
government’s surveillance of U.S. citizens. The Watergate robbery was put into sharp
relief when, in 1973, one year after Nixon’s reelection, Alexander P. Butterfield’s
revealed to the Senate Watergate Committee that Nixon recorded conversations in the
Oval Office, cabinet room, executive office, and on his personal telephone.40 If nothing
else, Watergate demonstrated that wiretapping and bugging were surveillance methods
used by the government that were almost always undetectable.
On the heels of the Watergate and COINTELPRO, Americans contended with the
fact that the government may use new technologies to surveil them. Domestic
surveillance was always situated in the interest of national security: only Americans
perceived as threats were surveilled in an attempt to thwart political dissonance. Despite
increasing awareness of the government’s surveillance methods, knowledge of the FBI’s
surveillance capabilities did not necessarily prepare Lexingtonians for the experience of
being watched. The physical presence of the FBI was especially new for the youngest
members of the New Left, many of whom, in 1974, were matriculating through the
University of Kentucky. Such was the case for Sally Kundert. When the FBI appeared at
Kundert’s doorstep, she “didn’t know a damn thing about [her] rights.”41 In fact, Kundert
was “a little pissed” that she had not been warned that the FBI was in town, only to learn
she was the first person visited by the FBI in the search for Saxe and Power.42 Kundert’s
experience suggests that the FBI meant to scare her into cooperation, which, at least to
some extent, indicated that they believed Kundert was ill informed about her rights.
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The FBI’s surveillance actions in Lexington were, in many ways, extensions of
COINTELPRO actions that targeted New Left groups. As David Cunningham argues, the
FBI’s attempts to repress the New Left consisted of the following goals: create a negative
public image, break down internal organization, create dissent among groups, restrict
access to group-level resources, restrict the ability to protest, hinder the ability of
individual targets to participate in group activities, displace conflict, and gather
intelligence.43 Many of these goals were accomplished by harassing targets. For example,
FBI agents blatantly followed their targets in Lexington, which allowed the FBI to gather
intelligence and promote criminalization by creating a negative public image and limiting
individual movement. Kundert recalls just how persistent the FBI was: “when we would
try to go to a restaurant, people in suits and ties, men, [would] just come and sit right next
to you at the table. You[’d] get up and go someplace [else], and they’d show up again.”44
The inescapability of the FBI thus contributed to a target’s experience of isolation. Many
people deliberately avoided friends who became FBI targets for fear of becoming a target
by association.45 This was particularly true for J. Carey Junkin, who was followed by FBI
agents on the University’s campus. “Most of my friends,” Junkin recalls, “would not get
near me.”46
The FBI’s deliberate use of physical surveillance tactics transformed what Jeremy
Bentham described as the panoptic into what Foucault describes as panopticism.
Bentham’s theory of the panopticon positioned the “illusion of constant surveillance” as
the drive of self-discipline, insofar as subjects became motivated to behave in a particular
way because someone might be watching.47 If COINTELPRO and Watergate established
the government’s ability to deploy covert methods of surveillance, physical surveillance
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transformed the illusion of constant surveillance into a reality. Foucault’s theory of
panopticism, therefore, points to “continuous individual supervision” as a form of state
power and control.48 In an era where FBI surveillance was often undetectable, physical
surveillance replaced the question of surveillance with the certainty of surveillance.
Targets need not wonder if they were being surveilled, but how they were being
surveilled. However, instead of internalizing the panoptic impulse to self-discipline, the
Lexington Six upended the expectation of self-monitoring by choosing to watch back.
Ironically, the FBI’s visibility allowed the Lexington Six to resist surveillance by
engaging in sousveillance. Sousveillance, theorized by Steve Mann, operates as a “mode
of monitoring in which citizens watch governing bodies from below, as an opposing
concept to surveillance—watching over or from above.”49 As a “direct action” that
empowers the surveilled to “watch back at those who watch us,” sousveillance
empowered Lexington’s radical community to disrupt the FBI’s efforts.50 For example,
sousveillance succeeded when it convinced the FBI that physically monitoring certain
groups was an entirely fruitless effort. Junkin, in particular, used sousveillance to this
end. As part of their physical surveillance of Junkin, FBI attended meetings of the Gay
Student’s Coalition at the University of Kentucky. In an effort to resist the FBI’s
presence, the group would “sit in dead silence or adjourn the meeting. So [the FBI] quit
doing it.”51 The benefits of physical surveillance allowed Junkin to devise a plan for
resistance that honed in on the FBI’s discomfort with a reversal in hierarchy, in which
targets watch back. While Junkin’s ability to thwart physical surveillance was probably
the exception as opposed to the rule, sousveillance worked as a promising form of
resistance to FBI surveillance and harassment.
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Despite the fact leftists found ways to interfere with FBI surveillance, the FBI
continued to use alarmingly obvious surveillance strategies. As Junkin recalls,
They weren’t even a little subtle. I mean, 35 year old men in suits
wandering around UK in ’75 was probably a real big tip off and it was real
obvious they were following me. Because a man would go—would walk
me to class—and then I’d come out of class and he’d be sitting there, like
in the old Classroom Building. And [it was] just real obvious. . . Even the
most committed fraternity Republicans did not wear three piece suits.52
Cunningham’s analysis of FBI surveillance helps explain why the FBI would deliberately
announce their presence and make themselves vulnerable to sousveillance. “Such overt
signs of surveillance,” according to Cunningham, “could be the product of sloppy
intelligence gathering, but more likely many of these actions were purposeful, serving to
harass their targets.”53 Cunningham’s theory explains the FBI’s seemingly careless
behavior: FBI surveillance functioned to gather intelligence and harass, intimidate, and
terrify the surveilled. While, in the presence of the FBI, targets could find ways to resist,
the absence of FBI signaled a transition to invisible surveillance tactics that often instilled
a sense of hypervigilance among the surveilled.
Invisible surveillance tactics were almost impossible to detect, and difficult to
resist. For example, Kundert suspected her phone was tapped after making a call to a new
acquaintance named Becky. Kundert withheld her last name during the call, but Becky
received a visit from the FBI the following day. They warned Becky to “watch out” when
choosing to get involved with a new group.54 Although Kundert was not certain her
phone was tapped, she suspected the FBI’s visit to Becky was not a coincidence.
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While resistance, in the face of wire taping and phone surveillance, was not impossible, it
was inconvenient: those who suspected their phones might be tapped could simply stop
using them. However, the number of precautions one might feel compelled to take could
easily immobilize a person. The uncertainty of invisible surveillance—the knowledge
that one was being watched, but the question of how one was being watched—forced
many to exist in a constant state of vigilance.
In addition to visible and invisible forms of surveillance, FBI targets in Lexington
were subjected to a number of illegal surveillance tactics. For instance, while the legality
of wiretapping remained in flux in 1974 and 1975, the FBI actively participated in illegal
acts when necessary, including unauthorized taps, illegal searches, and forced entry. On
several occasions, Kundert recalled returning to her apartment, only to find her front door
left open. Upon discovering that nothing was missing, it became clear that her apartment
had been searched as opposed to burglarized. Perhaps the most bizarre search occurred
with her landlord’s consent:
. . . one time three men came— I opened the door, and three men came in.
. . and they were dressed really straight, and they started going through the
room and looking in closets, and saying—and the landlord was with
them—and they said ‘well, we're just thinking about renting this place.’ I
don't even remember if I said I was leaving at the time. I just remember
thinking it's really weird that these three guys rushed in and started
looking through the closets.55
Kundert’s recollection of this event stops short of identifying the “prospective tenants” as
FBI, but their appearance and odd behavior suggests that Kundert recognized the that the
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men were likely agents. Given that Kundert lived in the apartment that Saxe and Power
formerly inhabited, the interest in routinely searching her apartment suggests the FBI
believed that Saxe and Power were either hiding with Kundert, or that Kundert possessed
information about their whereabouts. That these visits took place with the consent of
Kundert’s landlord suggests that Kundert experienced a perpetual—and illegal—invasion
of privacy.
Significantly, the FBI’s search for Saxe and Power did not appear to depend on
undercover agents or informants, probably because there was little to no time to recruit
and/or integrate informants as the hunt for Saxe and Power ensued. However, this did not
keep members of New Left groups from suspecting new faces were working for the FBI.
For example, Salmon remembers that when a new woman appeared at a women’s center
meeting wearing “a trench coat and lots of makeup,” she automatically suspected that the
woman might be an FBI agent.56 When the new woman volunteered to retype the group’s
mailing list, Salmon withheld her concern about potential FBI infiltration because she
believed “it would be really bad to accuse this woman of being an FBI agent, if in fact
she’s not. And this is her first women’s center meeting. She’s trying to make a big change
in her life, and I surely wouldn’t like somebody to accuse me of that, you know, at that
point in my life.”57 In the end, the woman left with the mailing lists, never to be seen
again. Although Salmon did not follow up on her suspicion, her fear demonstrates how
easily a feminist commitment to inclusivity could conflict with hypervigilance. In this
case, Salmon’s empathy and inclusivity prevailed with little (known) repercussions.
However, the woman’s presence triggered a response within Salmon, and perhaps other
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members of the group, that could have created dissention or led to a break down in the
group’s organization.
Many individuals in Lexington actively resisted the FBI, but the FBI’s relentless
investigation and surveillance tactics still wreaked havoc on the lives of those believed to
be associated with Saxe and Power. FBI agents sought information from their targets’
employers, which often led the employer to suspect their employee of wrongdoing. For
example, the FBI contacted Sally Kundert’s co-workers in an attempt to establish
whether or not she bore any resemblance to Katherine Power. On one occasion, Kundert
believed she might have been fired because she suspected the FBI had contacted her
employer in an attempt to gather more information— not because she was guilty, but
because of her association. The most damning tactic the FBI deployed involved outing
gay and lesbian individuals who refused to cooperate with their investigation. For
example, the FBI told Jill Raymond’s grandmother that she was a lesbian with the hope
that family members would pressure Raymond to cooperate.58 While this tactic did not, in
fact, convince Raymond to cooperate, it is clear that the FBI outed people as a form of
punishment. At a time where homophobia remained acute, the FBI placed gay and
lesbian lives in severe danger in the name of intelligence.
The families of the investigated were seldom sympathetic to their children and the
harassment they experienced. Kundert recalls that her father justified FBI harassment by
choosing to believe that “where there’s smoke there’s fire; they wouldn’t be there if there
wasn’t something wrong.”59 For Kundert’s father, the guilt or innocence of the surveilled
was irrelevant—the FBI’s presence alone had the power to convince some parents that
their children were guilty of something. The FBI’s ability to exploit noncooperation cast
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a shadow of guilt upon innocent people. While cooperation was the only way to establish
and preserve one’s innocence, this proved even more difficult for the lesbian feminist
community who, on account of their sexuality, were always already perceived by the
state as criminals.

Framing Queer Resistance
As the FBI pursued Saxe and Power, outrage over the harassment of lesbian
feminist communities resonated in papers like Gay Community News (GCN). One 1975
editorial captured the community’s anxiety. In acknowledging the FBI’s surveillance
tactics, including wiretaps, “degrading personal interrogations,” and grand jury
subpoenas, Skip Rosenthal asked:
Is any Lesbian-Feminist safe from this harassment?. . . How far is it
going? Where is it going to stop? How long will we tolerate these
infringements of our civil rights? We know that, in the past, the F.B.I. has
compiled “files” on radical groups. How fat are the dossiers becoming on
Lesbian-Feminists under the guise of locating Kathy Power and Susan
Saxe?60
Rosenthal’s critique underscored how the FBI’s hunt for Saxe and Power jeopardized the
safety and security of the lesbian feminist community and the gay liberation movement.
Rosenthal feared that the FBI would neutralize the gay rights movement, just as it had
attempted to neutralize Black nationalists, socialists, feminists, and other political
dissidents.61 The rhetoric of Rosenthal’s outcry—“What the Hell’s going on here?!”—
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urged the gay community, in particular the lesbian feminist community, to do something
to end FBI harassment.62
Across the country, a united campaign to end the FBI’s harassment of the gay
community could have united lesbian feminists, but feminists of all types did not
universally support FBI resistance. At this time, resisting the FBI was linked to the
question of supporting women who went underground, many of whom did as a result of
participating in violent revolutionary acts. As such, FBI resistance remained entangled
within ongoing debates concerning collaboration, both with the state and with men in
other social movements. These debates came to the fore two months before the FBI
arrived in Lexington when Jane Alpert, “the contrite ex-radical,” turned herself in on
November 14, 1974.63 Beginning in July 1969, Alpert joined Pat Swinton, David
Hughey, and Sam Melville in bombing “military and war-related corporate buildings in
Manhattan.”64 The FBI apprehended the four on November 12, 1969, but Alpert skipped
bail the following May and disappeared underground.
Alpert’s status as a fugitive did not prevent her from publishing two controversial
pieces in which she renounced the New Left in the name of feminism. “Mother right: a
new feminist theory” appeared in the May 31, 1973 issue of off our backs, and offered
early articulations of cultural feminism. In this piece, Alpert stressed the “immense
significance” of biology, in particular, motherhood—“a potential which is imprinted in
the genes of every woman.”65 Alpert’s interest in crafting a matriarchal culture was, as
Alice Echols notes, a “profoundly individualistic and far removed form the collectivist
impulse that informed radical feminism.”66 Not only was Alpert’s theory steeped in
biological essentialism, she overlooked the experiences of multiply marginalized women
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in order to argue that motherhood “cuts across economic class, race, and sexual
preference.”67 While “mother right” proved to be controversial on its own, Alpert
received even more pushback three months later when she published an open letter
criticizing the women of the Weather Underground Organization.
“Jane Alpert on Feminism” appeared in off our backs on August 31, 1973. This
piece not only disavowed the New Left, it critiqued the Weather women, who, from
Alpert’s perspective, remained politically aligned with men. In distinguishing herself
from the Weather fugitives—claiming she was “half-led, half dragged” into Sam
Melville’s group of radical bombers—Alpert renounced her leftist politics in favor of
radical feminism and criticized Weather women for failing to do the same. Alpert struck
down an ultimatum: “As long as you are working politically with men, as long as you are
letting men define your attitudes, behavior, and standards, then we stand on opposite
sides of the line, a line that exists in spite of your blindness to it, but which I know you
too will see once you have crossed it.”68 Alpert’s remarks deepened divisions among
feminists because she demanded that the movement prioritize the fight against patriarchy
above all else. For multiply marginalized feminists, who continued to confront poverty,
racism, and homophobia, working with men was a vital component of movement
building. The struggle for prisoner’s rights, for example, was a crucial issue, especially in
the aftermath of the massacre at Attica prison in the fall of 1971. If the Weather women
maintained that “Attica is the heart beat of our struggle,” Alpert took the exact opposite
position.69 Despite the fact Melville died in the riots—a man with whom she was
romantically involved—Alpert boldly proclaimed that she would “mourn the loss of 42
male supremacists no longer.”70
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Many feminists championed Alpert’s position, while others recognized that her
letter to Weather betrayed the underground’s safety and security. Though several months
passed before Weather women published their response in off our backs, the statement
that appeared in the spring of 1975 positioned Alpert as a collaborator—someone who
agreed to “cooperate with the state to reveal any information about the progressive and
revolutionary struggles of the people or about the people themselves.”71 Not only did
Alpert’s 1973 letter reveal sensitive information of use to the FBI, she continued to
cooperate with the state after her surrender.72 For example, many suspected that Alpert
led the state to locate and arrest Pat Swinton, who escaped from custody in 1969.73
Alpert’s supporters justified her willingness to collaborate with the state by claiming that
“the entire issue [of collaboration] is irrelevant since both the established authorities and
the male left are oppressive to women,” but Weather women refused to accept the claim
that the state and the male left presented “a choice between oppressors.”74 For Weather,
and many other radical feminists, revolting against the state and destroying its
apparatuses of power and control was of upmost importance. Replacing patriarchy with
matriarchy would only flip the script.
The debate sparked by Alpert influenced a range of feminist responses to the
FBI’s harassment of lesbian feminists in New Haven and Lexington, and the subsequent
arrest of Susan Saxe on March 27, 1975.75 Campaigns to end FBI harassment of the gay
community united lesbian feminists across the nation, but whether or not one supported
these efforts was often determined by one’s stance on Saxe and Power. Unlike Alpert,
Saxe did not apologize for her radical actions. Instead, she promised to “fight on in every
way as a lesbian, a feminist, and an Amazon.”76 In naming these groups, Saxe situated
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her politics in the middle of radical feminism, lesbian feminism, and lesbian/Amazon
nationalism, all of which distinguished her from Alpert’s politics. Many of Saxe’s
supporters emphasized that she was the state’s scapegoat—the American government,
and its capitalistic institutions were, in fact, the real criminals. Others admired her openly
lesbian identification, remarking upon Saxe’s “courage and determination and her ability
in the midst of this chaos to be an up-front lesbian-feminist.”77
Saxe appealed to many feminists by establishing herself as a symbol of lesbian
feminist resistance. Others, however, viewed her as co-opting lesbianism, and refused to
condone her stance on violence or her willingness to collaborate with men. In a letter to
GCN, one reader argued that “to idealize [Saxe] as a feminist/lesbian revolutionary hero
is not only insane but counter-productive to what a lot of lesbians are trying to
accomplish and achieve in this society utilizing ‘other weapons.’”78 Though the debate
over Saxe’s violent actions offered another iteration of a longstanding debate on the
merits of violence, Saxe’s critics stressed the importance of distinguishing Leftist and
radical feminist sentiments that condoned violence and state opposition from lesbian
feminism. For example, Jill Johnston, author of Lesbian Nation, emphasized that the
1970 Boston bank robbery that led Saxe to go underground was not a lesbian feminist
action, but an anti-war and anti-imperialist action. For Saxe to ground her politics in
lesbian feminism at the time of her arrest in 1975 not only misrepresented the political
ideologies that led her to action in 1970, it misrepresented lesbian feminists as violent
criminals. In effect, Johnston’s 1975 Village Voice article urged Saxe to shut up—the
lesbian feminist community did not deserve to be brought in to her mess.
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In “The Myth of Bonnies Without Clydes,” Johnston blamed Saxe for bringing
“down a wave of harassment and overt repression on lesbian and feminist communities
around the country.”79 But rather than argue that Saxe and Power should have turned
themselves in to the FBI in lieu of going underground, Johnston deployed a more passive
aggressive attack by calling state resistance “conventional.”80 In raising the question of
what lesbian feminist resistance should look like, Johnston elevated the political
superiority of lesbian feminism. As a proponent of lesbian separatism, Johnston believed
that lesbians should exist apart from men, heterosexual women, and all patriarchal
institutions. As Echols summarizes, “true rebels” did not resist, they “transcended
patriarchy.”81 While Johnston’s critique of Saxe did not outright suggest that Saxe should
cooperate with authorities, her critique of noncooperation insulted the women in New
Haven and Lexington who were unable to transcend the FBI’s surveillance and
harassment.
Although Johnston acknowledged that “if it weren’t Saxe, it would have been
someone else,” Saxe supporters refused to accept that Saxe’s arrest alone brought
collateral damage upon the lesbian feminist community.82 Supporters countered Johnston
by emphasizing that Saxe could not be held responsible for the FBI’s actions. Writing in
GCN, Jill Raymond insisted that Saxe and Power could not predict how the government
would react to their disappearance: “. . . no matter what our decisions—no matter how
thoughtful, how off-the-wall, how militant, or how passive, we will [have] had no more
control over who they were going to come after or who they might leave alone that we do
today. The government operates on its own terms, always.”83 Raymond’s response
emphasized the importance of holding the government accountable for the government’s
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Figure 2.1 A poster Susan Saxe, accompanied by an excerpt from Saxe’s first public
statement to her supporters. From the Atlanta Lesbian Feminist Alliance Archives
Collection, David M. Rubenstein Rare Book & Manuscript Library, Duke University.
133

actions, as opposed to holding activists responsible for government retaliation. While
resistance vis-à-vis the underground came with a risk that could, in certain circumstances,
implicate others, the only way Saxe and Power could protect lesbians, feminists,
socialists, and radicals would be to turn themselves in. Cooperation, however, was simply
out of the question.
Johnston and Raymond’s debate over lesbian feminist resistance captures the
limits of lesbian feminism and separatist ideology, especially in a time of crisis. When the
FBI arrived in Lexington—eager to find and arrest Saxe and Power—they descended
upon the larger leftist community. From that point, they narrowed their focus to the gay
community, and finally, to Lexington’s lesbian feminists. Though Johnston dismissed
state resistance as a conventional “male model of historical change,” there was nothing
conventional about the choices that Lexingtonians made in standing up to the state. The
resistance that emerged in Lexington braided three ideologies together in order to
produce the politics of queer resistance: an unwavering belief in the state as the primary
oppressor that must be resisted and disrupted, a commitment to solidarity across multiple
leftist ideologies, and a disavowal of essentialist and separatist feminisms that overlooked
the ties that form in the face of shared marginalization like racism or homophobia. Armed
with the power of queer resistance, those under FBI surveillance prepared themselves for
the second wave of state violence: the federal grand jury.

Silence, Civil Liberties, and Prosecutorial Abuse of the Grand Jury
By the time the FBI received the tips that would lead to simultaneous
investigations in New Haven and Lexington, they were particularly determined to find
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Saxe and Power considering they had been underground for more than four years.84 Their
inability to extract useful information—the result of a true lack of information as well as
noncooperation—motivated the FBI to expose a lesbian feminist underground network in
Lexington. When surveillance efforts proved futile, the FBI turned to the Justice
Department to convene a grand jury. Despite the fact that little evidence supported the
FBI’s theory that people in Lexington knowingly harbored fugitives, the U.S. attorney
convened a federal grand jury that allowed the state to subpoena uncooperative citizens
and force them to break their silence. In the absence of a federal judge and legal counsel,
witnesses were required to cooperate or risk being charged with contempt. The
punishment for contempt was an indeterminate jail sentence that lasted as long as the
witness refused to testify, up to the expiration of the grand jury term.
In 1974, Robert Gilbert Johnston explained that “the principle power of the grand
jury today is to decide whether prosecutions for more serious offences should proceed to
trial.” In other words, grand juries were different from a typical court proceeding, in
which an investigation is conducted and evidence gathered in order to ascertain guilt.
Grand juries evaluate existing evidence—they do not function as an investigative body.
The potential for abuse stems from the fact a federal or state prosecutor meets with the
grand jurors in the absence of a judge or attorneys. The prosecutor can influence the
grand jury to act in the best interests of the state by determining whom to subpoena,
guiding the questioning, and selecting (or censoring) what information is revealed to
grand jurors. For example, if the state’s goal is to indict someone, the prosecutor might
accomplish this by presenting “hearsay information to the grand jury to obtain an
indictment.” Even in the event this hearsay information turns out to be obtained illegally,
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Johnston emphasizes that “an indictment will normally not be dismissed even. . . [in the
event the prosecutor] presents illegally seized evidence.” In addition to being armed with
the ability to present information to the grand jury that would be inadmissible in a trial,
prosecutors are under no obligation to present evidence that might point to a witness’s
innocence. The prosecutors, as Johnston points out, may be able “to prejudice or even
manipulate the grand jurors and obtain an indictment when there may not be sufficient
evidence to hold an accused for trial.” Armed with the ability to persuade a grand jury to
“indict a ham sandwich,” as the saying goes, prosecutors can protect witnesses from
indictments just as they can produce indictments. In the event jurors decline to indict, the
state can reconvene a new grand jury. In theory, the state can convene as many grand
juries as it takes to reach a desirable outcome.85
The FBI’s ability to retaliate against lesbian feminist communities in New Haven
and Lexington hinged on the state’s ability to engage in prosecutorial abuse. Grusse and
Turgeon’s experience foreshadowed the fate of grand jury resisters in Lexington. As
reported by GCN, Grusse and Turgon received grand jury subpoenas “within two weeks
of their refusal to cooperate” with the FBI.86 In an effort to exert maximum pressure, the
state used last minute subpoenas against the women.87 Turgeon’s subpoena arrived at
3:30pm on January 27 and instructed her to appear before the grand jury at 10:00am the
following day. Worse, Grusse’s subpoena arrived at 6:30am on January 28, and required
her to appear later that day. This tactic ensured that the women had little to no ability to
consult an attorney prior to appearing before the grand jury, the effect of which only
made them more vulnerable to an already opaque legal procedure.
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When Grusse and Turgeon appeared, they “refused to speak because of ‘an
absolute moral belief that the investigation the government is engaged in violates our
basic constitutional and human rights.’”88 From their perspective, both the FBI and
federal prosecutor’s line of questioning violated their civil liberties, particularly their
right to privacy and unwarranted search and seizure. Not only did the prosecutor pose
“sweeping questions about roommates, friends, house guests, visitors and conversations
since 1970,” the U.S. attorney also subpoenaed four years worth of personal
correspondence.89 In addition to concerns about the attack on their civil liberties, Grusse
and Turgeon were concerned that the FBI’s investigation would out their friends and
acquaintances. By February, Grusse and Turgeon were charged with contempt, and jailed
on March 5. Although they were released on April 1, they were subpoenaed to a new
grand jury and began the process all over again. The second subpoena led to new
contempt charges, and the women returned to jail.90
In Lexington, the FBI turned to U.S. Attorney General William B. Saxbe to
convene a federal grand jury. The U.S. Attorney, Eugene E. Siler, Jr., convinced the jury
to subpoena Raymond, Seymour, Cohee, Hands, Link, and Junkin. While last minute
subpoenas were not used in this case, Grusse and Turgeon’s experience in New Haven
prompted the Lexington community to assemble a legal team in anticipation of last
minute subpoenas. Robert Sedler, professor of law at the University of Kentucky and the
state’s leading civil liberties attorney, and Judy Peterson, an attorney from Tampa,
Florida, agreed to defend the civil liberties of the Lexington Six with the support of the
newly assembled Lexington Grand Jury Defense Fund.91 Indeed, grand jury resistance
presented a new set of problems that required a team of experts to navigate the criminal
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justice system. As Kundert recalls, “I thought the FBI [was] the problem. And then we
[found] out the FBI is not the problem, there’s this thing called grand juries.”92
The Lexington grand jury began on February 10, 1975.93 From the moment Sedler
agreed to represent the Lexington Six, he believed the FBI intended to use the grand jury
to harass members of Lexington’s lesbian feminist community. Although the stated
purpose of the grand jury was to determine whether anyone in Lexington was harboring a
fugitive, Sedler recalls that “there [was] no serious claim that anyone was harboring a
fugitive. . . [there was] no serious claim that anyone knew [who Lena and May] were.”94
Instead, the grand jury was used to produced an ethnography of queer life in Lexington.
In an attempt to unveil an “incredible lesbian feminist conspiracy and underground,”
Siler posed idiosyncratic questions about the lesbian feminist community.95 Sally
Kundert recalls hearing that the women were asked:
“How do lesbians make love? . . . What do [lesbians] read? Where do they
buy their groceries? What’s their mode of transportation? Where do they
have their bikes fixed?” They just generally wanted a lifestyle analysis so
they know where to put people. It [was] very bizarre questioning.96
Siler’s questions were not necessarily bizarre in light of the FBI’s nationwide
surveillance of lesbian feminist communities. As Anne Enke’s study of 1970s feminist
and lesbian culture points out, it was not uncommon to see “FBI guys in their trench
coats and wing-tips” in women’s spaces like the Amazon bookstore in Minneapolis,
Minnesota.97 Still, Siler’s propensity to ask questions ranging from the innocuous (where
do lesbians get their bikes fixed) to the titillating (how do lesbians make love) outraged
the Lexington Six. Junkin remembers that Siler asked “who I’d been to bed with this
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year. I said it’s none of your business and it’s completely out of the scope of this
investigation.”98 In attempting to explore the contours of gay and lesbian sex, the
government revived tactics used in the Lavender Scare to identify and persecute queer
people. Within the context of the grand jury, invasive questions could only be understood
as a deliberate form of humiliation that used homophobia to criminalize uncooperative
witnesses.
If the Lexington Six began the grand jury with the intent to resist, Siler’s
questions did not inspire them to reverse their decision. Instead of answering, they plead
the First, Fourth, Fifth, and Ninth Amendments.99 After their first appearance, Sedler and
Peterson filed a motion to quash the Lexington Six’s subpoenas—a maneuver that would
effectively end the grand jury. The motion to quash, however, was filed on the same day
that Siler motioned to grant the Lexington Six use immunity. Sedler argued that the court
should not grant use immunity to the six witnesses “until we have a full evidentiary
hearing on our claim of grand jury abuse,” but the evidentiary hearing never took place,
nor was the motion to quash granted.100 Instead, Judge Bernard T. Moynahan, Jr.
scheduled a hearing for February 21, 1975 to decide upon, and ultimately grant, use
immunity to the Six.101 The compulsory nature of use immunity—witnesses could not
decline it—forced the Six to choose between cooperation and contempt. Because use
immunity paid lip service to a real immunity deal, the success of this tactic hinged not on
a mutually beneficial negotiation, but on the assumption that the Six valued their freedom
more than the information they withheld from the state.
As an act of queer resistance, the Lexington Six’s silence prohibited the state from
gathering more information about the lesbian feminist community. The Six’s willingness
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to go to jail not only defied the state’s expectation for cooperation, it drew attention to the
state’s dependence upon legal violence as a mechanism of coercion and repression. As
Junkin explained,
the FBI had come across six people who wouldn’t tell them what they
wanted to know, so they used the grand jury as a fishing expedition. The
political ramifications—God—if they could get away with it in Lexington,
with one gay man and a couple of women, what’s to stop them from
investigating the Democratic Party? From investigating the National
Organization for Women? From investigating whatever they want to
investigate, and just impaneling a grand jury and subpoenaing people. I
mean, you’d end up with the police state in ten years, or less. And we
figured that people had to be educated [about] how easily the grand jury
could be abused.102
From Junkin’s perspective, subpoenaing a small group of white, middle-class, gay and
lesbian college students to a grand jury was an experiment in legal violence that, if
successful, could be refined and applied to any other leftist, radical, or otherwise
progressive organization in the country that the state perceived as threatening. The
Lexington Six’s resistance not only exposed the state’s methods of coercion, it revealed
how the FBI relied upon the Department of Justice to gather intelligence. For Junkin,
demonstrating the state’s abuse of the grand jury was critically important. Allowing the
state to succeed would only bolster the state’s confidence in legal violence as a viable
means to retaliate upon anyone engaged in political dissidence.
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Toward Collective Defense: “We don’t talk about our sisters to the state”
On March 8, 1975, the Lexington Six were charged with contempt, and
immediately began indeterminate sentences, sans bail, in Kentucky jails for a period up to
18 months. In light of their failed motion to quash, Sedler and Petersen filed motions for
the “search and disclosure of electronic or other surveillance” just days before the
contempt hearing. If Sedler and Petersen hoped this motion would “suppress the fruits of
unlawful electronic surveillance,” the U.S. attorney destroyed this defense strategy and
sidestepped an investigation by producing an affidavit that simply denied that unlawful
electronic surveillance took place.103 As such, the Six were separated into pairs and jailed
throughout the state: Raymond and Cohee were sent to the Bell County jail in Pineville,
120 miles southeast of Lexington; Junkin and Hands were sent to the Madison County
jail in Richmond, 25 miles south of Lexington; Seymour and Link were sent to the
Franklin County jail in Frankfort, 23 miles northwest of Lexington. Among the
supporters of the Lexington Six, many of whom were active in the Lexington Grand Jury
Defense Fund, it was obvious that splitting the six and spreading them out across the state
was an attempt to drain supporters’ time, energy, and resources so that the jailed
witnesses might be compelled to testify more quickly.104
When the Lexington Six were sent to “some of the worst county jails in
Kentucky,” their supporters worried that they would endure threats to their health and
safety as a gay or lesbian inmate.105 Junkin, for instance, immediately received threats of
violence from a guard at the Madison County jail: “Look you goddamn queer. This is my
fucking jail. You get out of line here, I’m going to bust your head.”106 The women were
especially concerned about the lack of privacy and their vulnerability to sexual assault by
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male guards. In addition, the instability of jail, compared to the relative stability of
prison, played a structural role in convincing individuals to testify. Had the Six been sent
to prison, they would have had access to a stable community, and might have benefitted
from the dietary, recreational, and outdoor requirements determined by the Federal
Bureau of Prisons.107 Although the Lexington Grand Jury Defense Fund responded by
providing the Six with food, reading materials, and regular visits, the jails the Six were
sent to were not designed to house individuals on a long-term basis. Thus, the decision to
remain incarcerated required each person to jeopardize their health and safety on a daily
basis.
Across the country, leftist groups revered the Lexington Six’s decision to go to
jail. However, many at the local level believed that going to jail served no purpose. For
example, Selder conveyed to the Six that going to jail “wasn’t worth you all injuring your
lives and altering your lives. . . It just wasn’t worth it. The point was made. . . grand jury
abuse was exposed, you don’t have information. . . and you ought not to.”108 Kundert
shared a similar perspective and wondered—even as co-chair of the defense fund—“what
difference did it make?” 109 It is possible that Sedler and Kundert’s critiques stem from
the retrospective fact that five of the Six purged themselves of contempt within two
months of their incarceration. With the exception of Hands, who purged herself of
contempt within a matter of days, individual decisions to purge were often carefully
timed to be as unhelpful to the FBI as possible. For example, Junkin purged himself only
after Saxe’s arrest, so that whatever information he provided could not, in any way, be
used to aide in Saxe’s arrest (though Power remained at large).110 Similarly, Seymour,
Cohee, and Link waited to purge themselves in May, only after Moynahan denied them
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bail.111 Only Raymond would remain in jail for the following twelve months. She was
released when the grand jury expired on May 3, 1976.
Critiques leveled against the Six attacked both the decision to testify as well as the
decision to remain in jail. Some radical feminists likened testifying to acquiescence, and
attempted to bribe the women to stay in jail. For example, Ti-Grace Atkinson called
Hands and told “her that if she didn’t talk. . . she’d send her candy in jail.”112 Regardless
of the infantilizing bribe, many recognized this Atkinson as putting “unfair pressure” on
Hands.113 Other feminists maintained there was no point in going to jail if one was not
willing to sit through the entire term. Raymond’s decision to remain in jail for the full
term was not, however, beyond critique. Some of Raymond’s closest friends presumed
that she wanted “to be a martyr,” and only remained in jail because talking would “make
her look bad.”114 The urge to call Raymond a martyr—in a pejorative fashion, to be
sure—dismissed Raymond’s resistance as self-serving and disingenuous.
Taken as a whole, the critiques of the Lexington Six’s incarceration demonstrate a
desire to discredit acts of queer resistance on account of their purported failure or
inefficiency. For those who consider the penultimate decision to purge themselves of
contempt and testify as an act of failure—in which one trades testimony for freedom—I
suggest that the Lexington Six “failed” on queer terms. In the words of Jack Halberstam,
queer failure leads to “different rewards,” where in this case, one’s decision to testify and
gain freedom does not erase or undermine the overarching act of disrupting the FBI that
the Six embarked upon in the first place.115 Framing queer resistance as an all-or-nothing
phenomenon not only minimizes the sacrifices made in choosing to go to jail, it

143

overlooks the numerous acts of resistance that took place leading up to the Lexington
Six’s contempt charges.
For the Lexington Six, queer resistance could not necessarily prevent the state
from engaging in violent acts, but it did damage the state’s ability to benefit from that
violence. For example, it was impossible to stop the FBI from engaging in surveillance,
but it was possible to interfere with the FBI’s ability to surveil successfully. Similarly,
while the Lexington Six could not prevent the state from impaneling a grand jury, they
could transform the grand jury into an inconvenient process that interfered with the
state’s ability to achieve its goals. Queer resistance disrupted the state’s dependence on
surveillance, harassment, and legal violence as methods of scaring citizens into docility.
In recognizing that FBI harassment already portrayed them as criminals in a homophobic
society, the Lexington Six’s refusal to cooperate in the grand jury further exposed how
the state exploits the “deviance” and “criminality” of marginalized people. To be sure,
the grand jury proceeded even after the FBI and U.S. attorney “began to doubt these
people knew where Susan and Katherine were.”116 Rather than drop the subpoenas and
admit to unnecessary harassment, Sedler recalls that the grand jury became a “matter of
principle” that served to justify the FBI’s behavior.117 In proceeding in this fashion, the
state failed to account for the ways in which their actions “were going to piss off human
beings.”118
In refusing to “talk about our sisters to the state,” the Lexington Six united at a
time where political divisions separated feminists into radical, socialist, cultural, and
lesbian factions.119 At a time when white feminists were especially prone to embracing
the essentialism of cultural feminism, the Lexington Six stressed the importance of
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protecting their sisters from the patriarchal state, in particular the state’s use of classism,
and homophobia. Queer resistance, then, mobilized an intersectional understanding of
sisterhood that called for solidarity among multiply marginalized women who were
vulnerable to legal violence. The Lexington Six’s queer resistance can be considered an
act of “collective defense,” which, as Emily Hobson argues, unified “varying expressions
of counterviolence” by highlighting “how lesbian feminists tied women’s autonomy to
left solidarity against the U.S. state.”120 As a “rhetoric, theory, and a practice,” collective
defense “fueled the growth of a lesbian feminist left dedicated to anti-imperialist
solidarity.”121 In drawing attention to the way the state used legal violence against the
lesbian feminist community, the Six contributed to collective defense by charting a path
for FBI and grand jury resistance that other marginalized targets could use to resist legal
violence. From the perspective of the Six, the state was likely to plague other vulnerable
communities with grand juries.
Collective defense took the form of two important educational efforts that
emerged in the midst of the New Haven and Lexington grand juries. The first took the
form of pamphlets and other printed materials that sought to alert leftist communities—in
particular, lesbian feminist communities—to the danger of the FBI’s presence. One
pamphlet in particular, circulated by the National Lawyers Guild, emphasized that FBI
agents were trained to manipulate individuals into contradicting themselves. These
contradictions put individuals at risk because, as the pamphlets explained, it was illegal to
lie to an FBI agent.122 However, the pamphlets reminded individuals that they maintained
the right to refuse to speak to FBI, especially in the absence of an attorney, no matter how
much pressure the FBI applied. As one pamphlet emphasized, “there is only one way to
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Figure 2.2. Front cover of a pamphlet circulated by the National Lawyers Guild, featuring
caricatures of FBI agents. This pamphlet provided legal information to individuals
subject to FBI harassment, circa 1975. From the Atlanta Lesbian Feminist Alliance
Archives Collection, David M. Rubenstein Rare Book & Manuscript Library, Duke
University.
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Figure 2.3 Racist caricature of an FBI agent, which uses blackness to convince white
women to refuse to cooperate with FBI agents, circa 1975. From the Atlanta Lesbian
Feminist Alliance Archives Collection, David M. Rubenstein Rare Book & Manuscript
Library, Duke University.
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deal with the FBI: REFUSE TO TALK. . . The FBI pays its agents to use any methods
that work in picking our brains.”123 The pamphlets also offered physical descriptions of
the FBI, and emphasized the fact they were easily recognizable. Caricatures of FBI
agents (figure 2.2), however, were sometimes problematic. Images frequently portrayed
agents as suited white men wearing hats and sunglasses, but some images depended on
racist imagery to convey the danger of the FBI (figure 2.3). Because FBI agents were in
the habit of appearing at the door of their target’s homes, depicting FBI agents as black or
brown invoked the myth of the predatory black man who wanted to take advantage of
vulnerable white women. The racist criminalization of blackness, however, may have
appealed to white women accustomed to relying upon law enforcement for their
protection. In this case, the black or brown FBI agent was “sinister” on account of his
race, rather than account of his duties.
In addition to the publication of anti-FBI materials, significant efforts were made
to educate the public about the prosecutorial abuse of the grand jury. In the absence of the
Justice Department’s oversight, educating the public was considered one of the most
effective ways to motivate citizens to identify and disrupt grand jury abuse. In the later
1970s, the Coalition to End Grand Jury Abuse (CEGJA) circulated booklets that
explained the history of the grand jury, nuances of subpoenas and civil contempt charges,
types of immunity deals, and signs of prosecutorial misconduct. The booklet also outlined
a grand juror’s responsibilities, and made several recommendations regarding ways to
protect grand juries from prosecutorial manipulation. For example, CEGJA alerted jurors
to the use of last minute subpoenas, which prevented witnesses from consulting an
attorney prior to their appearance. CEGJA also recommended that grand jurors ask their
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“prosecutor if any other evidence exists that would shed a different light on the case at
hand,” and encouraged grand jurors to think independently, be watchful, and question
prosecutors.124 CEGJA’s booklet did not intend to replace grand jury instructions, but
instead worked to enhance a prospective grand juror’s knowledge about the legal
procedure. Not only were citizens more aware of grand jury processes, CEGJA’s efforts
worked to transform citizens into grand jurors who could identify and intervene in abuse.

Shutting Down Tight
In the words of Sedler, “no one really thought [the Lexington Six] would go all
the way to jail.”125 Sedler’s remark underestimates the power and conviction of
marginalized individuals by suggesting that many believed the Lexington Six would
prioritize their individual safety over the safety of their community. By engaging in queer
resistance and refusing the homonormative impulse to cooperate with the government,
the Lexington Six exposed the relationship between FBI surveillance, the criminalization
of citizens who invoke their Fifth Amendment rights, and the inevitability of jail. As
political people transformed into political prisoners, the Lexington Six experienced the
effects of political repression, particularly when the state deployed a legally sound
punishment. The opportunity to jail a group of white, middle-class, gay and lesbian
college students allowed the state to add to their book of cautionary tales about punishing
political dissidents. The state did not anticipate, however, that the Lexington Six’s
resistance would force the state’s hand, and teach other communities how to resist.
Whether or not the Lexington Six defeated or succumbed to the state depends on
one’s perspective. The Lexington Six’s imprisonment allowed the state to prove that jail
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functioned as an effective means of coercion that would eventually lead the majority of
resisters to testify before the grand jury. The violence one endured throughout one’s
incarceration came into sharp relief when Hands, Junkin, Link, Seymour, and Cohee
offered information that was of little to no use to the FBI. While the political efficacy of
imprisonment drew considerable criticism, Raymond’s ability to remain silent must be
recognized as a personal and political victory. To that end, focusing on the perceived
failures of the Lexington Six overshadows their accomplishments. In the process of
resisting FBI harassment and the grand jury’s legal violence, the Six disrupted the state’s
surveillance methods, insisted on solidarity across groups who remained vulnerable to
legal violence, and mobilized people across the country to resist the FBI and fight against
prosecutorial abuse. As Kundert recalls, the Lexington Grand Jury Defense Fund “had
articles in newspapers all over the country. . . once we had people communicating . . .
people knew not to say anything.”126 The lesbian feminist community in Philadelphia
exemplified what it meant to “shut down tight” in the aftermath of Saxe’s arrest on
March 27, 1975.127 As suspicion of illegal surveillance loomed over the community—the
FBI, for one, moved into the apartment below Saxe’s then-girlfriend, Bryna Aronson—
women tirelessly prepared the community to respond to FBI surveillance and grand jury
subpoenas in Philadelphia.128
In the wake of Raymond’s release from jail on May 3, 1976, and Saxe’s arrest,
trial, and sentencing between 1975-1977, the FBI’s visible presence in Lexington
decreased considerably. However, as the Lexington Six began their lives in cities across
the country, the search for Katherine Power continued. Convinced that lesbian feminists
from Lexington knew of Power’s whereabouts, the FBI surveilled them accordingly. For
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example, the FBI kept tabs on Kundert and Raymond for years after the Lexington grand
jury. When Raymond moved to Washington D.C., the FBI sifted through her garbage for
so long that her garbage man eventually asked her: “why do they make me. . . take your
garbage to a certain place? Are you some kind of rock star or something?”129 Similarly,
the FBI continued to maintain contact with Kundert because they believed she was in
communication with Power. In 1978, they arrived at her door on the day of her baby
shower, offered a half-hearted apology for “everything that happened,” and asked
Kundert if she would “give some information to Kathy Power? Could you tell her that it
would be okay for her to give herself up now? That there wouldn’t be any problems?”130
Although Kundert scoffed at the request, the FBI returned in 1980 to repeat their request
to Kundert’s mother.
It is difficult to know the extent to which acts of resistance impacted the state. For
example, it is unclear if the preparations made in anticipation of FBI surveillance
influenced the FBI to decide against a grand jury in Philadelphia, or if other factors were
at play. Still, the Lexington Six’s strategy in confronting the state reveals three
interventions that queer resistance makes. First, the Lexington Six’s experience
demonstrates that queer resistance is not a linear process that results in, or demands,
success. Instead, queer resistance seeks to disrupt, to intervene, and to challenge
institutions. Second, queer resistance is context-specific, and does not need to constitute a
set of replicable actions. In this sense, queer resistance prioritizes acts of disruption that
inhibit the state’s ability to perpetrate violence, and remains malleable in the face of the
state’s commitment to immobilization. Finally, queer resistance advocates for solidarity
across marginalized groups. In the wake of a fracturing women’s movement, a good part
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of which advocated for matriarchy, cultural separatism, and/or lesbian separatism, the
Lexington Six never lost sight of the state’s ability to adapt, transform, and apply new
methods of violence against marginalized groups.
The 1980s would bring a resurgence of federal grand jury abuse as leftist
revolutionaries sought shelter in the underground. Failed actions, such as the 1981
Brink’s Robbery, wreaked havoc on the leftist revolutionary community as the FBI made
sweeping arrests. The grand jury would continue to be used as a form of legal violence to
compel testimony, and jail those revolutionaries who refused to cooperate with law
enforcement. However, as the next chapter demonstrates, the discourse around “leftist
revolutionaries” would turn toward the language of “terrorism” to justify more expansive,
and more violent carceral regimes. Within ten years of the Lexington Six’s refusal to
cooperate with the FBI, the Bureau of Prisons would announce the opening of the first
women’s high security unit in the nation at the Lexington Federal Prison.
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CHAPTER 3. From COINTELRPO to Counterterrorism:
Carceral Power and the Lexington High Security Unit
The Rise of Maximum Security
On October 31, 1986, the Lexington Herald-Leader announced that “two
convicted female terrorists” had arrived in the Bluegrass to serve decades long sentences
in the newly constructed women’s High Security Unit (HSU).1 The 16-bed unit, literally
buried in the basement of the Federal Correctional Institution (FCI) in Lexington,
Kentucky, ushered women—specifically those deemed terrorists in the eyes of the state—
into the burgeoning world of maximum security incarceration. In 1986, maximum
security units were only beginning to gain popularity in the U.S. carceral landscape. Up
until the opening of the Lexington HSU, the men’s penitentiary in Marion, Illinois,
operated as the sole maximum security prison in the country, housing the most severe
security risks—men classified at level six— in twenty-four hour lockdown.2 According to
the Bureau of Prisons (BOP), women classified at security levels four or five would serve
their terms in the Lexington HSU.3 The BOP considered several factors when
formulating an inmate’s security classification, including their “criminal offense and
institutional behavior.”4 The HSU, however, afforded the BOP the additional opportunity
to consider a prisoneer’s past or current political affiliations. As a unit created with leftist
female terrorists in mind, political affiliation functioned as a crucial piece of information
in the era of clandestine revolutionary action and successful prison breaks.
From the perspective of anti-prison activists, the new unit marked the dangerous
spread of carceral power. Activists immediately anticipated that Susan Rosenberg and
Alejandrina Torres—women whose involvement in leftist revolutionary groups marked
them as domestic terrorists—would be sent to the unit and forced to endure conditions
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that “would deprive prisoners of their basic rights.”5 On April 19, 1986, six months
before the HSU opened, three hundred activists gathered outside the fences of FCILexington to protest the unit’s extreme conditions and the anticipated targeting of
political prisoners. FCI spokesperson, Dan Dove, attempted to assuage the activists,
claiming that “federal corrections officials had not identified the prisoners who would be
transferred to Lexington.”6 Anti-HSU activists’ foreshadowing proved accurate when
Rosenberg and Torres were transferred from MCC, Tucson to Lexington.7 Although the
HSU’s population would never contain more than seven inmates over the course of its
21-month operation, the first three women transferred to Lexington were reclassified into
higher security levels solely on basis of their radical leftist politics.
Of all the women whom the BOP could choose to send to the HSU, the BOP
selected women known for their commitment to armed revolutionary struggle as antiimperialists, anti-racists, and anti-capitalists. Between 1980 and 1985, Silvia Baraldini,
Kathy Boudin, Marilyn Buck, Judith Clark, Bernadine Dohrn, Linda Evans, Eleanor
Raskin, Susan Rosenberg, Alejandrina Torres, Laura Whitehorn, and Cathy Wilkerson
came into custody by way of arrest or surrender. Taken as a whole, these women
represented a number of radical leftist groups, including the Weather Underground
Organization (WUO), the Prairie Fire Organizing Committee (PFOC), May 19th
Communist Organization (M19), the Black Panther Party (BPP), the Black Liberation
Army (BLA), and the Fuerzas Armadas de Liberación Nacional (Armed Forces for
National Liberation, FALN). With the exception of Dohrn, Raskin, and Wilkerson, all
were charged and sentenced to extensive prison time. Sentences ranged from 20 to 80
years, but the vast majority were indeterminate based on the “to life” qualifier that
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followed a double-digit number. In keeping with the mission of the HSU, one might
expect that all eight women would be incarcerated in the HSU. This, however, was not
the case. The BOP hand selected three of the eight women for its experimental behavioral
modification unit focused on small group confinement. Others would remain at
correctional facilities in New York, Washington D.C., Louisiana, Arizona, and
California.8
This chapter considers how the intelligence community’s fight against radical
leftist revolutionaries in the 1960s and 1970s emerged, by the 1980s, as a fully realized
domestic counterterrorism movement. As early as 1972, the intelligence community
began referring to leftist revolutionaries as terrorists, particularly when discussing groups
like the Black Panthers, Black Liberation Army, and the Weather Underground
Organization. I argue that the state shifted away from the language of “political
dissidents” to “domestic terrorists” in an effort to criminalize and incarcerate members of
the radical left. Once the state refused to recognize the left’s commitment to protest and
armed action as legitimate forms of political behavior, the state could render these actions
threatening, abnormal, and/or dangerous, and punish radicals accordingly. The state’s
ability to cast a shadow of queerness upon acts of political dissidence, I argue, ultimately
transformed leftists into queer enemies of the state whose actions threatened white
supremacy, heteropatriarchy, and U.S. imperialism. Under the new rubric of domestic
terrorism, the struggle against state sponsored racism, imperialism, and capitalism
amounted to an illegitimate pursuit that exceeded the limits of respectable political
dissent. I illustrate how the dichotomy between respectable dissent and irrational acts of
domestic terror points to the early contours of homonationalism. As a biopolitical form,
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homonationalism served the state by dividing marginalized people and their allies into
two groups: those willing to uphold white, cis-gender, heteropatriarchal ideals under the
guise of “acceptance” or “inclusion” amongst the privileged, and those who refused to
acquiesce and function as docile citizens. In separating the left into two distinct parties,
those who actively antagonized the state as “domestic terrorists” prompted the state to
create new carceral technologies that specifically responded to domestic terrorism. The
development of the Lexington High Security Unit, I argue, reflects this trajectory in
creating a unit that targeted female terrorists for ideological reconditioning.
I advance this argument in three sections. First, I attend to the legacy of
revolutionary women in the radical left, and consider the queer threat posed by the female
terrorist. I document how early conceptualizations of “terrorism” shaped the early
iterations of homonationalism by differentiating between acceptable forms of resistance
and acts of terror amongst the radical left. I complicate terrorism, and its racial and ethnic
connotations, by considering the ways a terrorist’s threat becomes more severe when the
terrorist is multiply marginalized. I turn to the intelligence community’s obsession with
former Panther-turned-BLA leader Assata Shakur. The government’s attacks on Shakur
hinged on the intersection of blackness and femininity. The reputation the state
established for Shakur was steeped in racist and misogynist beliefs that justified the use
of violent carceral force that would contribute to her physical and psychological
deterioration. The harshest and most problematic conditions of Shakur’s confinement
would later be incorporated into the Lexington HSU. I insist that Shakur’s notoriously
successful escape from a women’s prison in Clinton, New Jersey, forever changed the
carceral landscape for leftist female terrorists in the United States. Shakur’s escape would
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prompt the BOP to imagine a new, more punitive confinement strategy that prohibited
such an escape from ever taking place again.
In section two, I outline the myriad philosophical and tactical overlaps that
emerged among revolutionary groups in the late 1960s and early 1970s, particularly the
Black Panther Party, Black Liberation Army, Weather Underground Organization, and
Fuerzas Armadas de Liberación Nacional. Plagued by varying degrees of COINTELPRO
repression, one might suspect that J. Edgar Hoover’s 1971 moratorium on
COINTELPRO actives in the aftermath of the program’s revelation offered some
reprieve to leftist revolutionaries. In this section, I suggest that COINTELPRO merely
rebranded itself as a counterterrorism program that specifically targeted “urban guerrilla”
organizations.9 I trace the development of Joint Terrorism Task Forces (JTTF) as they
formed in response to the 1974 Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) that severely
restricted the intelligence community’s ability to use unauthorized forms of surveillance,
including wire taps and bugs. Acting as a “force multiplier,” JTTFs allowed the
intelligence community to draw upon law enforcement labor as they sought out to
monitor terrorist activities. I specifically track the impact JTTFs had on rounding up
revolutionary women in the aftermath of the 1981 Brink’s robbery, and detail the charges
and disproportionate sentences issued to leftist female “terrorists.” Faced with a critical
mass of female “terrorists” with “special” security needs, I illustrate how the BOP
reimagined the prison as part of the state’s counterterrorism regime.
The figure of the queer female terrorist—“having gone beyond the bounds of
acceptable female behavior in the U.S.,” in the words of Rosenberg, Baraldini, Buck, and
Whitehorn—served as the ideal subject upon whom the state could experiment with new
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conditions of confinement intended to drive terrorists to the point of political
renunciation.10 In section three, I examine the development of the Lexington High
Security Unit, which served as a repository for female terrorists for twenty-one months.
In identifying the numerous abuses perpetrated by the Lexington HSU, I analyze the
lawsuit that overwhelmingly affirmed the legality of the HSU’s conditions of
confinement. I argue that the ACLU lawsuit that ordered the Lexington HSU to be closed
in 1988 ultimately allowed new high security units to emerge and operate within other
larger prisons, where they would remain protected from scrutiny. In examining a federal
court’s response to allegations of First, Fifth, and Eighth Amendment violations, I
establish how the state prohibited “terrorists” from successfully claiming that the
conditions of confinement they faced within the HSU violated their Eighth Amendment
protections against cruel and unusual punishment. High security units, in meeting the
basic requirements for life within a carceral space, allowed the state to produce the social,
if not literal, death of its queer, dissident citizens.

Assata’s Escape: Terrorism and the Origins of Homonationalism
On October 10, 2001, President George W. Bush released the first FBI Most
Wanted Terrorists list to the public. Different from the FBI’s Ten Most Wanted list, the
new list identified men indicted for acts of terror between 1985 and 1998, the majority of
whom were accused of facilitating the 1998 U.S. embassy bombings in Tanzania and
Kenya.11 As the War on Terror unfolded in the aftermath of the 9/11 attacks, the FBI
continued to add names to the initial list of 22, in conjunction with a separate list of
individuals suspected of seeking information about terrorism, but who had not yet carried
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out attacks. Throughout the early 2000s, the individuals on the list were, unsurprisingly,
overwhelmingly Middle Eastern and/or Muslim, and would lead the American public to
believe that brown men were the exclusive perpetrators of global terror aimed at
destroying Western democracy. The FBI, however, broke this trend when they added
Assata Shakur—the first woman, and second U.S. citizen—to the list on May 2, 2013, the
40th anniversary of the New Jersey Turnpike shooting.12
Writing in 2014, Angela Davis described the FBI’s decision to add Shakur as
“ceremonious,” “bizarre,” and “incomprehensible.” She queried:
what interest would the FBI have in designating a 66-year-old black
woman, who has lived quietly in Cuba for the last three and a half
decades, as one of the most dangerous terrorists in the world—sharing
space on the list with individuals whose alleged actions have provoked
military assaults on Iraq, Afghanistan, and Syria?
In aiming to distinguish Shakur from twenty-first century terrorists, Davis highlights how
conceptualizations of terrorism have shifted over time. She writes: “the term [terrorist]
was abundantly applied to U.S. black liberation activists [herself included] during the late
1960s and early 70s.” For Davis, calling Shakur a “terrorist” in 2014 obscures the
historical circumstances that not only motivated Shakur to act, but influenced the state to
name terrorism as a pervasive threat to national security. Regardless of the FBI’s
ahistorical use of the word terrorism, distinguishing an individual or group as terrorist
allows the state to invest in anti-terrorist efforts that target racial, ethnic, and/or sexual
difference. In other words, the actions that the state associates with terrorism may vary
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over time, but the state’s approach to containing and annihilating terrorists remains
overwhelmingly focused on maintaining national security.13
Jasbir Puar’s seminal text on the twenty-first century war on terror argues that the
state divides queer populations into “terrorist and citizen bodies” based on the way queers
subscribe to homonationalism.14 In deploying queer as an analytic marker of difference
inclusive of gender, sexuality, race, and ethnicity, Puar looks to the ways in which
marginalized subjects turn to homonationalism—a term derived from Lisa Duggan’s
concept of “homonormativity”—to engage in the reproduction of white supremacy,
heteropatriarchy, and capitalism so that they may benefit from “associations with white
national hetero- and homonormative bodies.”15 For Puar, the practice of homonationalism
involves disavowing “perversely sexualized populations,” where the “queer or
homonormative ethnic is a crucial fractal in the disaggregation of proper homosexual
subjects joining the ranks of an ascendant population of whiteness.”16 In other words,
homonationalism is a form of discipline and control that rewards the queers who are
willing to perpetuate the status quo. Homonationalism appeals to these queers because it
offers them a chance to be “folded into life,” where queer subjects are celebrated and
included on account of their ability to contribute to and uphold white supremacy,
heteropatriarchy, and capitalism.17 As “citizens,” homonational queers stand in contrast
to those who are undesirable: populations deemed “sexually pathological and deviant.”
Within this population lies the terrorist, who must be literally or figuratively “targeted for
death” on account of their difference.18 From Puar’s perspective, the U.S.-led war on
terror exemplifies the way ethnic and sexualized queerness is used to target “terrorists” in
the Middle East, which, at the time of writing, has resulted in the deaths of more than
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335,000 innocent Afghan, Iraqi, and Pakistani civilians.19 This war, initiated as a
response to the 9/11 attacks, not only legitimized U.S. military occupation in the Middle
East as a “counterterrorism” strategy, it diffused xenophobia throughout the United
States. Almost twenty years later, anti-Muslim racism and xenophobia persists
domestically in the form of travel bans, increasingly restrictive immigration policy,
limiting the number of accepted refugees, and presidential calls to send legitimately
elected U.S. lawmakers “back” to the countries they presumably belong to.
Puar’s scholarship maintains that the word terrorist is strategically (and
biopolitically) deployed by the state to control and destroy bodies who either “decline or
are declined entry [to homonormativity] due to the undesirability of their race, ethnicity,
religion, class, national origin, age, or bodily ability.”20 Calling Assata Shakur a
terrorist—be it in 1973 or 2013—situates her blackness, her femininity, and her
leadership in the Black Liberation Army as undesirable and improperly queer. If terrorists
have always been portrayed as racial others, Shakur’s experience stands out because it
demonstrates how women, especially women in leadership roles, are portrayed as
particularly ruthless and violent. Of course, Shakur’s status as a “terrorist” is meant to
overshadow the numerous, state-sponsored attacks on Shakur’s community that instigated
her alleged actions. In framing Shakur as a terrorist, the state situated its attacks on
communities of color as acts of counter-terrorism, thus absolving itself of responsibility
for violence they, in fact, instigated. It is thus crucial to recognize that the state deploys
the term terrorist to satisfy its own racialized and gendered interests. For example,
Shakur’s philosophy on violence was formulated as a response to state-sponsored police
brutality, who in her view, amounted to “nothing but a foreign, occupying army, beating,
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torturing, and murdering people [of color] at a whim and without restraint.”21 Violence,
for Shakur, was perceived as a last resort. “I despise violence,” Shakur wrote in her
autobiography, “but I despise it even more when it’s one-sided and used to oppress and
repress poor people.”22
Law enforcement’s preoccupation with Shakur aligns, in part, with a larger
targeted attack on revolutionaries fighting racism, imperialism, and capitalism. Long
before the FBI and law enforcement would name Shakur the “‘high priestess’ and ‘the
soul’ of the ‘cop-hating BLA,’” authorities took special interest in Shakur based on her
involvement with the Panters.23 Shakur recalls being the subject of COINTELPRO
surveillance: not only did FBI agents follow Shakur in the early 1970s, she was certain
her apartment and/or telephone line was bugged.24 Her first arrest, however, occurred
after she was shot on April 5, 1971, when she allegedly attempted to rob guests at the
Statler Hilton Hotel.25 Shakur faced charges of “attempted robbery, felonious assault,
reckless endangerment and possession of a deadly weapon,” but was released on bail.26
Shakur skipped bail, an act that only further bolstered her reputation as a “radical
terrorist” who pursued violence for the sake of violence.27 Within months, law
enforcement found themselves hunting for Shakur once again, only this time, they wanted
to question her in the aftermath of several police deaths: the May 19, 1971 shooting of
two officers on Riverside Drive in New York and the January 29, 1972 shooting of two
officers in the East Village.28 Shakur had no interest in speaking to law enforcement in
light of the intense police repression that the black community experienced, and promptly
slipped underground.29
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When police efforts to locate Shakur proved futile, law enforcement turned to the
public. The search for Shakur expanded throughout New York City. According to
Alondra Nelson, photographs of Shakur appeared “everywhere. . . in newspapers like the
New York Daily News, [and] in subway stations.”30 The effect of this campaign not only
attributed a “larger than life” ethos to Shakur, it also, as Akinyele Umoja notes, enabled
law enforcement to “tie Assata to every suspected action of the BLA involving a
woman.”31 Consequently, when Shakur and fellow BLA members Zayd Malik Shakur
and Sundiata Acoli were pulled over by state troopers on the side of the New Jersey
Turnpike on May 2, 1973, tensions immediately flared and gunfire erupted. The
altercation left Zayd Shakur and trooper Werner Forester dead, and Assata Shakur
seriously injured from three gunshots. Cuffed to a hospital bed, Shakur’s recovery would
be accompanied by a daily smattering of police intimidation, violence, and endless
questioning.32
Shakur’s exaggerated status as a “cop killer” determined the contours of her
imprisonment, in particular, the racist and misogynistic treatment she endured that led to
her physical and psychological deterioration.33 The state facilitated Shakur’s physical
deterioration by denying her adequate medical attention and exercise, which was
particularly devastating as Shakur attempted to regain mobility in her hand after her gun
shot wound.34 Physical and psychological terror manifested through vaginal and anal strip
searches, twenty-four hour lighting and surveillance, the withholding of reading
materials, and extended time in solitary confinement.35 Although Shakur recounts many
harrowing details of her incarceration in her autobiography, her attorney, Lennox Hinds,
insists that she “understates the awfulness of the condition in which she was
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incarcerated.”36 For instance, Shakur would “forget how to talk” after extended periods of
solitary confinement.37 The literal silencing of Shakur not only demonstrates the state’s
interest in destroying political activists who fought for the liberation of black people in
the United States, it foreshadowed some of the physical and psychological abuse regimes
that would emerge in the 1980s.
In addition to day-to-day abuses, the BOP repeatedly, and often inexplicably,
transferred Shakur between county and municipal jails, as well as state and federal
prisons.38 The effect of these transfers stripped Shakur’s life of continuity, and
interrupted her legal counsel as attorneys scrambled to find their client who,
unbeknownst to them, had been moved.39 Shakur’s transfers took her to a range of
carceral institutions. She became the “first, and last, woman ever imprisoned” at the
Middlesex County jail in New Jersey, and was among the first group of women to be
incarcerated in Davis Hall at the Federal Reformatory for Women at Alderson, West
Virginia.40 Opened in 1978, Davis Hall served as the prison’s maximum-security unit
(MSU) and housed “the most dangerous women in the country.”41 This unit, however,
would not remain open for long. Emily Thuma’s scholarship documents that “ACLU
staffers. . . grassroots activist and several of the unit’s former prisoners, mounted enough
public pressure to shut down the unit later that year.”42 Upon the close of Davis Hall in
February 1979, Shakur was transferred to the Clinton Correctional Institution for Women
in New Jersey.43 By the time she reached Clinton, Shakur faced charges for seven
criminal incidents ranging from robbery and armed robbery to kidnapping, attempted
murder, and murder.44
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Of the seven cases brought against Shakur between May 1973 and November
1977, three were dismissed, and three resulted in an acquittal. The charges that stuck,
however, hinged on flimsy evidence produced in the aftermath of the New Jersey
Turnpike shooting. Despite the fact ballistics evidence failed to prove Shakur fired a gun,
she was convicted of eight counts of first- and second-degree murder, several counts of
assault, as well as illegal possession of a weapon and armed robbery on March 26,
1977.45 Shakur received a life sentence plus sixty-five years.46
After a particularly painful visit with her mother and four-year-old daughter in
1979, Shakur simply recalls that it was “time to leave.”47 On November 2, 1979, Shakur
escaped from Clinton’s maximum-security unit in the middle of the afternoon with the
help of four BLA accomplices. The New York Times reported that three men posing as
Shakur’s visitors took three guards hostage at gunpoint, commandeered a prison van, and
drove Shakur just beyond the prison’s borders, where “another confederate was waiting”
with two getaway cars.48 At that point, the group of five split themselves between the two
cars and drove toward Interstate 78. According to the Times, “roadblocks were set up, but
the escapees eluded police.”49 From that point forward, Shakur remained underground
until surfacing in Cuba as a political asylee in 1988.
The success of Shakur’s escape was cause for international celebration in the
black community. As Dan Berger notes, “Assata’s liberation from prison was a bold
move that countered FBI and police claims to have ‘broken the back of the BLA.’”50 That
Shakur successfully escaped from prison— in the middle of the day, no less—sent a
powerful message of strength in spite of the efforts the state took to secure Shakur and
immobilize the BLA over the course of her incarceration.51 Springing Shakur from jail,
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however, prompted a major unintended consequence: it justified the need for intensified
security measures in women’s prisons. If, just months earlier, activists successfully
dissolved the Bureau of Prison’s maximum security unit at Alderson on account of its
constitutional violations, Shakur’s escape legitimized the BOP’s decision to use punitive,
allegedly “precautionary” tactics to secure other political prisoners.52
News of Shakur’s escape immediately spread to prisons incarcerating political
women. When the news reached Alderson, prison administrators immediately relocated
Rita Bo Brown to administrative detention in light of “the escapes of [John] Sherman and
Shakur and concern over a possible attempt to forcibly effect [Brown’s] removal from
Alderson.” The decision to subject Brown to “maximum security conditions” and solitary
confinement was steeped in pure suspicion. As Brown recalls, a prison administrator
simply believed that Shakur was “coming to get” her. Court documents reveal that
Alderson administrators identified Brown as an escape risk for four reasons. The
Alderson administration pointed to several characteristics that Brown and Shakur had in
common: (1) Shakur and Brown were friends, (2) were both considered model prisoners,
and (3) received seven to nine mutual visitors at Alderson. The fourth justification for
Brown’s security reclassification rested on the fact that the recently escaped John
Sherman was an associate of Brown’s in the George Jackson Brigade, leading prison
administration to believe Brown might be sprung next. Brown’s response to the
administrator’s concerns regarding her communication with Shakur—“you know, she
called me last night and said you really are a stupid mother fucker”— is Brown’s
sarcastic way of emphasizing the state’s willingness to overdetermine her relationship
with Shakur to justify her increased security. Upon her relocation to administrative
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detention, Brown challenged the constitutionality of her confinement by suing Alderson’s
warden, Kenneth R. Neagle, several BOP administrators, and the U.S. attorney.53
The order issued by West Virginia District Judge Dennis R. Knapp acknowledged
the court’s “difficult position” in this case. According to Knapp, the court needed to
maintain some degree of deference and balance “the legitimate concerns of the
respondent [the prison administration] with the constitutionally guaranteed rights of the
petitioner [Brown].” Ultimately, Knapp did not end Brown’s administrative segregation.
The Nixon appointee acknowledged that the Alderson administration’s treatment of
Brown treaded “the razor’s edge between constitutionally permissible and impermissible
action,” but the order he issued ultimately empowered prison officials to make similar
decisions in the future. Rather than return Brown to the general prison population, Knapp
transformed her administrative detention into a “constitutionally reasonable”
circumstance by improving several conditions of her confinement. Knapp outlined
guidelines that restored Brown’s ability to attend educational and vocational classes, and
reemphasized her right to “adequate diet, hygiene, exercise, and medical treatment.” In
addition, Brown’s ability to access visitors and her attorneys could be “no different than
the treatment afforded to any other prisoner in administrative detention.”54
Knapp’s order may have demanded that the Alderson administration make
changes, but it also empowered the BOP to further justify their decision to proactively
segregate political prisoners like Brown from the general population. For instance, Knapp
acknowledged that
[t]he petitioner cannot remain in administrative detention merely on the
respondent’s good faith belief that she might be an “escape risk.” Due
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process and essential fairness demand that the respondent have credible
evidence upon which to base a reasonable belief that the petitioner or, in
this instance, someone else intends to effect her escape.
In acknowledging that the Alderson administration established only a “tenuous link”
between Brown and Shakur and Sherman’s escapes, Knapp’s order demanded that
Alderson administrators find a more credible reason to serve as the basis for Brown’s
segregation. Knapp ordered Alderson administrators to provide Brown with weekly
reports concerning the “changes or lack of changes in her status” in administrative
segregation, but what information the administration considered “credible” remained
open to internal interpretation. Shared political affiliation was not, in the eyes of Knapp, a
sufficient reason for Brown’s segregation, but this determination simply led Alderson
officials to find a new rationale to justify their action against Brown.55
The proactive measures taken to secure Brown in the aftermath of Shakur’s
escape established a troubling precedent. Despite maintaining a spotless record in prison,
one could still be punished on account of another individual’s actual or hypothetical
actions. In the era of COINTELPRO and disinformation campaigns targeting political
prisoners, it was not difficult to imagine prison administrators finding ways to credibly
justify Brown’s administrative segregation. While it is unclear how many other women
political prisoners were subjected to increased security measures after Shakur’s escape,
Brown’s experience points to the way other institutions feared that the BLA—or any
other leftist revolutionary group—might take similar action to defeat prison security and
spring political prisoners. In the following sections, I suggest that Shakur’s escape, when
paired with the rise of leftist revolutionary action in the 1970s, created the context that
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would prompt the BOP to shift their carceral tactics. The following section outlines how
throughout the 1970s, law enforcement agencies evolved COINTELPRO into a
counterterrorism regime that functioned to transform the “leftist woman revolutionary”
into the “female terrorist.” As we will see in the final section, the creation, and
subsequent incarceration of the female terrorist, urged the BOP to open a prison unit
specifically designed for the nation’s most dangerous women.

“One man’s terrorist is another man’s freedom fighter”: From COINTELPRO to
Counterterrorism
The social movements of the late 1960s produced a shift in radical organizing that
embraced revolutionary violence as a means of protesting the state. Organizations like the
Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee (SNCC) largely advocated for peaceful
protest in the face of persistent and gratuitous racial violence, but leaders such as Robert
F. Williams, Malcolm X, and later Stokely Charmichael promoted a politic of selfdefense that gave birth to a new revolutionary movement within the broader context of
civil rights. In 1966, the “cutting edge of the Black Power movement” emerged in
Oakland, California as the Black Panther Party for Self-Defense.56 Protecting black
communities from police violence was among BPP’s top priorities, but they also
challenged the state by establishing a number of community self-defense programs, in
addition to a Ten Point Program that outlined the black community’s demands for racial
equality and justice. The extent to which the BPP threatened the state is evident in FBI
director J. Edgar Hoover’s response. By 1969, Hoover considered the BPP to be “the
greatest threat to the internal security of the United States,” and deployed COINTELPRO
to destroy the party by using legal and illegal surveillance and infiltration tactics.57 As the
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BPP struggled to maintain a sense of order in the midst of unprecedented levels of statesponsored violence and repression, the call for self-defense, as Bryan Burrough suggests,
rapidly accelerated from “‘struggle’ to ‘resistance,’ to ‘Black Power,’ to revolutionary
and guerrilla warfare and death.”58
A desire to engage in increasingly militant action against the state emerged within
the BPP. This escalation was not without fault lines, and ultimately separated the more
militant East Coast panthers from the West Coast leadership in Oakland. According to
Assata Shakur, “the concept of the BLA arose because of the political, social, and
economic oppression of Black people in this country. And where there is oppression,
there will be resistance.”59 The tension within the BPP was exacerbated by the indictment
of twenty-one Panthers in New York on April 2, 1969. By the time the Panther 21 trial
concluded and all individuals acquitted from charges in 1971, “several members of the
Panther 21 went underground, convinced by experience that the government intended to
crush radical aboveground organizing in Black communities.”60 Indeed, COINTELPRO
actions were effectively annihilating black radicals: “27 Panthers were murdered and 749
arrested in 1969 alone.”61 Different from the Panthers, the BLA emerged in order to
“promote revolutionary Black Nationalism and exact a material cost from the state for its
continued repression of Black people.”62 Acting as a guerrilla army, the BLA retaliated
against police, robbed banks to raise money, and drove drug dealers out of the black
community.63 In the eyes of the BLA, the violence they inflicted upon others was not
only necessary, but fundamentally rooted in a revolutionary pursuit of black liberation.
Indeed, what the state would soon consider to be acts of terror would be a fight for
freedom for others.64
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At a time where numerous social movements, including the civil rights
movement, women’s liberation, gay liberation, and the anti-war movement overlapped,
organizations like Students for a Democratic Society (SDS) grew increasingly aware of
the way U.S. imperialism and capitalism intersected with white supremacy at home and
abroad. The Black Power movement would ultimately challenge white leftists to leave
black organizations and independently organize in white communities. As Berger
explains, leaders in the black community—especially SNCC leadership—called on white
people to “confront white supremacy in their own communities” so that black people
could “organize for self-determination.”65 The separation of white leftists from black
leftists established a source of solidarity that allowed both groups to work toward similar
goals within their respective communities. For example, SDS initially formed as an antiwar group, adopted a distinctly anti-racist position that established “solidarity with the
Black movement as a cutting edge issue.”66 Likewise, the civil rights-oriented SNCC
helped anti-war organizing by offering a racial analysis of the Vietnam War.
The Weather Underground Organization emerged in 1969 as the result of a split
within SDS as the organization attempted to transition from “resistance to revolution.”67
In 1968 the future of SDS’s commitments were up for debate: some members demanded
that anti-racist organizing be the group’s first priority, while others minimized racial
difference in favor of organizing solely around class struggles and labor.68 The founding
WUO document, “You Don’t’ Need a Weatherman to Know Which Way the Wind
Blows,” emerged in a 1969 issue of SDS’ New Left Notes, and called for a “‘white
fighting force’ in alliance with anti-colonial struggles, especially the Black Liberation
Movement in the Untied States, and focused heavily on white working class youth as
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agents for change, when aligned in solidarity with the national liberation movements.”69
Members of the newly formed WUO were inspired by revolutionary action, and engaged
in “militant demonstrations, tried to organize working class whites against imperialism . .
. and did minor acts of property destruction” in an attempt to inspire their white working
class peers and recruit new membership.70 The WUO’s actions—ranging from planned
actions like the Days of Rage to symbolic bombings of government property—earned
them the reputation as the “most violent, persistent and pernicious of revolutionary
groups.”71 The WUO’s violent actions were not intended to harm civilians, but instead
state actors who actively perpetuated violence against the black community. In spite of
attempts to recruit a critical mass of white people to engage in revolutionary action,
aboveground organizing grew increasingly difficult as the FBI and law enforcement
issued warrants for the arrest several WUO leaders. In response, the organization slipped
underground, turning their attention to clandestine bombings and other actions that
targeted state property.
The FBI’s attempt to “neutralize” leftist political dissidents depended upon tactics
such as wire taps, bugs, and mail surveillance. A wide range of political organizations fell
under the purview of COINTELPRO surveillance. In addition to organizations like the
BPP and the lesbian feminist targets outlined in chapter two, the FBI took action against
virtually every active leftist social movement including the Communist Party, USA, the
Socialist Workers Party, the Puerto Rican Independence Movement, the American Indian
Movement, as well as the Black Liberation Movement and the New Left.72
COINTELPRO tactics were ruthless. The COINTELPRO-instigated murders of Black
Panther leaders, for instance, sparked outrage among leftist groups, especially after Fred
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Hampton, Chairman of the Chicago BPP, was drugged by an FBI informant just hours
before a planned police raid administered by the Chicago Police Department on
December 4, 1969.73
The FBI’s approach to dissident groups would undergo a dramatic evolution in
the 1970s after news of COINTELPRO surfaced. On March 8, 1971, the Citizen’s
Commission to Investigate the FBI stole a number of documents from a Pennsylvania
FBI office.74 The documents unearthed details about COINTELPRO, a report of which
appeared on the front page of the Washington Post on March 28. The key finding
revealed that the FBI surveilled a number of “campus and black activist organizations,”
including the BPP and “other extremists.”75 In the midst of mounting political pressure,
FBI Director J. Edgar Hoover issued a “termination memo” on April 21, 1971 that
technically dissolved COINTELPRO investigations. While the FBI maintains that the
COINTELPRO program ended in 1971, evidence suggests that the bureau increased the
use of “warrantless bugging and wiretapping” from 1972-1974.76 According to Ward
Churchill and Jim Vander Wall, “the reality of COINTELPRO’s continuation was
masked not only behind the dropping of the descriptive title, but a retooling of the
terminology utilized to define its targets as well.”77 Those initially recognized as leftist
political dissidents would quickly be categorized as domestic terrorists in the eyes of the
FBI.
Conceiving of dissident groups as “terrorists” helped the FBI legitimize the
political policing of citizen groups. Evidence suggests that the FBI reimagined dissident
groups as “terrorists” as early as 1972. In the February 1972 issue of the FBI Law
Enforcement Bulletin, an article entitled “The Police Officer: Primary Target of the
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Urban Guerrilla” explicitly pointed to the “Eldridge Cleaver Panther Faction” (an early
articulation of the BLA) and WUO as examples of urban guerrilla organizations.78 In
defining urban guerrilla warfare as “secret and planned activity designed to disrupt and/or
terrorize the ‘establishment’ or Government,” the FBI established a criteria for
revolutionary action that included “the expropriation of money, guns, and explosives to
further revolutionary goals” that would serve as evidence of terrorist activity.79 Despite,
then, the 1971 moratorium on COINTELPRO activities, FBI documents included in
Churchill and Vander Wall’s collection of COINTELPRO papers reveal that “terrorists”
would remain prime targets for unwarranted surveillance. For example, a telegram dated
April 12, 1972 urged special agents in Albany, New York, to “insure that every effort is
being made to effectively identify, investigate, and control urban guerrilla terrorists in
this country.”80 Although several right-wing terrorist groups occupied the FBI’s attention,
the Bureau’s attention on “urban guerrilla organizations” advanced the belief that leftist
revolutionary groups were considered the most dangerous perpetrators of domestic
terrorism in the United States.81
Throughout the 1970s, clandestine revolutionary groups like the Symbionese
Liberation Army (SLA) and Fuerzas Armadas de Liberación Nacional joined the BLA
and WUO in taking revolutionary action against the state. While the ideologies driving
each group varied, they used similar tactics, ranging from bank robberies and kidnapping,
the killing of police officers, to the bombing of public and private property. Often, the
revolutionaries perpetrating violence situated their actions as retaliation to statesanctioned violence, including acts of violence the state took against fellow
revolutionaries. For example, when law enforcement launched an attack against a SLA
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hideout on May 17, 1974, a live television broadcast captured the state using “tear gas,
then fire bullets, and finally. . . an incendiary device” upon the house containing several
SLA members.82 Although the WUO was critical, at times, of the SLA, they responded to
the televised murder of six by bombing the California Attorney General’s office.83 In the
midst of persistent government attacks, small revolutionary groups like the SLA could
only exist briefly before being annihilated. Larger groups like the WUO fractured into
smaller subgroups and were protected by aboveground allies. The WUO, however, would
undergo political restructuring several times, resulting in aboveground groups like the
PFOC and the underground M19.
Throughout the 1970s, FBI attempts to find clandestine revolutionary groups
proved difficult. Their task grew more complicated when, in 1974, Congress passed the
Freedom of Information Act (FOIA). According to a Homeland Security case study on
surveillance techniques and the FALN, the intelligence community was forced to
dismantle its domestic intelligence units. . . [and] . . . could no longer
conduct warrantless searches or wiretaps in the name of national security,
nor use informants unless there were allegations of criminal activities. The
only available means to gather intelligence at this early stage of the
[FALN] investigation, was through physical surveillance of potential
suspects.84
While FOIA proved to be a tremendous setback for FBI agents, the new regulations
ultimately forged new, more expansive surveillance techniques as law enforcement
continued to pursue clandestine revolutionaries. For example, when faced with the task of
finding the ever-active FALN—who carried out more than 120 attacks between 1974 and
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1981—physical surveillance proved remarkably ineffective between 1974-1980.85 Only
after the FBI gained access to a “flipped” FALN member were they able to make
headway in locating and surveilling FALN activity. The human power required to
effectively surveil the FALN ultimately led to the formation of Joint Terrorism Task
Forces. According to Mathieu Deflem, the first JTTF was formed in New York in
response to “domestic terrorism from ethnonationailst groups.”86 Acting as a “force
multiplier,” the JTTF initially recruited New York police and detectives to serve FBI
ends by “following up on information and leads, gathering evidence, collecting
intelligence, and making arrests.”87 In extracting the power of multiple law enforcement
agencies, JTTFs were able to better conceal the FBI’s mission while expanding their
depth. In conjunction with intelligence gleaned from a flipped informant, the FBI finally
infiltrated the FALN’s “sophisticated counter-surveillance techniques” that, for years,
kept law enforcement at bay.88
Successful JTTFs depended upon cooperation and collaboration among various
law enforcement agencies ranging from the Secret Service to state police. The
information gleaned in the aftermath of arrests, however, was invaluable to law
enforcement in their attempts to neutralize domestic terrorists. For example, much of the
FBI’s success in annihilating “domestic terrorists” in the 1980s took place after the failed
Brink’s Robbery in 1981. On October 20, six revolutionaries from the BLA and M19
robbed an armored car in Nyack, New York. More than $1.5 million dollars were stolen,
but the robbery failed tremendously in lieu of the subsequent police chase. After leaving
one Brink’s guard dead and two wounded, the revolutionaries split up between two cars
and headed toward the highway. The New York Times reported that one car “opened fire
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on several police officers and detectives who had stopped them at a roadblock at an
entrance to the Gov. Thomas E. Dewey Thruway,” killing two police officers and
wounding one.89 In spite of the heavy gunfire, law enforcement captured four of the six,
including BLA member Samuel Brown, and M19 members Judith Clark, Kathy Boudin,
and David Gilbert. Within days of the initial Brink’s arrests, law enforcement killed the
remaining two robbers at large, Sekou Odinga and Mtayri Shabaka Sundiata, and made
dozens of other arrests in the New York area.90 According to Dan Berger, individuals
who “had personal or political ties to radical movements or the people involved,” were
the targets of more than 1,000 FBI agents who formed a JTTF with NYPD in the hours
following the robbery.91 Confident in their new approach to clandestine radical groups,
the FBI claimed that “within a week of the Brink’s incident” they had “found links
among the Weather Underground, the Black Liberation Army and the Black Panther
Party, and . . . possible connections with the FALN.”92
Between 1980 and 1985, law enforcement rounded up eleven women affiliated
with clandestine revolutionary groups by way of self-surrender or arrest. In court, leftist
women engaged in political violence were “viewed as aberrant and ‘less than a woman,’”
and thus perceived as more deserving of long-term sentences that could potentially result
in life in prison.93 Refusing to play by the rules of the U.S. justice system only further
exacerbated the understanding of female terrorists as particularly unhinged individuals.
For example, the M19 women involved in the Brink’s Robbery used two dramatically
different legal strategies that resulted in dramatically different results. Judith Clark, who
was tried alongside two male co-defendants, deployed an untraditional legal defense that
situated one co-defendant as a prisoner of war, while Clark and the other co-defendant
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argued that they were as allied political prisoners.94 Due to the fact “international law
[was] supposed to supersede national legal proceedings,” the three attempted “to be tried
as political combatants in an international court under UN jurisdiction.”95 This strategy
was completely and utterly ignored in U.S. court. All three received sentences of seventyfive years to life for triple murder. Compared to Clark, Kathy Boudin faired substantially
better after deploying a traditional legal strategy and taking a plea bargain. She received
twenty years to life for her role in the Brink’s Robbery.
The arrest and sentencing of Silvia Baraldini (BLA), Alejandrinia Torres (FALN),
and Susan Rosenberg (M19) in 1983, 1984, and 1985, respectfully, often resulted in
maximum sentences for first-time convictions. Baraldini, for example, received a total of
43 years: “maximum time” of 40 years for a Racketeering Influence Corrupt
Organizations (RICO) charge, and three additional years for criminal contempt in
refusing to testify before a grand jury investigating the Puerto Rican independence
movement.96 As a “terrorist” convicted of conspiring to break Assata Shakur from jail
and participating in the larger project of “waging armed actions in the name of ending
[the] oppression of Black people within the U.S.,” Baraldini represented the type of
conspicuous foreign national whose conviction was a “closed question.”97 Like Baraldini,
Alejandrina Torres represented a faction of the Puerto Rican independence movement
that threatened the state’s security. She received twenty years, the maximum sentence for
seditious conspiracy, and an additional fifteen years for “bomb and weapons violations,”
though the state failed to prove that Torres was, in fact, a member of the FALN.98
Susan Rosenberg faired similarly to Baraldini and Torres. Law enforcement
believed that Rosenberg, a white Jewish woman, was associated with almost every major
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group and action in the late 1970s and early 80s, including the FALN, BLA, and “other
terrorist groups,” in addition to actions like Assata Shakur’s escape and the Brink’s
robbery.99 As a result, Rosenberg and her co-defendant received the maximum sentence
for a first time weapons charge that amounted to 56 years. Writing in the The Nation,
William Reuben and Carlos Norman took note of the particularly long sentences that
leftist revolutionary women received. “Although neither [Torres or Rosenberg] were
convicted of committing acts of violence,” they wrote, “each received an unusually harsh
sentence. Rosenberg’s term is sixteen times longer than the average sentence meted out to
weapons-possession offenders, and twice the 1985 average for first-degree murders in the
Federal courts.”100 In pointing to the fact that Rosenberg’s first-time weapons charge
resulted in double the time of a murder charge, Reuben and Norman addressed the ways a
prison sentence could act as a method of counterinsurgency. Even in the absence of openended, “to life” sentences, revolutionary women received sentences, often without parole,
that could keep them behind bars for the rest of their lives.
One of the last major arrests to come out of the Brink’s affair took place on May
11, 1985, when law enforcement arrested Marilyn Buck and Linda Evans in Dobbs Ferry,
New York.101 While Buck and Evans’s arrest would lead authorities to arrest Laura
Whitehorn in Baltimore, the local JTTF surveilling Buck and Evans did not procure the
“remaining Brink’s robbery fugitives or other suspects” that authorities hoped to
locate.102 Although Buck would be convicted in 1988 for her role in the Brink’s robbery,
law enforcement had rounded up half of the individuals that made up the “Resistance
Conspiracy Case.” Together, Buck, Evans, and Whitehorn were accused, alongside four
others including Rosenberg, of bombing the U.S. Capitol and three Washington D.C.
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military buildings in 1983.103 The Resistance Conspiracy case would not go to trial until
1990, but the three women faced no chance of bail. Assistant U.S. Attorney Patricia
Williams requested that Buck be held without bail because she failed to return to the
Alderson Federal Prison after receiving a furlough to visit her attorney in 1977; Evans
was similarly identified as a flight risk due to the fact she harbored Buck.104 Whitehorn
was held under “preventative detention” and denied bail, although her record showed “no
previous criminal charges and only three arrests for demonstrating against the Vietnam
War and forced sterilization.”105 Several rounds of sentencing would take place at
different times for Buck, Evans, and Whitehorn, resulting in lengthy sentences for each
woman. Buck, initially sentenced to ten years in 1973 for “acting as a gun runner for the
Black Liberation Army,” received 50 years for her involvement in Shakur’s escape and
the Brink’s robbery, and an additional ten years for her involvement in the Resistance
Conspiracy case.106 Evans’s sentences totaled to 40 years: 35 years for illegal gun
purchases, and an additional five “for her role in the bombing conspiracy.” Whitehorn
received 20 years for the Capitol bombing. After Assistant U.S. Attorney Margaret Ellen
emphasized in court that “the defendants Linda Evans and Laura Whitehorn are
terrorists,” their lengthy sentences could hardly come as a surprise.107
Domestic terrorism in the 1980s drew attention to sentencing disparities for those
convicted on the left and the right. While members of the BLA, M19, FALN, and other
clandestine revolutionaries faced decades long sentences, right-wing terrorists seemed to
face remarkably less severe punishment. Writing in 1990, Elizabeth Fink emphasized the
public perception of differential treatment, specifically with regard to the sentences given
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to right-wing terrorists who bombed abortion providers. Citing the 1984 Christmas Day
abortion clinic bombings in Pensacola, Florida, Fink argued that
the disparity of sentencing between the right wing and the left wing in this
country is well known. . . If you bomb a series of abortion centers in
Florida, and you stand up in court and say, “I’m proud of what I did,” you
are going to get five years and your wife will receive probation. If you do
the most outrageous of criminal offenses and you are a member of the
right wing, you are going to get out of prison.108
From Fink’s perspective, right-wing terrorists like Mathew Goldsby, James Simmons,
Kathy Simmons, and Kaye Wiggins benefitted from their political affiliations in the form
of light sentences, fueling the belief that conservatives could evade harsh punishments for
politically motivated crimes.
A closer evaluation of sentencing disparities among right wing and left wing
terrorists draws attention to the significant relationship between gender, political ideation,
and punishment. Brent L. Smith’s 1994 study of domestic terrorism in the United States
reviewed a number of 1980s sentences corresponding to members of domestic U.S.
terrorist organizations, including members from the right-wing groups such as the Aryan
Nations, Ku Klux Klan, and The Order, and leftist groups including the FALN, M19, and
the United Freedom Front. Of the 165 individuals indicted for acts of terror throughout
the 1980s, Smith’s study documents that the majority—103 individuals—identified as
members of right-wing groups.109 In addressing the question of differential sentencing,
Smith concludes that “while the conviction rate for leftists (77 percent) was slightly
higher than for rightists (70 percent),” the sentences given to convicted terrorists “were
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almost identical.”110 Smith’s research may dispel Fink’s general claim of differential
sentencing, but it does reveal the way political affiliation influenced the sentences women
received. Smith’s study found that “female members of right-wing groups were much
less likely to be arrested, indicted, and convicted. Those who were convicted received
less severe sentences than left-wing terrorists. . . left-wing female terrorists received
sentences equal to those given to male terrorists.”111 While it is difficult to assess the
degree to which the figure of the leftist female terrorist fueled “the view of the terrorist as
universally leftist and Marxist,” Smith affirms the existence of a cultural bias against the
left that has “permeate[d] not only the news media but has left its mark upon academic
studies of terrorism.” 112 This bias against the left must be understood to be inclusive of
feminist politics that complemented revolutionary fights against racism, imperialism, and
capitalism.
In the wake of widespread patriarchal and misogynistic bias, feminism, in the
words of Gilda Zwerman, “made its mark—for the worse” by perpetuating the belief that
leftist revolutionary women were “amazons” who required “new and expanded security
measures to contain them.”113 This belief was staunchly reinforced by the fact that the
state believed that several of the women in custody aided in Assata Shakur’s notorious
escape. The new accumulation of domestic female terrorists created the circumstance in
which the BOP could experiment with a new carceral technology for the nation’s most
dangerous women, resulting in a new high security unit for women in Lexington,
Kentucky. As I demonstrate in the following section, the Lexington HSU’s brief, 21month existence would deploy a new set of cruel and unusual conditions of confinement
that treated female terrorists as “pure evil” that must be destroyed.114
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Locking up the Left: The Lexington High Security Unit
The task of confining domestic female terrorists posed entirely new problems for
the BOP. From the perspective of one alleged counter-terrorism insider, publishing under
the pseudonym “Gayle Rivers,” female terrorists were a new breed.115 According to
Rivers, leftist female terrorists were a group of predominately white, “spoiled, welleducated women from so-called good backgrounds who are turned on by aggressive acts.
. . they soon enough become single-minded bitter killers. . . [the female terrorist] lives in
a world of violence that was long thought to be a male preserve. Therefore, there is great
pressure for the female terrorist to keep proving herself.”116 Rivers’s analysis of female
terrorists queered the women of the radical left—especially privileged, white women with
access to higher education—by suggesting that violence was the expression of a
pathological sexual urge. In turning to biological determinism to account for the “natural”
occurrence of violence perpetrated by men, Rivers situated patriarchal claims to violence
as the reason female terrorists attempted to do violence better than men. Thus, in
presenting the white, wealthy, and well-educated female terrorist as a queer subject who
transgressed the gender binary and derived sexual satisfaction from violence, Rivers
suggested that female terrorists were “less than human, [and] by definition not eligible for
‘rehabilitation.’” 117 Rivers need not invoke stereotypes such as the angry feminist or the
man-hating lesbian to convey to his audience that female terrorists were more
threatening, more dangerous, and more extreme than male terrorists.
The Lexington High Security Unit can be understood as the BOP’s response to
the myriad security problems specifically posed by the female terrorist. Mainstream and
anti-prison media alike reported news of the unit’s development when it reached the

188

public in the fall of 1985, one year before the unit’s anticipated opening. The Lexington
Herald-Leader reported basic details about the HSU, including the BOP’s renovation
plans, and the development of the basement unit that would be reserved for up to “16
women with assaultive backgrounds” from the women’s federal prisons in Alderson,
WV, and Pleasanton, CA.118 The Insurgent, however, contested the language of “assault”
by arguing that the BOP was attempting to hold the “most militant and revolutionary
political prisoners in special ‘maximum-maximum’ security units, to isolate them from
the general prison population, from the community[,] and from one another.”119 In
underscoring some of the anticipated features of the new HSU, Insurgent writers cited the
men’s federal penitentiary in Marion, Illinois, which in 1978 emerged as the country’s
first level-six prison. This unit enforced a solitary confinement regime that kept
“prisoners in their cells 23 hours a day with few personal belongings, denied all work and
educational programs, fed cold and inedible food in their cells, and denied all contact
visits. Random beatings and forced rectal searches [were] common.”120 Davis Hall at the
Federal Reformatory for Women at Alderson, West Virginia opened that same year and
engaged in similar tactics, including sensory deprivation techniques before it closed in
early 1979. As reported by The Insurgent,
when someone is housed in a cell that shuts out all normal input, the
government hopes that they will lose their bearings, go insane, and even
commit suicide. At the very least, it is hoped that they will renounce their
political principles—go to their jailers and offer to do anything to be
released from their terrible conditions.121
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Whether referred to as sensory deprivation, behavioral modification, or torture, critics of
these techniques acknowledged their role in punishing prisoners on the basis of standing
up to state power.
Despite BOP spokespersons’ efforts to dismiss early allegations that women from
the radical left would be sent to the HSU, Susan Rosenberg and Alejandrina Torres were
the first to be transfered to the HSU when it opened in late October 1986. Upon their
arrival, the women disappeared into a completely artificial world where “the things we
take for granted as basic components of human existence—natural light, fresh air, color,
sound, human contact, various smells—were conspicuously, intentionally, absent.”122
Rosenberg and Torres lived in an isolated, all white-unit with 24-hour florescent lighting
and “cameras [that] continuously surveyed the stagnant air conditioned cells.”123 Within
the HSU, Rosenberg and Torres experienced constant surveillance: “their actions and
spoken words were written down by male guards, who also observed them taking
showers and sitting on the toilet.”124 Worse, the women endured at least one daily strip
search upon reentering the unit after their recreation hour.125
The twenty-four hour physical surveillance of the inmates, however, composed
only one element of the HSU. The BOP placed significant limitations upon written
communication and physical visits, likely on account of the fact that the men who sprung
Shakur from prison were on her visitation list.126 The BOP consequently limited physical
visitations to immediate family, required all visitors to be photographed, and were capped
at ten hours a month.127 Inmates could correspond with immediate family, but were
required to provide prison administration with a list of up to fifteen names in order to
correspond with friends.128 Torres, in particular, recognized how the state’s
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communication restrictions made family and friends vulnerable to state surveillance. In
refusing to submit a list of friends to communicate with, Torres prioritized the safety of
her community over maintaining lifelines to the outside world.129
In January 1987, the BOP transferred its third “terrorist,” Silvia Baraldini, to the
HSU, which only reinforced the belief among critics that the HSU was specifically
created for the female terrorist. Similar to Rita Bo Brown’s “administrative segregation”
at Alderson in the aftermath of Assata Shakur’s escape, activists argued that leftist
revolutionaries were “sent to Lexington not because of any particular act or behavior but
because [their political affiliations suggested that] unnamed persons might attempt, at
some unspecified time in the future, to help them escape.”130 The BOP rejected this
claim, insisting that the unit was designed for “women prisoners who [were] considered
highly dangerous and escape-prone,” but seemed well aware of the HSU’s optics.131
According to Jan Susler, the BOP’s “apparent concern for the transparent political nature
of the HSU” prompted the subsequent transfer of two “social prisoners” to the unit whose
crimes were not associated with any particular political ideology or party.132 By March,
1987, Debra Brown arrived to the unit to serve “federal time” for kidnapping charges, but
was considered a security risk on account of the fact she was sentenced to “two life
sentences” and faced “two death penalties for murder convictions at the state level.”133
Silvia Brown (no relation to Debra) was sentenced to prison for robbery convictions, and
fit the criteria for the HSU on account of her “history of escape.”134
As the HSU captivated the attention of human rights activists, the BOP’s attempt
to obscure the acutely political nature of the unit failed on two accounts. First, claims of
inmate abuse that spread throughout the community made it impossible to argue that the
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HSU’s living conditions were merely adjusted to provide enhanced security for the
women assigned to the unit. Within six months of the HSU’s existence, Amnesty
International “determined that the allegations of human rights violations met its criteria”
and sent “a letter of inquiry to federal prison officials.”135 The ACLU’s visit to the HSU
confirmed Amnesty International’s fears. In July 1987, ACLU attorneys visited the HSU
alongside prison psychologist Dr. Richard Korn.136 Korn’s initial report, issued in August
1987, indicated that the ACLU “found the unit’s five prisoners subjected to unnecessary
strip searches, constant surveillance even while showering and inadequate medical
care.”137 Korn’s evaluation of the psychological effects of the unit were especially
damning: he argued that the HSU found ways to “depersonalize and deny individuality”
by denying the women “personal touches” to their appearance or their living space—a
strategy that instigated the “denial of personal initiative, tending toward enforced
dependency and infantilization.”138 The HSU deployed a number of tactics meant to
humiliate its inhabitants, for instance, requiring women to ask for sanitary napkins one by
one.139 Korn further cited Torres and Rosenberg’s experiences of sexual violence at
MCC, Tuscon, in which the women experienced “forced and unnecessary vaginal and
anal examination by male staff.”140 “The effect of this process,” according to Korn, “is
that even women who have not actually suffered the reported abuse experience it
psychologically both in prospect and retrospect as a permanent possibility.”141 The
creation of a terrifying environment for female terrorists did not, in fact, lend itself to an
enhanced security strategy, but instead mobilized a gendered form of punishment that
targeted leftist political ideologies.
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In forcing leftist revolutionaries to live amid terror-inducing conditions, the HSU
used physical and psychological trauma as a form of behavioral modification meant to
inspire terrorists to renounce their political affiliations. The political implications of
ideological reconditioning tactics were difficult to dispute, especially in the aftermath of
first-hand accounts from HSU prisoners. According to the ACLU’s report, “most of the
women [had] been told they [would] remain in the unit until they are released from
prison,” but “one of the political women report[ed] being told she would be released from
the unit when she changes her affiliation.”142 Rosenberg, Torres, and Baraldini did not,
however, elect to refute their political beliefs as a way out of their confinement. Even in
event they pursued that path, it would have been difficult, if not impossible, to satisfy the
BOP’s alleged requirements for “release” from the HSU. Korn’s report highlighted this
conundrum, in that “entry into nor exit from the facility is something for which the
offender herself is responsible. . . There is some vague hope held out to the prisoner who
professes some willingness to ‘change her associations.’ But this language does not
inspire confidence because it does not specify the criteria according to which her good
intentions can be tested.”143 In pointing to the fact there was no litmus test by which
one’s associations could be assessed, leftist revolutionary women would be confined
within the HSU until the BOP altered their perceptions of the women’s political
affiliations. This created, as the International Tribunal on Political Prisoners and
Prisoners of War in the U.S.A. claimed, an “indefinite length of stay in the Unit,” to
which political women remained uniquely vulnerable.144 The indeterminate nature of
Baraldini, Rosenberg, and Torres’s confinement exacerbated the inescapability of the
HSU’s physical and psychological terrors. One unnamed inmate in Korn’s initial report
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even argued that the BOP was “tying to kill us. But they’d rather we kill ourselves.”145
Indeed, the HSU’s behavioral modification regime may have failed to produce political
renunciation among inmates, but it succeeded in destroying the women’s physical and
psychological health. Korn’s initial assessment of the HSU detailed that the women
incarcerated in the unit experienced claustrophobia, chronic rage reaction, low to severe
depression, hallucinations, and defensive psychological withdrawal.146 Physical
symptoms included loss of appetite, weight loss, physical malaise, dizziness, heart
palpations, and the exacerbation of pre-existing medical conditions.147
The ACLU’s report prompted a meeting with BOP director Michael Quinlan on
October 5, 1987 to discuss changes to the HSU’s conditions of confinement. Quinlan
agreed to end strip searches, relax visitation restrictions, and reevaluate prisoners’
security classification.148 In this moment, the pressure campaign built by organizations
like the ACLU and the Campaign to Abolish the Lexington Women’s Control Unit
appeared at least partially successful. However, the struggle to abolish the Lexington
HSU was undermined by the BOP when they announced plans to close the Lexington
HSU, only to replace it with a new, more expansive “150- to 200-bed facility” within
nine months.149 According to the BOP, the HSU was considered “inconvenient,” on
account of operating as a “high-security unit within the minimum-security prison.”150 The
BOP did not expand on how the HSU posed an inconvenience to larger prison operations,
but Quinlan suggested that a larger women’s high security unit was necessary because the
“the ‘justice community’ [was] concerned about what to do with the influx of terrorists
into the federal prison system.” 151 Allegations of a growing female terrorist population
were unfounded, but the growing population of women prisoners in the 1980s justified
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carceral expansion. A new high-security unit would also repel the levels of scrutiny
directed at the Lexington HSU by transforming the majority of political prisoners in the
Lexington HSU into a small minority at the new facility.
For scholars like Gilda Zwerman, the HSU and its anticipated successor amounted
to a new “special incapacitation” regime mobilized by the fear and loathing of an
exaggerated female terrorist population. Zwerman argued that the BOP’s new strategy
accomplished three specific tasks:
1. [The HSU] utilizes and manipulates the ‘terrorist’ label, as defined by
conservative ideologues, in order to justify the ‘special’ treatment of
political prisoners within the correctional system;
2. It demonstrates how intelligence and counterinsurgency policies may
be infused into the correctional system;
3. It represents an expansion in the use of incapacitation, surveillance,
and deterrence as mechanisms for social control and repression to a
degree heretofore unprecedented in the U.S. correctional system.152
As Zwerman points out, the state’s propensity to transform COINTELPRO into a
counterterrorism program also implicated the prison system as the BOP transformed
“traditional” forms of confinement into an exercise in carcearl counterterrorism. The
HSU’s meticulously managed environment implemented surveillance that immobilized
terrorist activities inside and outside, the necessity for which stemmed from the BOP’s
mistakes that allowed for Shakur’s escape.
When inmates like Rosenberg and Baraldini challenged the constitutionality of
the Lexington HSU, the opinion delivered by Senior District Judge Barrington D. Parker
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failed to count the physical and psychological effects of the HSU as cruel and unusual.
The significance of this ruling cannot be understated: while the plaintiffs sought to prove
that the HSU’s living conditions were cruel and unusual, they were also fighting to
prevent new HSUs from emerging around the country. Parker’s ruling consequently
protected the BOP as they transferred the dangerous conditions of confinement used in
Lexington to their new facility in Marianna, Florida. Thus, the legacy of the HSU persists
as a definitive instance of carceral expansion that forever changed the way women
experienced high security units in the United States.
In March 1988, Baraldini, Rosenberg, and Sylvia Brown sued the BOP, claiming
that the conditions of their confinement in Lexington violated their First, Fifth, and
Eighth Amendment protections. The lawsuit may have granted Baraldini, Rosenberg, and
Torres release from the HSU, but it also legitimized the contours of high security
confinement at the new Marianna facility. Much to the plaintiffs’ disappointment, Parker
would only find the HSU to be in violation of the First Amendment. According to the
lawsuit, the BOP created the HSU, first and foremost, as a response to “the threat of
external terrorist attacks on institutions” and used “past or present” affiliations with
political and/or terrorist groups to determine who would inhabit the HSU. Terrorism, for
the BOP, was not assessed on the basis of the crime one committed, but rather on the
basis of one’s alleged political affiliations. Incarcerating women “with histories of
‘assaultive, escape prone or disruptive activity,” remained a secondary concern for the
BOP. Despite the BOP’s attempts to retroactively situate the HSU as a space to secure
escape-prone women, the disparity between unoccupied HSU cells and the number of
escape-prone women in the general prison population pointed to a glaring contradiction.
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Rosenberg and Baraldini’s attorneys successfully argued that the BOP used overly broad
and vague criteria to assign women to the HSU, a carceral space that ultimately served
“no legitimate penological purpose.” Parker ruled that the HSU functioned as an
“exaggerated response to the [BOP’s] penological concerns” that violated Baraldini,
Rosenberg, and Torres’s First Amendment rights.153
Baraldini, Rosenberg, and Brown’s First Amendment claims established the HSU
as an illegal penal repository for leftist revolutionary women. The women’s Fifth and
Eighth Amendment claims, however, failed to persuade Parker that they were
unconstitutionally transferred to the HSU, where they were subjected to cruel and
unusual punishment. With regard to their transfer, the plaintiff’s Fifth Amendment claims
were swiftly dismissed when the women’s attorneys argued that “they should have been
afforded a pre-transfer hearing” as part of due process in advance of their HSU transfer.
Parker’s response explained that “the Due Process Clause does not protect a prisoner’s
interest in remaining at a specific prison,” meaning inmates have “no right to be
incarcerated in any specific institution,” even if one’s transfer results in significant
changes to their conditions of confinement. Charges of Eighth Amendment violations,
however, required a more nuanced legal analysis in light of claims that the HSU’s
conditions of confinement led to life-threatening physical and psychological
deterioration.154
Baraldini and Rosenberg testified that the HSU caused them “extreme emotional
distress” that, in Baraldini’s case, prompted suicidal ideation and planning. Several expert
witnesses reinforced the severity of the HSU’s conditions, affirming that the “unit would
not be proper for anyone because of the ‘debilitating effect of the institution, the
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harassment of staff, the sort of aggravation plaintiffs face on a daily basis, the fact they
have become extremely depressed and see no future and no way out.” Despite the
severity of Rosenberg and Baraldini’s claims, they would not rise to the standard the
Supreme Court established when deciding Estelle v. Gamble in 1976. According to the
court, “a prisoner attempting to prove a violation of the Eighth Amendment must show
‘unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain.’” Unable to show that the HSU deliberately
prompted inmates’ pain and suffering, the court considered the extent to which the HSU
met inmates’ basic needs. According to Parker,
Because the record is supported by strong evidence that the meals served
in the Unit are prepared by a registered dietician and are more than
adequate, the Court finds that plaintiffs have not been denied the basic
nutritional necessities. The same is true with respect to their shelter. Their
cells are 110 square feet, larger than most within the federal system, and
complies with recognized standards. Recreational equipment, laundry
facilities, and a variety of entertainment are provided. The Unit is clean
and well-maintained. Plaintiff’s expert, Dr. Kamka, testified that
“physically and technically you would find little to complain about.”
In recognizing the many ways the HSU met, and sometimes exceeded, the basic
requirements for human life, Parker rejected Eighth Amendment claims because inmates
had access to the “essential mainstays of life.” Under this constitutional rubric, Parker’s
opinion highlighted the state’s narrow conceptualization of “life” for incarcerated people.
Psychological damage could not be counted as cruel and unusual so long as the HSU
supported physical life. In other words, the HSU could legally operate and administer
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“social death”—a form of living death that positions prisoners as “risks to be managed,
resistances to be eliminated, and organisms to be fed, maintained, and even prevented
from taking their own lives.”155
Though unable to rule in favor of the plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment claims,
Parker’s opinion drew attention to the problematic nature of the HSU. From his
perspective, “the Unit at best meets the bare Eighth Amendment standards but at times
the treatment of plaintiffs has skirted elemental standards of human decency. The
exaggerated security, small group isolation, and staff harassment serve to constantly
undermine the inmates morale.” In emphasizing the barely legal nature of the HSU,
Parker demonstrated his concern over the possibility that other facilities would inherit the
“problems haunting the Lexington Unit.” Parker’s concern, in particular his decision to
emphasize the barely legal nature of the HSU, however, enabled the BOP to design a
better prison. Indeed, Parker’s opinion cited the creation of the Marianna, Florida facility
as a remedy for some of the plaintiff’s concerns. Parker believed that the plaintiffs’
complaints would be alleviated upon their transfer: “Because the population will be larger
and the women will be allowed to mingle and interact with each other, they should not
suffer from the psychological effects associated with small group isolation.” In other
words, prison expansion and transfer remedied the plaintiffs’ Eighth Amendment claims,
where one’s transfer to a new facility with a larger population would absolve the
psychological suffering women experienced in the HSU.156
On July 15, 1988, Parker issued a judicial decree that closed the Lexington HSU.
His order that Baraldini, Rosenberg, and Torres be immediately transferred to the general
prison population was only partially satisfied by the BOP.157 According to Susler, the
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BOP “refused to comply with Judge Parker’s unambiguous order that they place the
political prisoners in the general population of a women’s federal correctional
institution.”158 Rather than immediately integrate the women into the general population
of FCI Lexington or FCI Alderson, the BOP waited until October 1988 to distributed the
women between three different jails: Baraldini to MCC, New York; Torres to MCC, San
Diego, and Rosenberg to the Washington, D.C. jail.159 Lexington HSU inmates Debra
Brown and Sylvia Brown were transferred to the Shawnee Unit for “medium- to highsecurity women prisoners” upon its opening in August at the Federal Correctional
Institution in Marianna, Florida.160

Moving the Mission
The Shawnee Unit at Marianna ultimately allowed the BOP to correct the First
Amendment errors made in Lexington. In expanding the available space for women
prisoners, the BOP shifted the ratio of political prisoners and non-political prisoners,
effectively correcting the mistake made in Lexington that over-represented political
prisoners in the HSU. From Susler’s perspective, the BOP merely “moved the mission”
of the HSU to “a new high security unit. . . inside a new men’s federal prison in
Marianna, Florida. This mission still involves special, punitive treatment for women
political prisoners.”161 Indeed, several leftist revolutionary women were sent to the
Shawnee Unit throughout the late 1980s and 1990s, including Carol Manning, Laura
Whitehorn, Marilyn Buck, and eventually Baraldini and Rosenberg.162 While some prison
advocates assured that “conditions in Marianna have never matched the extreme
abusiveness of Lexington,” the women who lived in the new unit contested that
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assessment, claiming that Shawnee was “designed to deflect any concern from the
outside about human rights abuses—it looks comfortable and attractive.”163 Writing in
1992, Baraldini, Buck, Rosenberg, and Whitehorn argued that Shawnee extended the
HSU’ mission
to control, isolate, and neutralize women. . . behind a veneer of new paint
and the momentary elimination of the most notorious abuses. The BOP
always denies the truth of its workings. It denies the existence of control
units and this unit in particular, not even listing it in the BOP Register of
Prisons. Nevertheless, Shawnee is the present women’s version of the
Marionization of the prison system.164
While it remains unclear how long the Shawnee Unit remained in operation—to
Baraldini, Buck, Rosenberg, and Whitehorn’s point—the new unit remained immunized
from the political and legal pressure that shut down the Lexington HSU. If nothing else,
the BOP became far more adept in censoring news of the day-to-day functions of
women’s high security units. One might say the BOP went underground in the aftermath
of the Lexington HSU lawsuit.
The ACLU’s legal battle to shut down the Lexington HSU did the important work
of granting Baraldini, Rosenberg, and Torres’ release from the HSU on account of their
ability to show First Amendment violations. Baraldini v. Meese did not, however,
interrupt the larger carceral machine that continued to expand an increasingly
problematic carceral technology across the United States. In failing to establish the
Lexington HSU as a cruel and unusual form of confinement, the ACLU’s case ultimately
led to a ruling that portrayed small group confinement, behavioral modification, and
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ideological reconditioning as worthy of constitutional protections, thus cementing
counterterrorism tactics as an American penological practice. In the event Judge Parker
interpreted the HSU’s various forms of psychological abuse as a form of cruel and
unusual punishment, it is possible that the Lexington HSU would have set a significant
precedent in the ongoing battle against prison torture.
The Lexington HSU serves as one end result of twentieth-century U.S. domestic
counterterrorism efforts. Not only did the rubric of terrorism allow the intelligence
community to delegitimize the radical left’s political dissonance, it also promoted
terrorism as a category by which the state could more freely pursue, prosecute, and
punish dissident citizens. Indeed, the pursuit and punishment of Assata Shakur—the
“first” female terrorist—served as an early example of the kinds of punishment the state
was capable of, but her escape ultimately prompted the development of the HSU as a
prison with a more formalized counterterrorism penology. The Lexington HSU
exemplified the state’s ability to subject its enemies to forms of social death, in which
one exists without truly living. In creating a life-sustaining space steeped in physical and
psychological harm, the HSU functioned as space where “terrorists” would exist as the
living dead. From Torres’s perspective, life in the HSU was “like being buried alive.”165
Narrating the moments that underpin the birth of the Lexington HSU risks
representing carceral counterterrorism as a straightforward process. It is anything but.
This third case study links the Lexington HSU to the emergence of counterterrorism as a
form of political repression. But it is far more difficult, albeit increasingly necessary, to
trace the legacy of politically driven carceral abuse in the aftermath of the Shawnee Unit.
In the words of Dan Berger, “the United States stands out in the world not so much for

202

having [political prisoners], as for being so vengeful in continuing their incarceration
while denying their very existence.”166 Thus, in turning to the contemporary development
of U.S. carceral politics in the twenty-first century, one must ask: Who are our political
prisoners? Where have they been disappeared? How do we resurrect the socially dead?
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EPILOGUE: Full Circle: Queer Resistance in the Twenty-First Century
To venture further into the question of what quality of life the carceral state
allows for inmates, this epilogue returns to the issue of women’s suicide in jail.
Antoinette DiBenedetto’s 1947 suicide served as a catalyst for homophobic conservatives
to rearticulate what women’s incarceration was, or could be. When, in 2015, Sandra
Bland died in police custody, Bland’s alleged “suicide” presented yet another occasion to
imagine women’s life and death within the prison-industrial complex. While the
geographical, sociological, and historical contexts are different for Bland, her reported
“suicide” worked like DiBenedetto’s to mobilize the carceral state and its resisters in a
well publicized conflict.
Supplementing the preceding historical case studies, then, this epilogue turns to
entertainment media to explore representations of women who resist the carceral state in
the twenty-first century. I examine Bland’s case as an entry point to a popular rendering
of women’s life in prison in Netflix’s Orange is the New Black. I argue that the show
offers suicide as a method of queer resistance to the carceral state, but in so doing, cannot
avoid the sexual and racial stereotypes that perpetuate the carceral cycle. I then integrate
this insight into a summary of findings from earlier case studies in a conclusion that
advocates for abolitionist teaching, scholarship, and activism.

How to Die in Jail
On the afternoon of July 10, 2015, a Texas state trooper pulled over a 28-year-old
black woman after she allegedly “failed to signal a lane change.”1 What should have been
a routine traffic stop for a minor infraction quickly escalated for Sandra Bland. Well
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aware of the inherent danger she was in, Bland decided to video record her interaction
with the officer, which—paired with her refusal to put out her cigarette—only served to
aggravate him. After opening her car door and threatening to “light [Bland] up” with his
taser, trooper Brian Encinia forcibly removed Bland from her car. Once outside the view
of his dashcam, Encinia pushed Bland to the ground, and arrested her for assaulting a
public servant.2 Bland was charged with felony assault, and booked later that day at the
Waller County Jail in Hempstead, Texas.3
On Monday morning—three days after her arrest—Bland was reportedly found
hanging in her cell, prompting the Harris County Medical Examiner’s office to record
Bland’s death as a suicide.4 Bland’s death sparked widespread outrage, not only over the
violent circumstances under which Bland was arrested, but over the growing number of
black women and girls dying in police custody.5 Bland’s death contributed to widespread
calls to #SayHerName over social media, while protests erupted across the country from
Hempstead to Chicago, New York to California. Bland’s death was particularly troubling
because she was a vocal Black Lives Matter activist who used Facebook as a platform to
upload her video series, “Sandy Speaks.” As such, her knowledge of, and involvement
within the Movement for Black Lives cast an enormous shadow of doubt over her alleged
suicide, prompting the viral hashtag, #WhatHappenedToSandraBland?
Throughout this dissertation, I have demonstrated how the carceral cycle operates
as a biopolitical form of control that is punctuated by women who engage in queer acts of
resistance. I have taken care to note the ways in which carceral institutions invest in new
forms of carceral control in the aftermath of a threat. I arrive at a discussion of death in
order to count suicide among the tactics of queer resistance, in which, in the words of
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Chloe Taylor, one can use death to “escape biopolitical regulation through one’s own
agency.”6 Suicide as queer resistance emphasizes that a desire to die is not a “private and
personal” act rooted in an individual pathology, rather, it is a reasonable response to the
social conditions that produce suicidal ideation, and as such, is “public and political.”7
Scholars examining the maintenance of life and the production of death recognize
the ways in which suicide has been framed as an individual, rather than a social,
pathology. For example, Taylor argues that the biomedicalization of suicide has treated it
as “a condition of subjects rather than as an effect of societies, situations or institutions.”8
In Taylor’s Foucauldian analysis, the production of suicidal subjects, as opposed to the
treatment of suicidal societies, serves a specific biopolitical purpose. When suicide—like,
as Taylor suggests, crime and sex—is no longer an act, but a condition, it is subject to the
disciplinary and regulatory power networks that target both individuals and populations.9
In this epilogue, I suggest that suicide, when framed as an act of queer resistance,
disrupts the carceral cycle. However, I also focus on the ways in which suicide
perpetuates the carceral cycle. Within the context of prison, “suicide” is always
represented as an individual, self-inflicted choice, typically rooted in mental illness, that
shields the state from accusations of culpability in the aftermath of a death. Suicide’s
emphasis on individual responsibility absolves prison administrations from having to
make meaningful changes to improve conditions of confinement, even when prison
conditions such as solitary confinement are known to exacerbate suicidal ideation. In
other words, suicide protects power when administrations relying upon a biomedical
model that insists upon treating suicide as an “individual pathology,” and as a result, does
not necessitate prison reform. Even when carceral institutions are moved to engage in
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suicide prevention efforts, administrative efforts serve the prison, not the prisoner, by
enhancing the production of slow death so to better engage in the long-term life
management of prisoners.
Sandra Bland’s death complicates suicide because her family and friends
perceived her declared “suicide” as a cover-up for murder. In this epilogue, I read
Bland’s death against the stereotype of the strong black woman in order to demonstrate
how this stereotype upholds the carceral cycle. In arguing that Bland was likely murdered
by a state actor, Bland’s family framed her suicide as impossible by framing her as a
strong black woman.
When the stereotype of the strong black woman is used to insist that Bland should
have been strong enough to survive three days in a county jail, it works to eclipse the
most insidious acts of violence that can lead one to take one’s life. As such, in
maintaining the likelihood that Bland was in fact killed, I wish to emphasize how suicide
can function not only as self-murder but also as a murder committed by the state. I argue
that the stereotype of the strong black woman serves the carceral cycle when it refuses to
acknowledge that suicide is among the modes of state-sponsored death. Insisting that a
black woman is too strong to commit suicide not only establishes expectations for what
sort of circumstances one must be able to survive, it relinquishes suicide to the “weak”
and “mentally ill.” Perhaps worst of all, this stereotype fails to hold the state accountable
for the production of death vis-à-vis suicide. As Taylor suggests, when the state kills, it
justifies death in a specific way. As such, the declaration of suicide must be read as a
very deliberate “justification.”10 It is this type of murder that is most dangerous, in which
suicide absolves prisons of culpability, even after it is clear that the state manufactured
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conditions of confinement designed to promote suicidal ideation.
In addition to considering the ways in which suicide upholds the carceral cycle, I
also theorize suicide as an act of queer resistance that allows one to transcend the carceral
cycle. Suicide, when conceived of as a rational act, allows one to make decisions about
life and exert control their existence—especially when entrenched in an institution that
counts them among the “living dead.” I apply this argument to representations of suicide
that appear in Netflix’s Orange is the New Black (OITNB). As the preeminent visual
narrative concerning U.S. women’s incarceration in the twenty-first century, OITNB
partially fulfills what Miriam Van Waters sought to accomplish when she embraced film
as a means to educate popular audiences about women’s incarceration more than 60 years
ago.
Just months after her reinstatement, Van Waters was approached by two
screenwriters who hoped to bring the “Ordeal in Massachusetts,” as a Harper’s Magazine
article referred to it, to the big screen.11 Van Waters carefully weighed the potential for
positive publicity, concluding that “if a motion picture would really extend information
and constructive feeling, [she] would be glad to cooperate” with efforts to write and
produce a film.12 After two writers failed to produce treatments that Van Waters found
suitable, Warner Brothers released a film that, according to Estelle Freedman,
“emphasized women’s vulnerability in prison, rather than the rehabilitation that Van
Waters championed.”13 According to Judith Mayne, the Academy Award nominated film
shifted away from the exploitation films of the 1930s and 40s, and propelled the womenin-prison genre toward the “respectable, social problem film.”14 Still, the legacy of Caged
(1950) could not have been worse for Van Waters’s public relations campaign. Caged not
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only told the wrong story, but a wrong story that would be repeated: scholars like Mayne
would eventually consider Caged to be the “prototype” of the overtly homophobic
women-in-prison genre that unfolded over the following decades.15
OITNB, as a twenty-first century descendant of Caged, engages in the type of
consciousness-raising that Van Waters hoped Caged might offer in the 1950s. There are
many shortcomings of the show, which was initially adapted from Piper Kerman’s 2010
memoir.16 OITNB, however, remains an undeniably important representation—often
cited as Netflix’s most watched original show—that informs a mass audience’s
understanding of women’s experiences with policing, the criminal legal system,
incarceration, and resistance.17 To its credit, OITNB deconstructs layers of systematic
abuse in order to offer a more comprehensive picture of incarceration. As such, my
analysis of suicide in OITNB explicates the more “complete picture” of the
circumstances that lead characters to their deaths. That the narrative penetrates the “blue
wall of silence” meant to protect information about prison administrator’s culpability is
significant. OITNB depicts corruption in a way that is difficult to access, let alone prove,
in real-life instances of brutality and corruption.
My analysis of OITNB begins with Tricia Miller’s suicide in the first season,
where her liberatory drug overdose also creates a scenario in which a guard covers up his
role in funneling drugs into the prison. Next, I turn to Tasha “Taystee” Jefferson’s story
arc in OITNB’s final season, in which Taystee deliberately considers suicide as a way to
gain control over her life. Although viewers watch Taystee work to obtain the means for
a guaranteed drug overdose, Taystee’s “student,” Tiffany “Pennsatucky” Doggett beats
her to it and overdoses on Fentanyl in the prison laundry. I question this narrative
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decision for the way it perpetuates the depiction of black women as capable of enduring
the pain and suffering that prison projects upon them. As such, this representation invests
in the problematic stereotype of the “strong black woman” whose pain and suffering is
ignored, or at least, believed to be tolerable on account of her race and gender. While I do
not wish to suggest that writers should have killed off Taystee, OITNB’s decision to
interrupt Taystee’s plan with Tiffany’s suicide distinguishes between the types of women
for whom suicide is acceptable, and the types of women for whom survival is a
requirement of their incarceration. Before turning to my analysis of suicide in OITNB, I
consider how scholars have theorized issues of slow death and suicide.

Critical Remarks on Slow Death and Suicide
Across the country, Black Lives Matter activists refuse(d) to accept that Sandra
Bland died of suicide. HBO’s documentary, Say Her Name: The Life and Death of
Sandra Bland (2018), captures this sentiment shared among family, friends, and activists.
From the point of view of Bland’s mother and sisters, Bland was murdered while in
custody: “I just don’t see her taking her own life. I just don’t see it,” remarked Sandra’s
sister, Sharon Cooper.18 Bland’s friend and mentor, Lavaughn Mosley, also had a
difficult time believing that Sandra died of suicide: “If you know Sandra Bland, you
know she’s had much harder times than sitting in jail for three days.”19 Indeed, Bland
endured significantly longer jail stays just a few years earlier, where she spent 30 days in
the Harris County Jail in Houston, Texas, for a misdemeanor drug possession charge.20
As a new, underemployed college grad, Bland could not afford to pay a series of
staggering traffic fines and court fees, so she elected to “sit out” her fines in jail where
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she could “earn” $100 a day to pay off her fine, and dissolve the bench warrant the state
had issued.21 Given Bland’s commitment to racial justice, it made “no sense,” in the
words of Latoya Smith, Bland’s sorority sister, “that she would go into a jail and cower
away and kill herself.”22
The theories that emerged in the aftermath of Bland’s death, many of which were
inspired by the #WhatHappenedToSandraBland hashtag, posit that Bland was murdered
by police or prison guards. That some suggest Bland was already dead when her mug
shot was taken demonstrates a deep-seeded suspicion of official law enforcement
narratives that deploy suicide as a persuasive cover-up for systematic racism, sexism, and
classism.23 These reactions, all of which are reasonable in light of systematic racism and
sexism, stem from one resounding question: how could a traffic violation escalate to the
point of death? As scholars such as Andrea Ritchie argue, Bland’s death was first and
foremost “the product of coming into contact with police in the first place, and of the
subsequent denial of [Bland’s] humanity and medical needs while in police custody.”24
At least three videos, including Brian Encinia’s dashcam video, a bystander’s video, and
the video Bland initially recorded on her phone, document the brutal conditions in which
Encinia escalated his interaction with Bland.25 In what follows, I outline the way suicide
functions as a cover-up. While I maintain the probability that Bland was the victim of
homicide, I seek to outline the myriad ways in which the state produced Bland’s death by
subjecting her to conditions of confinement that promoted the possibility of suicidal
ideation.
The conditions of Bland’s confinement at the Waller County Jail are riddled with
infractions. First, Bland—who revealed she had epilepsy upon being slammed to the
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ground by Encinia—was deprived of Keppra, an anti-seizure medication.26 As Tamara
Tabo’s research reveals, patients taking Keppra are cautioned against suddenly stopping
the drug, which is known to alter patient’s mood, and may increase one’s risk of suicidal
ideation.27 Second, the jailers in charge of Bland’s incarceration were negligent insofar as
they failed to place Bland “on a suicide watch or summon a mental health expert to
evaluate her” despite the fact that Bland indicated a suicide attempt within the last year at
the time of her intake.28 According to reporter Debbie Nathan, Bland’s forearm arm was
covered in small cuts, indicating that she may have engaged in self-harm prior to her
arrest.29 Finally, the county failed to prevent Bland’s death—giving her access to a plastic
garbage bag in an empty cell—despite knowing that suicide was well within the realm of
possibility. That Bland’s jailers pre-filled the forms that documented the times they
checked on inmates only served to further render the prison culpable; Bland did not
receive the “regular welfare checks at fifteen-minute intervals” that were meant to protect
her life.30As a result, authorities at the Waller County Jail were unable to specifically
determine Bland’s time of death, or identify when a guard last checked on Bland.
Bland’s death is only possible in a society that subjects black women to what Kali
Nicole Gross calls an “exclusionary politics of protection.”31 For Gross, “black women
[are] not entitled to the law’s protection, though they [cannot] escape from its
punishment.”32 Gross’s theory accounts for the ways in which black women have, and
continue to experience violence at the hands of police, so much so that black women are
unable to benefit from police protection because of the way law enforcement perpetrates
violence against them. Bland’s fate expands Gross’s rubric by demonstrating how the
exclusionary politics of protection applies in carceral spaces, where jailers fail to carry
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out their duties that ensure that black women live. As such, the exclusionary politics of
protection inform the way in which Bland’s death is read. The racialized and gendered
acts of violence perpetrated against Bland by her arresting officer contests the state’s
narrative that Bland died from suicide, and support claims that Bland was murdered.
However, the exclusionary politics of protection also illuminate the ways in which Bland
may have possibly been driven to suicide, where the state deliberately subjects black
women to dangerous conditions of confinement that, in the event of death, depends upon
“suicide” as an excuse to absolve the state of culpability.
When the Waller County Sherriff’s department announced that Bland died of
suicide, they refused to acknowledge the errors they made that contributed to Bland’s
death. Further investigation uncovered several mistakes, including falsified welfare check
logs. Still, as Nathan’s report suggests, the allegation that “the jail and jailers didn’t do
what they should have done to prevent [Bland] from committing suicide,” was met with
“stunning and stupefying cruelty,” in which the county argued that “‘Bland’s decision to
commit suicide was hers alone.’”33 Even when the county elected to settle Bland’s
wrongful death suit, they vehemently denied any wrongdoing. According to Waller
County attorney, Larry Simmons, the $1.9 million dollar settlement was not an admission
of guilt: the county “vigorously den[ies] any fault or wrongdoing, and the potential
settlement does not involve any such admissions.”34 The county’s willingness to settle,
however, must be read as part of a legal defense strategy meant to mitigate the county’s
responsibility and/or prevent a trial from uncovering more evidence of neglect.
Bland’s family took the opposite approach, insisting that Bland was murdered.
While the family’s investigation into Bland’s death would unearth enough evidence to
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support a wrongful death civil suit, allegations of homicide proved futile. As the HBO
documentary reveals, forensic pathologist Dr. Joye Carter did not find evidence of foul
play. Instead, Carter points to a different possibility:
I have ruled out a homicidal hanging. It’s not suggestive of that at all. But
I think this is something . . . you’re supposed to be face-to-face one an
hour, not looking through a window and guessing. This young woman is
scared and frightened and someone is having emotional pain, physical
pain, isolated, then you have some things that should be considered as
being driven to. You know, we know that someone’s spirit can be broken
even in a short period of time.35
Although it is important to note that errors made at the jail failed to record important
information such as core body temperature and fingerprints at the time of Bland’s death,
Carter’s autopsy report suggests that Bland was “driven” to suicide. In shifting away
from a homicidal hanging argument to a suicidal foul play argument, Carter implies that
the jails’s action and inaction could have promoted the suicidal ideation that prompted
Bland’s death. Whether by suicide or homicide, Bland was killed by the state. Suicide
merely helps distance the state from culpability by giving semblance to Bland’s agency,
where Bland, as the “agent of her own death,” covers up state-sponsored acts of foul play.
In raising concerns about Bland’s mental wellness, Carter demonstrates how the
conditions of Bland’s confinement could have led her to suicide. In granting Bland a full
range of emotional reactions to her confinement, Carter relieves Bland from problematic
“perceptions of Black woman as menacing and their bodies as ‘superhuman,’—and
therefore not susceptible to pain,” which scholars like Ritchie and Kimberlé Crenshaw
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identify as racist and sexist myths that inform police brutality.36 The distinction, then,
between suicidal ideation as a result of a social circumstances and suicidal ideation as a
symptom of mental illness is crucial when demonstrating how the state drives individuals
to death. Though the correlations between mental illnesses and suicide are important for
suicide prevention, scholars such as Mark Button have criticized the medical profession’s
preoccupation with the “interior psyche of a [suicidal] person” which leaves the “external
sociopolitical conditions that are a constitutive feature of all subject formation. . . out of
the picture.”37 In stepping back from the idea that suicide is an individual pathology,
Button argues that suicide is, in part, a “consequence of wider social and political
forces.”38 One might consider, then, the extent to which structural inequalities and
experiences with marginalization influence suicidal ideation, particularly against the
backdrop of the prison. Carter and Button would agree that one can die from suicide
without being suicidal. Mental illness is certainly not a prerequisite.
The civil wrongful death suit filed by Bland’s mother, Geneva Reed-Veal, argued
that Bland “should not have been arrested and that she was later held in dangerous
conditions without proper supervision.”39 Indeed, there are a number of circumstances
that might have protected Bland’s life: had she not been arrested, had she had access to
medication and medical assessment, had she been housed with another person, had
guards conducted wellness checks. And while #WhatHappenedToSandraBland remains
unknowable, suicide prevention efforts remain a passive concern for prison
administrators at the Waller County Jail. Although the wrongful death suit settlement
would require the county to use sensors “at the jail to ensure that detainee checks were
done accurately and could not be falsified,” and ensure that “a duty nurse or emergency
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medical technician [is available] on all shifts,” the institution’s commitment to protecting
lives remains dubious.40 What remains apparent, in the midst of Bland’s death, is that an
inmate’s possible suicide allows the state to engage in practices that will continue to put
incarcerated lives at risk. So long as suicide is represented as an act for someone who has
“lost one’s will to live,” it will remain difficult to understand how the state enacts
violence that is designed to annihilate one’s will to live. In this arrangement, we cannot
readily understand suicide as a cover up for foul play; suicide is foul play. The state’s
ability to inspire suicidal ideation is deliberate, and serves as evidence of a fully
functioning carceral cycle that depends on suicide to produce death.

Suicide as Queer Resistance
Given the extent to which prisons operate as institutions that condemn inmates to
social death, while also producing literal death, how can suicide function as an act of
queer resistance? In recognizing that suicidal ideation is most often classified as a
symptom of mental illness, I turn to scholars who position suicidal ideation as a sane,
rational response to the experience of being forced to exist among the living dead. I
establish these dichotomies in an effort to demonstrate how the instances of suicide I
contend with exceed these binaries.
Scholars such as Button build upon the work of David Mayo, who in 1986,
conceptualized suicide as a rational choice. If Button, in imagining suicide as a response
to external factors including marginalization, calls for suicide prevention efforts that
recognize and respond to the political conditions that exacerbate suicidality, Mayo’s
research suggests that suicide can be understood as a perfectly rational choice. In
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criticizing the psychiatric view of suicide, Mayo argues that
the psychiatric objection [to suicide] is animated by the presumption. . .
that suicide is always ‘. . . a maladaptive action, irreversibly counter to the
patient’s sane interests and goals,. . .’ and that life under any
circumstances is worth living, or if it is not, that there are medical
interventions available that can make it so.41
Unlike Button, Mayo is not interested in advocating for suicide prevention strategies. His
approach to suicide should not be mistaken as an appeal to suicide, rather, his interest in
depathologizing suicide is meant to challenge the notion that life is always worth living.
Suicide, for Mayo, deserves attention for its liberatory capacity. So long as death remains
a fact of life, one remains capable of rationally choosing suicide as a means to end the
experience of pain and suffering.
In following Button and Mayo, a conversation about prison suicide must contend
with the ways in which institutions contribute to suicidality. It is crucial, then, to
understand prisons as institutions that receive “disposable” populations, where “who
matters and who does not, who is disposable and who is not,” as Achille Mbembé
remarks, is predetermined in a neoliberal, heteropatriarchal, and white supremacist
society.42 As Angela Davis emphasizes, incarcerated people face social and premature
death because prisons are “an abstract site into which undesirables are deposited,
relieving us of the responsibility of thinking about the real issues afflicting those
communities from which prisoners are drawn in such disproportionate numbers.”43
Confinement, then, can be understood as a slow death sentence, where, to use the words
of Lauren Berlant, prison embarks upon “the physical wearing out of a population.”44
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Jasbir Puar’s understanding of Berlant makes a crucial distinction: “slow death is not an
orientation toward the death drive, nor is it morbid; rather it is about the ‘maintenance of
living, the ordinary work of living on.”45 It is the slowness of slow death—the normalcy
of slow death—that makes prison especially insufferable, where the project of existing as
a confined person is also the process of dying. Prison’s capacity to maintain life—
without maintaining quality of life—draws the distinction between living and existing.
For prisons to function, prisoners must merely exist.
Suicide prevention efforts led by prison administrations are consequently at odds
with the prison’s political commitments. The incidence of prison suicide suggests that
prisoners have limited access to mental health care. The ineffectiveness of suicide watch
protocols points to ambivalent and/or negligent attitudes towards prisoners’ wellbeing.
As such, a meaningful investment in prison suicide prevention would mean assuring that
all inmates have access to mental health care, abolishing the use of solitary confinement,
and reassessing the living conditions that prisoners must endure. However, the expense of
these interventions prohibits them from taking place in both public and private
institutions. On the one hand, preventing prison suicide means humanizing prisoners. On
the other hand, slow death, as Puar points out, “is profitable for capitalism.”46 The longer
a private prison, for example, can keep someone alive with as few resources possible, the
more profit there is to be made off of the body. We might imagine, then, that the
argument for suicide prevention resembles arguments perpetuated by anti-abortion
activists. Pro-life conservatives want babies to be born, but often fail to support the social
safety nets that would allow these children, and their parents, to thrive. Administrative
suicide prevention efforts masquerade as a “benevolent” desire to preserve life, regardless
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of the quality of life being maintained.
The irony of suicide prevention, as scholars such as Mayo and Button argue, is
that prison suicide prevention does little to address the fact that incarceration implicitly, if
not explicitly, promotes suicidal ideation. That prisons deliberately maintain life under
the worst circumstances renders administrative suicide prevention efforts as actions that
intend to keep prisoners alive, not as uninhibited people, but as subjects who must live
under conditions that count them as socially dead. As a result, suicide prevention is an
oxymoron for both prison administrators and inmates. On the one hand, prisons should
prevent suicide, despite the fact that several prison conditions exacerbate suicidal
ideation. On the other hand, prisoners should not commit suicide, despite the fact they are
always already forced to live as, and among, the socially dead.
While finding ways to better care for incarcerated populations is important for
those on the inside, a static investment in suicide prevention is not only a strategic
position for prisons to maintain, it is characteristic of regulatory power, which Foucault
describes as determining who lives and who dies.47 As Taylor suggests, “every minute of
the prisoner’s life is regulated. . . in an age of biopower, death is no longer the
paradigmatic expression of power; it is elided in favour of a total management of life.”48
While an institution’s literal or figurative commitment to suicide prevention is in the
interest of saving lives, administrative suicide prevention is, at best, a life management
tool that upholds regulatory power. When an inmate commits suicide, inmates die “on
their own accord” so that the prison is not liable for a death they did not directly cause. In
some cases, this outcome is desired, where the conditions of one’s confinement are
deliberately meant to cause suicidal ideation. One need not look further than the
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Lexington HSU to appreciate the ways in which the unit deliberately subjected prisoners
to death-like living conditions. For Alejandrina Torres, the HSU was like “being buried
alive,” in which potentially driving a terrorist to suicide was part of the HSU’s design.49
Rather than be held responsible for annihilating inmates, suicide would absolve the BOP
from responsibility, even when they design conditions of confinement that deliberately
contribute to inmate death. Suicide, then, is strategic.
Netflix’s Orange is the New Black presents several characters who are drawn to
suicide as a form of queer resistance. In examining the layers of marginalization that lead
women to rationally entertain suicide, and either follow through with or resist their
decision, I demonstrate how suicide rejects the mandate that life is worth living under any
circumstance, and as such, works to restore power to incarcerated subjects.
In OITNB, nine incarcerated women die over the course of the show’s seven
seasons. Suicide bookends the series, where Tricia Miller and Tiffany “Pennsatucky”
Doggett, two young white women, deliberately overdose on drugs in season one and
season seven. Despite the prevalence of characters with mental illness, suicide is never
seriously on the table for black women like Suzanne, or white women like Lolly,
Morello, or Red. Audiences are thus surprised when characters like Tricia take their own
lives. Similarly, Tiffany’s death is shocking, mostly because it casts an enormous shadow
of doubt upon Taystee’s anticipated suicide. Though Taystee is pressured to embrace the
strong black woman myth throughout the final season, she is engaged in the careful
planning of her death in the aftermath of a failed attempt to hang herself early in the
season. Unlike Tricia and Tiffany, viewers gain insight into Taystee’s interest in suicide
as a mode of empowerment and self-determination. Tiffany’s suicide, however, allows
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just enough time to pass to influence Taystee to change her mind. My analysis
demonstrates how the myth of the strong black woman forecloses suicide, as queer
resistance, for Taystee. Taystee’s renewed interest in life perpetuates the myth that black
women can, and must endure under any circumstance.
The series’ first suicide represents an act of queer resistance that also functions as
a cover-up for corruption. In episode ten, season one, Tricia dies after deliberately
overdosing on Oxycontin. As one of the youngest inmates in Litchfield who suffers from
addiction, Tricia is vulnerable to Mendez, an especially corrupt correctional officer.
When Mendez tries to sell drugs to Tricia, only to learn that she insists upon staying
clean, he forces Tricia to deal for him. The moment that leads to Tricia’s suicide takes
place after lunch, when Mendez intercepts an allegedly high Tricia in the prison hallway.
In order to prevent Tricia from participating in the “scared straight” tour that is taking
place for a group of visiting delinquent girls, Mendez stuffs Tricia into a janitorial closet.
When he returns to let her out, Mendez discovers Tricia’s crumpled body on the floor. He
quickly realizes she has overdosed on his drugs and frantically transforms her overdose
into a hanging. The cover up works: Tricia’s body is rediscovered by another CO, and
suicide by hanging is ruled the cause of death. The hastiness with which Tricia’s body is
removed from the prison grounds suggests that suicide is a common enough occurrence
that her body is sent to the morgue without much investigation. The cause of death—
suicide by hanging—goes unquestioned, and Mendez is never suspected to have
contributed to Tricia’s death.50
As the first death to take place in the show, Tricia’s suicide illuminates how easy
it is for authorities to absolve themselves of the harm they cause. Mendez may not
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technically kill Tricia, but he is culpable. When Mendez forces Tricia to sell drugs, he
generates within her new feelings of indebtedness. As several flashbacks suggest, Tricia
has struggled to pay off debts throughout her life, but remains meticulously committed to
righting her wrongs. As such, Tricia’s suicide can be read in a number of ways. On the
one hand, her death can be understood as an act of liberation, where Tricia transcends the
full extent of her multiple marginalization that she cannot escape in prison, much less in
the free world. On the other hand, her suicide can be imagined as a strategic attempt to
expose Mendez as an abusive CO. Regardless of Tricia’s intent, however, her suicide
absolves the prison of responsibility because Tricia chooses to take her life. Tricia may
be free, but her death fails to expose Mendez. In fact, in knowing that he can essentially
“get away with murder,” Tricia’s death runs the risk of empowering Mendez.
By the time viewers arrive at the final season of OITNB, the series has presented
death in circumstances that hit a variety of emotional tenors. For example, in season two,
the terminally ill Rosa Cisneros, upon learning she has three to six weeks to live, steals a
prison van, and drives it off a ledge into a quarry to the tune of Blue Oyster Cult’s
“(Don’t Fear) The Reaper.” In this bittersweet scene, Rosa’s suicide allows her to regain
control over her life in the wake of terminal illness, while also allowing her to indulge in
one last crime. Rosa’s getaway, however, takes a sinister turn when she spots the freshly
escaped Vee Parker—season two’s villain—on the side of road. Rosa decides to take Vee
with her, so to speak, and runs her over.51 The introduction of inmate-on-inmate
violence/homicide persists in the following seasons. Maureen Kukudio dies (off screen)
from the injuries she sustained in her fight with Suzanne in season six, Barbara and Carol
Denning kill one another in season six, Daya poisons Daddy at the beginning of season
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seven. The most devastating death in the entire series, of course, is the murder of Poussey
Washington in season four.
Unlike any of the other deaths, Poussey’s death explicitly connects abuses of
power within the prison system to racist policing practices, both of which depend on
physical brutality. Poussey’s death is the result of a peaceful inmate action, in which the
women of Litchfield stage a protest demanding that Captain Desi Piscatella—known for
promoting a culture of inmate abuse—be removed. When Bayley, a young, poorly trained
CO follows Piscatella’s orders to begin clearing inmates from the cafeteria, he pins
Poussey to the ground, but gets distracted by Suzanne Warren. Bayley does not hear
Poussey when she gasps for air and repeats Eric Garner’s final words—“I can’t
breathe.”52 Poussey dies in this moment, and like Michael Brown, whose body remained
exposed for hours on a Ferguson street, remains on the cafeteria floor as prison
administrators figure out what to do.53
Poussey’s death haunts the remaining seasons of OITNB. If, in the moments
before Poussey’s death, it was possible to believe, if momentarily, in the potential power
of prisoner organizing, her death is a stark reminder of just how easily one can be crushed
by the system. Taystee’s subsequent crusade for justice for Poussey’s death incites a riot,
where inmates take over the prison, hold guards hostage, and attempt to negotiate a set of
demands. What results is an armed retaking of Litchfield not unlike the armed retaking of
Attica in 1971, where twenty-nine prisoners and nine prison employee-hostages were
killed by military, law enforcement, and prison guards, who were ultimately absolved of
their many criminal acts.54 In the process of retaking Litchfield, Captain Piscatella is
accidentally killed when a guard team shoots him at close range with a rubber bullet.55
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Instead of acknowledging their mistake, the group moves Piscatella’s body to the pool
area—where several women are discovered—to stage his death and manufacture a story
they can repeat in lockstep. According to the man in charge of the unit, “all we need is a
story that everyone can get behind, and we’re coming out of this like heroes of the day.”56
Indeed, as the state investigates Piscatella’s death, it becomes remarkably clear that one
of the women will pay.
Piscatella’s death is ultimately pinned on Taystee. It is true that Taystee almost
kills Piscatella—she’s given the opportunity to toward the end of the riot in season five,
but she chooses not to. Instead, the U.S. district attorney interviews a series of women,
many of whom offer testimonies in exchange for immunity. Taystee is charged with
inciting the riot and the second-degree murder of Piscatella.57 While she pleads not guilty
to inciting the riot, she risks a trial in an attempt to beat the murder charge. Despite being
supported by the ACLU, Taystee is found guilty, and sentenced to life.58
One of the most powerful elements of OITNB is the show’s capacity to
demonstrate the cycles of injustice that produce social death for women like Tasytee
Jefferson. Multiple marginalization defines Taystee’s struggle, from the time she was a
child, growing up in group homes, to the point in her young adulthood where she begins
selling drugs at the insistence of her foster mother. Taystee is caught, imprisoned,
released—but risks her freedom once more when faced with the “choice” to live on the
street, or sell drugs in exchange for a roof over her head. She chooses the latter, and soon
finds herself back in Litchfield. As if watching Poussey die were not difficult enough,
Taystee’s attempt to get justice for Poussey’s death results in her own annihilation when
she is framed for a crime she did not commit. Taystee’s experience in prison has only
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ever compounded her experience with marginalization. This is why, after discovering her
appeal has been denied, Taystee pursues suicide as the only remaining method of
resistance.59
When Taystee approaches Daya for drugs that will end her life in season seven,
she does so with the understanding that her containment only serves the state. “Everyday
that I’m here they win,” she explains to Daya, who responds with the obvious critique:
“don’t they win if you take your life away?”60 Taystee’s response frames suicide as a
queer form of resistance that will allow her to transcend the state’s control over her life.
“No,” she insists, “they want me alive so I can stay in prison. Don’t you feel how fucked
up that is? But if I’m not alive, then I’m not in prison. That’s the only way I can have
some kind of control over my own life.”61 Here, Taystee’s logic epitomizes suicide as a
method of queer resistance. For Tasytee, gaining control of one’s life, even if it means
losing life, is a victory. More over, choosing to lose a life that is impossible to live is an
acknowledgement that not all life circumstances are worth living. Although Daya is also
serving a life sentence for murder, she fails to fully sympathize with Taystee, and sets an
impossibly high price for the drugs Taystee wants. What follows is Taystee’s first suicide
attempt, in which she tries to hang herself, albeit unsuccessfully. When she returns to
Daya, she explains that she can’t die “the old fashioned way” because “instincts kick
in.”62 Daya, aware of the ways in which Taystee’s proximity to the warden may help her,
agrees to make a deal with her “lifer” sister.
In the episodes that follow, several women attempt to reinvigorate Taystee’s will
to live. Suzanne, in particular, attempts to lift Taystee’s spirits by writing down “the
truth” of how Piscatella died, with the hope that it might be useful in a legal context.
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When the new warden, Taystee’s childhood friend, Tamika Ward, discovers Suzanne’s
writing, she too doubles down on the ways Suzanne’s narrative might help Taystee.
However, the faith placed upon Suzanne’s notebook is deeply problematic because it
promotes the idea of having hope in the face of systematic injustice that Taystee is so
deeply entrenched within. As scholar-critic Myles McNutt sees it,
Taystee wants nothing to do with [Suzanne’s notebook,] because it only
confirms that she never had a chance, and that she fought so hard against a
setup she had no way to overcome. And while Ward sees it as hope, that
strikes me as deeply naïve: why would a judge believe Suzanne, whose
sanity would surely be questioned by prosecutors? Obviously, I don’t want
Taystee to kill herself, but I also realize how broken she is, and that the
idea of trying again to revisit her case only to have it fall apart will only
break her more.63
Taystee’s instinct to disregard Suzanne’s notebook is an act of protection, as is her
insistence to Tamika that she “don’t have no more fight left.”64 Tamika, however, insists
upon the unknown: “You don’t know what’s gonna happen. You gotta keep fighting so
you can find out.”65 The bitter irony in this exchange is that Taystee does know that
Suzanne’s notebook will be of little use. She may concede to hope, and send the
notebook to her attorney, but doing so does not necessarily stop her from working to get
drugs from Daya.
By the end of episode eight, Taystee is in possession of a lethal dose of Fentanyl,
which she keeps hidden at her desk at the warden’s office. And yet, Taystee’s demeanor
noticeably shifts now that Suzanne’s book is with her attorney. Tamika persuades

232

Taystee to tutor Tiffany, who has recently learned in GED class that she has dyslexia.
When Tiffany’s GED teacher remarks upon her improvements, Tiffany gives her credit:
“Taystee’s actually really been helping me. And she ain’t so mopey anymore. It’s kinda
like a who-saved-who situation.”66 While it is true that Taystee is a talented teacher who
appears to enjoy working with students, Tiffany’s observation promotes two harmful
stereotypes. On the one hand, Tiffany appears to envision herself as a white savior, who,
by nature of needing a black woman’s academic help, has restored Taystee to some
semblance of her former self. On the other hand, that women like Tiffany are eager for
Taystee to emerge from their “mopey-ness” is a not so subtle demand that Taystee return
to playing the part of the “Strong Black Woman.” While this trope is a source of pride for
some black women, black feminist scholars like Joan Morgan have long demonstrated
that
the original SBW and her alleged ‘super strength’ was a myth created by
whites to rationalize their brutality. The contemporary SBW, however, is
our internalization of this mythology. Superhuman strength was the
salvageable shred of dignity remaining after sexism and racism ravaged
our images. In turn, we fabricated an identity out of it.67
That Tiffany wants Taystee to return to her strong black woman ethos is an
uncomfortable moment in which Tiffany neglects the pain that Taystee endures. The
expectation that Taystee be strong enough to survive her confinement under any
circumstances is a sentiment that is deeply rooted in white supremacist ideology. As
Morgan insists, “black women are not impervious to pain. We’re simply adept at
surviving.”68 Indeed, Taystee has done nothing but survive. The difference now is that
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Taystee has relinquished the strong black woman title, which makes white women—and
to an extent, black women in positions of power like Tamika, uncomfortable.
And yet, as Taystee continues to tutor Tiffany, their teacher-student relationship
flourishes. When the GED teacher abruptly resigns and Taystee gets a larger audience of
students, she appears to be genuinely happier. She begins to imagine other ways in which
she can make a positive impact, and even asks Mr. Caputo to help her initiate a microloan
program to decrease recidivism rates among newly released women. Episode twelve,
however, presents several highly anticipated events, including Taystee’s meeting with her
attorney and the GED exam. To begin with the former, Taystee’s meeting goes exactly
the way she feared it would. Her attorney reviewed Suzanne’s notebook, but does not
believe “it meets the evidentiary burden for a habeus proceeding.”69 Taystee tells her
attorney to “get the fuck out” of her life, and vows that she “ain’t never seeing [her]
again.”70 Taystee immediately goes to retrieve her Fentanyl, and has no trouble lying to
Tamika regarding the outcome of her meeting. In fact, she convinces Tamika to bring
Storky’s to the end of the semester party—an homage to the fast food restaurant Tamika
and Taystee worked at as teens. Tamika, unable to detect Taystee’s despair, happily
obliges. In the meantime, Tiffany—who soothed her GED anxieties with the knowledge
that she would receive extra time on her exam to accommodate her dyslexia—does not
get the extra time, due in no small part to CO Lusckeck’s incompetence. This leads
Tiffany to believe that she failed the exam.
At the end of the semester party, Taystee not only gets her last meal, she says
goodbye to important figures like Tamika and Mr. Caputo. Neither administrator picks up
on the finality of Taystee’s tone, though Daya is completely aware of how Taystee has
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orchestrated the evening. As Daya leaves with her crew of girls to “take this party up a
notch,” she bids Taystee farewell: “Finally got you last meal, huh? Guess I shouldn’t say
‘I’ll see you later,’ then. Well, at least you found your way out this place.”71 It is worth
mentioning that Daya makes these remarks to Taystee, who is seated next to Tiffany. As
such, one must wonder if Daya’s comments influence Tiffany’s decision to join Daya’s
crew in the laundry.
By the time Taystee leaves the cafeteria, clutching her Fentanyl in her hand as she
walks down the hallway, Tiffany is already dead. In fact, Taystee is among one of the
first to discover Tiffany as she passes the laundry en route to her cell. For a second time,
viewers encounter Taystee holding on to a dead woman’s body, crying out for help.
While it is reasonable to believe that Tiffany’s death snaps Taystee out of her own
suicidal ideation, it merely prolongs her process when a guard refuses to leave Taystee’s
cell that night. Taystee is forthright when Tamika comes to see her the next morning: “I
don’t wanna do this no more.”72 However, Tamika, like Tiffany, refers to the strong black
woman narrative when she insists that “tomorrow will be better.”73 Taystee doesn’t buy
it: “Tomorrow can also be worse. That’s been my fuckin’ experience.”74
Although Tiffany may have beat Taystee to it, Tiffany’s death does not dissuade
Taystee from taking her own life. If anything, it gives Taystee the opportunity to say
goodbye to Suzanne, after which she returns to her cell, and closes the door. As she sits
down on her bed and begins to unwrap the Fentanyl, a manila envelope catches her eye.
A note from Tamika appears on top: “Taystee—You made this happen. Tomorrow will
be BETTER. –T.”75 Enclosed are copies of GED certificates earned by the women she
tutored, including a certificate for Tiffany, who in the end, passed. It is at this point that
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Taystee pivots in her thinking and decides to live. She throws herself into creating the
Poussey Washington Fund, reaches a successful agreement with celebrity ex-con Judy
King, and by the end of the episode, is teaching financial literacy classes to soon-to-be
released women. From the perspective of McNutt, “with Taystee’s story hope wins. It
isn’t the justice she deserves, but it is a force for justice nonetheless, and a fitting end to
what evolved into the series’ most meaningful journey.”76 Nothing, however, has
fundamentally changed for Taystee, who must endure despite the fact and things are
predicted to get worse. Tamika’s exit from her role as warden signals as much: “I am
totally relieved. ‘Cause this job is too fucking much. And… those programs were never
gonna work. Those women are never gonna catch a break. The system will always be
what it is, and there’s not a damn thing I can do.”77 Upon realizing she cannot create
change, Tamika’s reaction undercuts the work that Taystee now finds meaning in.
Tamika may be able to walk away from the prison, but Taystee remains stuck in the same
situation. Taystee’s ability to positively impact women on the individual level is
worthwhile, but it does little to create the structural change she longs for.

Conclusion: Abolitionist Visions
Considering suicide as a mode of queer resistance illuminates the conditions of
confinement that many believe prisoners deserve to endure. In contesting the notion that
life is always worth living, I point to suicide’s queer potential for people condemned to
exist as socially dead subjects. In witnessing the increasingly deadly conditions of
confinement that the socially dead have come to endure, suicide must be considered as a
mode of resistance that is honored and respected, rather than situated as a personal failing
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or pathology. For those who insist on investing in the “life saving” work of
administrative suicide prevention in carceral settings, I question what type of life,
exactly, we wish to promote for incarcerated people. There is a distinct difference
between living and existing.
Without considering the full state of one’s life—including the multiple forms of
marginalization one is subjected to—administrative suicide prevention efforts merely ask
us to invest in keeping multiply marginalized people alive for the mere state-sanctioned
pleasure of exercising power and punishment. The suggestion that suicide prevention
strategies be improved in prisons, or that incarcerated people gain better access to mental
health care, are examples of reforms that fall short of instigating meaningful structural
change. In drawing upon scholars who theorize suicide as a form resistance, I risk
promoting suicide among incarcerated people who struggle to survive life in prison. I
caution my readers against reaching this conclusion—I do not wish to promote death,
celebrate self harm, or rejoice in the fact humans are moved to the liberatory potential of
death—though death certainly functions in that capacity. Rather, I wish to theorize
suicide as an act queer resistance that one may find refuge in when prohibited from
accessing life in a meaningful way.
When one engages with suicide as a mode of queer resistance, they react to the
way in which life has been arranged into an unlivable experience. The incidence of queer
resistance does not ask that we find hope in death, but rather calls for a serious
(re)engagement with questions pertaining to social control and the production of social
death. Queer resistance is always a response to a white supremacist, heteropatriarchal,
and capitalist state that predetermines which bodies live, and which bodies die.
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My call, therefore, is not to find hope in death, but to seriously engage in the task
of envisioning what it means to abolish carceral systems that maintain state power. This
level of deconstruction is only possible if “benevolent” practices like administrative
suicide prevention are interrogated for the ways they uplift carceral projects. In offering a
critical analysis of suicide, and administrative suicide prevention, I expose the ways
suicide benefits the carceral state, broadly construed, by sheltering acts of brutality
perpetrated by law enforcement and prison guards. The notion that administrative suicide
prevention efforts have been manipulated to serve the state’s interests demonstrates just
how carefully the state maintains life, especially from behind bars.
Queering the Carceral Cycle offers an historical account of the increasingly
deadly forms of violence that emerged over the past seventy years, but it also offers a
point of reference for activists and scholars who continue to fight for prison abolition in
the twenty-first century. Throughout this dissertation’s three case studies, I have argued
that queer acts of resistance have, and will continue, to prompt an increasingly violent
reaction from the state. Still, I maintain that queer logics and acts of resistance will
continue to carve a path toward abolition. Attempts to defeat elements of the carceral
cycle, as endeavored by feminists such as Miriam Van Waters, the members of the
Lexington Six, Assata Shakur, Alejandrina Torres, Siliva Baraldini, and Susan
Rosenberg, can, and must be applied to the ongoing and emerging carceral logics that
present in the twenty-first century. As this epilogue’s examination of Orange is the New
Black suggests, the carceral cycle, as Michel Foucault see it, only gets us so far. To
examine only the recurring production of social “deviants” into prisoners of the state,
without understanding the intersecting oppressions that enable that cycle, quite literally
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leads to a dead end. As such, prison abolition remains a queer and an intersectional
project that can lead not only to the defeat of the prison, but to the annihilation of carceral
logics that shape the way we think about harm and justice. Wherever the carceral cycle
remains intact, queer resistance will endure.
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